/ home / courses / ps12 /The Always Controversial Iraq War, Part 2(from PS12: Intro to IR)Continues the exchange from Part I.The Rebuttal to My Reponse to Original Question
Professor Slantchev,
First, I would like to thank you very much for such a thought out and detailed response to my question.  When I read it I could not get over your writing that all out for me.  Also, I would like to agree with the points you were making in the first and second paragraphs of your response.  However I am confused about other paragraphs.  It seems like we have not locked down a reason for the US to go to war.
In Paragraph 3 you make the point that we?ve escaped the financial strain of maintaining the ?no fly? zones, and the political and ideological burden of military bases in Saudi Arabia.  However that seems questionable on both counts.  The occupation has already cost more in casualties and tax payer dollars than a decade or two of ?keeping him in the box.?  Moreover, the bases in Saudi Arabia were merely convenient, given the many other available bases for our efforts in the region (Turkey, UAE, and carriers), as well as the fact that almost half of the sorties were coming off of US aircraft carriers already, it seems like one cannot use this as a justification for a full scale invasion.  
About Saudi Arabia, it seems that any smoldering anger we have quenched among devout Muslims by leaving their Holy Land has surely been equaled by the flaming hatred towards the Iraqi invasion.  
Now to put all of that into historical (can you call just over a year ago historical) perspective.  The UN (whose side I guess I am arguing) did not ask for ?indefinite? maintenance of the no-fly zones. One month prior to Bush declaring war on Iraq the UN inspection force had grown 10 fold and the UN wanted until November (this being March) for the much-enlarged inspection effort to find something, force Saddam to reveal something, or fail to do either and raise the real possibility that Saddam did not have WMD. 
Now again I am presumptuous enough to say that we agree on the point, ?A successful model would be contagious. IF it succeeds, and that's a big 'if'.?  It is obvious that a new democracy in Iraq will be an incredible boon to the US and all of the western powers.  However, if we believe in a ?rational actor model,? should we go to war on the ?hope? for a best-case scenario, or should we weigh the likelihood and costs of other outcomes.  It does seem like we have a lot to lose if this doesn?t work out.  Worst case, Iraq continues to decline into anarchy and US casualties continue to increase.  After 2 or 3 years when we are losing several thousand soldiers a month we lose our nerve and pull out (think Vietnam, Somalia, Beirut).  
Here, one of the main points of contention in made clear.  Which is more likely, failure or success, and do we have more to gain or more to lose.  If we believe that a failed Iraqi Democracy will be bad for us, we have to honestly assess the odds of success.  It?s not enough to believe that our invasion might produce good results, but that good results outweigh bad results in their desirability and their likelihood.
Even if we install a democracy in Iraq, can we assume that it will act in our interests?  Having enraged the Arab/Muslim world we are faced with the reality that a genuine democracy in the region means anti-American policies. 
Which may be morally acceptable as a price for spreading freedom, but contradicts your real-politick approach.  Iraq in particular, after a five-year occupation, will have particularly good reasons for hating us.  They will have died in large numbers at our hands, and larger numbers by each other?s hands on our watch.  We can?t help but be held responsible for the difficulties that we have triggered, especially since, as you say, it is hard to weigh what did happen against the counter-factual.  (By the way, does Iraq have a secular tradition to draw on?)
I agree that success in Iraq might mean lower oil prices; I don?t agree that this benefits only the Europeans and the Japanese.  When oil prices rise or fall in Japan/Europe/North America they rise or fall at essentially the same rate and time across the board.  Well this seems to strengthen your argument.  However, whether this world oil market will have anything to show for the hundreds or thousands of dead American soldiers is dependant on whether you believe in the ultimate success of our mission. 
9/11 was a terrible tragedy that changed the character of our country substantially and I grieve the fallen heroes of that day as much as any red-blooded American. However, I am not sure that it is true ?we? (meaning academics and informed policy makers?) have changed our own expectations about the risks of domestic terrorism especially since the danger Al Qaeda presented to the US was a grave concern since the Clinton era, this becoming crystal clear thanks to recent book releases.  It seems to me that if 9/11 did anything it gave GWB the political currency to go into Iraq - something he had apparently been trying to do since the first few weeks of his term. 
Next you argue that the statistical probability that Saddam was a danger does not matter and that confuses me because according to the models we have been learning in class the decision to go to war is made by rational actors who weigh the pros and cons of all things.  Let us assume that there was an X% chance that Saddam was helping terrorists and let us also assume that there is a Y% chance that by going into Iraq we have energized the roots of terrorism both in the region generally and Iraq in particular. (Honestly, do you think we are now more or less likely to have an Iraqi suicide bomber show up in this country?)  
If we fix Y at 50% then whether the result is likelier to be positive than negative depends on where X is in the range you gave.  So to answer your question, yes, we should and at least I do care whether the chance was 5% or 85% and unfortunately it is proving to be closer to the former rather then the later.
9/11 was a tragedy in proportions that I hope the US never sees in my lifetime but many things have come to light since the war began that show Saddam Hussein had nothing to do with it.  You even say it, ?The reason 30,000 more did not die in NYC was not because the Saudi terrorists did not try to kill them ?? pointing out that the terrorists were Saudi and not Iraqi. You say that saving 30,000 US citizens is worth the billions spent on the war and I say it?s worth a lot more than that.  I would have started this war if I knew it would save 30 US lives but based on the logic in the previous paragraph the invasion is as likely to cost 30,000 lives as it is to save them.
In your argument you suggest that this war is putting us in the good graces of countries like Pakistan, China and Russia.  Of course it is, by acting barbarically we?ve given them a green light to act likewise.  Obviously, our treatment of Iraqis does not compare with Chechnya or Tibet, nonetheless, we used to have principled arguments for objecting, and now we seem supportive of Russian and Chinese ?wars on terrorism.?  
We have also established the doctrine that vague fears justify invasion, which seems counterproductive in the long range ? what are the chances that our protests or UN sanctions will deter China from attacking Taiwan if that becomes militarily feasible in 20 years?  They are definitely lower than they were two years ago.  What happens when Russia or China attack another small country and cites the Bush Doctrine as justification?  We are just bringing this on ourselves. 
You mention that China likes the fact that we got it into the WTO.  Is this evidence that China is our good friend?  No, rather than evidence that we have friends, this represents the expenditure of political capital to wrangle support for an adventure that does not have a clear pay off.  China is not the only place we can see this cost of the war.  Eastern Europeans feel that they owe us a great debt for bringing down the Iron Curtain, and they see showing up in Iraq as a way to discharge that debt. 
About Europe.  Even if we don?t care what they think today, we will tomorrow.  It would be a remarkable historical precedent if we remained this dominant indefinitely, especially since we are pushing others into catching up by making them resent us unnecessarily.   You say that ?the Germans don?t have an army worth talking about, so they will always depend on the US for protection??  If Germany and Japan are militarily weak today, we should remember that they nearly conquered the world within living memory.  And just as the development of nuclear weapons allowed an impoverished and repeatedly war-torn Russia to hold Western Europe, Japan and the US all hostages for fifty years, we have to accept the possibility that the next shift in technology might again shift the balance of power. Yes, if the US were invaded, Europe would be anxious to help ? but that isn?t going to happen soon.  What will happen is a strengthening of the EU as a counterweight to US dominance, and a broader unwillingness to follow the American lead in areas of cooperation we have taken for granted. 
After 9/11 we had tremendous world support for the War on Terror but now we have completely lost any ability to persuade anyone on our good merits alone.  Worse, we have stretched our military out so thin that if a genuine crisis erupts who knows where we will get the troops and weapons to respond. 
The administration could not even get a small peace keeping force together to send to Liberia when it was obviously needed.   Our force structure has been designed to handle ?one-and-a-half? wars, and between Iraq and Afghanistan our hands are full doing just that.
What was and remains unclear to me is whether we have gained anything at all to balance out the sunk costs in blood, treasure, and goodwill.   I can?t figure out why we needed to go to war: we could have made friends with China and Russia in other ways; we could have distanced ourselves from Arab regimes much more easily; we haven?t saved any money or made any friends with the Arab public in leaving Saudi Arabia; angering the Europeans may not be much of a negative but surely isn?t a positive; and invading seems at least as likely to increase American lives lost to terrorism than to save American lives.  The only excuse Bush came up with that was remotely acceptable to anyone was WMD and that point needs no embellishment. 
In conclusion, please don?t flunk me.  I make this argument out of complete respect to further the discussion among my fellow students.  Thank you for drawing all of our attentions to this critical topic and thank you for the very interesting subject matter of this course.
[name removed]Poli Sci 12The Response
Hi,
This is pretty interesting. My responses are interspersed with your comments below.
 However I am confused about other paragraphs.  It seems like we have not locked down a reason for the US to go to war.
Agreed.
 In Paragraph 3 you make the point that we?ve escaped the financial strain of maintaining the ?no fly? zones, and the political and  ideological burden of military bases in Saudi Arabia.  However that seems  questionable on both counts.  The occupation has already cost more in casualties  and tax payer dollars than a decade or two of ?keeping him in the box.?  
That is so, I was merely pointing out that it is not clear that we could have (or should have) kept SH"in the box" indefinitely. It was just an example of costs that nobody seems to have acknowledged. Again,the war did cost more and will continue to do so. However, there will be benefits, both economic andpolitical for the US. Iraq can finally export its oil and use the money in ways better than building yetanother monument to SH. The modernization of the infrastructure is good for the companies that do it andfor the Iraqis who are employed and who will enjoy it once completed. We don't get to see many pictures ofthis these days, which is a shame really.
Another important thing to keep in mind is that keeping SH in the box was extremely costly for the Iraqis!Remember all the pain and suffering that sanctions were causing civilians while SH's cronies were contentto skim off huge profits from the lucrative business with the UN? This is a scandal in the making that willseverely damage the reputation of the organization when it comes out that it was not the much-maligned sanctionsthemselves that killed so many but rather the mismanagement of the programs designed to alleviate their impacton civilians. In other words, keeping SH in the box would have been more detrimental to Iraq than the brief war,and the painful reconstruction period. America destroyed a lot but it is also building a lot. I've no doubt thatmany in Iraq are better off right now than they ever were under SH.
So the bottom line would be that keeping SH in the box was more costly than normally acknowledged, both to theWest and to the Iraqis. Maybe not sufficient for war, but perhaps just enough to tilt the balance toward it.
 Moreover, the bases in Saudi Arabia were merely convenient, given the  many other available bases for our efforts in the region (Turkey, UAE, and  carriers), as well as the fact that almost half of the sorties were coming off of  US aircraft carriers already, it seems like one cannot use this as a  justification for a full scale invasion.  
Stationing US troops in SA was supposed to serve a deterrent purpose. I do not know whether SH was going toinvade SA (probably not), but there was some genuine fear that he just might. While it is true that the UScould use carriers (and I am all for abandoning the land bases and moving totally toward sea-based ones),stationing troops on the ground has the trip-wire effect that an aircraft carrier simply cannot provide. It'sgreat for launching strikes but not very useful for promising to do so. For deterrence purposes, you want thetroops in harm's way. Turkey, UAE, and others are simply off the list for that reason. They are useful, as youpoint out, for efforts in the region, but not for deterrence, which is what we were after with SH.
 About Saudi Arabia, it seems that any smoldering anger we have quenched among devout Muslims by leaving their Holy  Land has surely been equaled by the flaming hatred towards the Iraqi  invasion.  
We can do little about this anger. As I pointed out in class, a lot of it has very little to do with the US, whichis just a convenient target these days. The hatred was also flaming because sanctions were killing civilians inIraq. Was that our fault? Not really. But "the street" does not care. The hatred was there before the US cameand will be there after US leaves. There is not a whole lot we can do about it short of national suicide. Thehatred has deep historical roots and has to do much with the sense of relative deprivation that we discussed.The problem is that we can hardly satisfy many of these grievances without seriously jeopardizing our interests.I strongly believe that the only solution to the problem of hatred is democracy in the Middle East, nothing elsewould work. Do you think that if we abandon our "friendly" governments to the crowds right now, the people wouldrest content? Or do you think we shall get yet another repeat of Iran? After all, why are they still passionatelytrampling on US flags about something that happened over 30 years ago? Most of the people who do that today weren'teven born back then. This hatred is institutionalized and propagated by governments who have miserably failed theirown people and who need scarecrows to chase. 
 Now to put all of that into historical (can you call just over a year ago historical) perspective.  The UN (whose side I guess I am arguing) did  not ask for ?indefinite? maintenance of the no-fly zones. One month prior to Bush  declaring war on Iraq the UN inspection force had grown 10 fold and the UN  wanted until November (this being March) for the much-enlarged inspection  effort to find something, force Saddam to reveal something,  or fail to do either and raise the real possibility that Saddam did not  have WMD. 
Well, my take on this that the time for inspections ran out back in the 1990s when SH expelled them. Here's why.First, we could definitely count on evasive actions once the threat of imminent invasion receded. It is extremelycostly to maintain large forces far from home for extended periods of time, and it is politically costly to do sowhen there is no apparent need for them. SH only became 'cooperative' with the UN when he saw the US marinesdisembarking in his backyard. If we stopped then to give the UN more time, especially the time it demanded, wewould have had to pull them back. This would have given SH another breather and before long he would have beenback to his old game: give them a bit, then restrict them a bit, obfuscate here and there, and finally expel themwhen it is clear that international vigilance has slackened yet again. He had done it before, why should we expecthim to behave differently. Again, the 11th hour Iraqi concession to cooperate was only produced by the extremethreat of an imminent American action, not any willingness to demonstrate that WMD did not exist.
Second, put yourself in the president's shoes for a second. You run on a dumb platform to disengage America fromforeign adventures. Then 9/11 happens and suddenly you have to face the music. The CIA tells you that maybe SHhas some links with terrorists but then again maybe he does not. Nobody really knows. Even if he does not, wouldhe provide safe haven for elements scurrying out of Afghanistan once the inevitable hammer blow falls on it?Maybe. Even if not very likely, still not out of the question. SH may have been a secular Ba'athist but he didrevert to apocalyptic religious rhethoric when it suited him (much like Stalin switched, with great success,from communism to the defense of the motherland to inspire the Russians in 1941). So maybe he has links, maybehe hasn't. Maybe he'll help, maybe he won't. You do know he has some unaccounted for by inspections large amountsof biological agents. Maybe he'd share them, maybe he won't. What do you do? Do you sit back, keep SH in the box,hoping that nothing bad would happen? Do you take the risk of another 9/11 on your watch? Or do you take the safecourse of action and get rid of the possible threat? You know, people may now criticize Bush for the war, but theywould have crucified him if he caved in to French/German/UN demands and then another attack on the US happenedand was traced to SH. You think the 9/11 Commission was serious? If I were Bush, I would have opted for thecourse of action that would minimize the probable danger to US civilians also.
 boon to the US and all of the western powers.  However, if we believe in a ?rational actor model,? should we go to war on the ?hope? for  a best-case scenario, or should we weigh the likelihood and costs of  other outcomes.  
We should weigh the options, definitely. This is what we've been doing with you in this exchange. Maybe theBush administration did not engage all options seriously (I happen to think that they did not pay enoughattention to postwar planning), but that does not automatically make the war a bad decision.
 out.  Worst case, Iraq continues to decline into anarchy and US  casualties continue to increase.  After 2 or 3 years when we are losing several  thousand soldiers a month we lose our nerve and pull out (think Vietnam, Somalia,  Beirut).  
No, no, no! Iraq is NOT Vietnam. There is no foreign superpower supporting the effort. There is no base likeNorth Vietnam to which insurgents can retreat. There are no jungles in which to hide. Syria and Iran are perhapsscared enough not to provide overt aid and comfort. And if they try to do, we should go after them (notmilitarily). There won't be a point at which we shall ever lose soldiers in numbers anywhere close to thecasualties in Vietnam. The Iraqis do not have an army they can field. The Vietnam analogy is flawed in so manyways, I am astounded every time I hear it on the news and in print. It's perhaps worth pointing out that unlikeVietnam, a LOT of Iraqis do support the Americans.
The Somalia and Beirut analogies are more relevent and more troubling. I am afraid that we may lose our nerve,which is why I am following the current prisoner abuse scandal with great trepidation. If the most stupid andincredible thing happens --- Rumsfeld is fired or forced to resign --- then the Iraq effort may truly becomejeopardized. Why? Because DR embodies everything people in Europe and the Middle East do not like about the US,especially his willingness to use force in pursuit of national goals. Make no mistake, when the NYT calls forhis resignation, the scandal is just a convenient excuse, it is his policies that people dislike intensely, andone of these policies is an unwavering determination to see the Iraq war through to its end. If he goes, we maylose our nerve quicker still.
And then? If we withdraw prematurely, civil war is likely. Iran will probably back the Shias, who, while morenumerous than the Sunnis are not nearly as well organized. If the alternative is an Iran-style Shia-controlledIraq, the Kurds will probably not sit on the sidelines. And who will be blamed for all this? The US, of course.Should it? Of course not --- how is it our fault that Iraqis want to slaughter each other? Unless one arguesthat SH was good for Iraq, after all, he kept them all in check. 
 we believe that a failed Iraqi Democracy will be bad for us,
As long as we can stay a few years (4-8), the Iraqi democracy will survive. Why? Because it will work and lifewill be better. When people have more to lose, they are less likely to attempt to overthrow the status quo. Ourbig problem right now is keeping the Iraqis from slaughtering each other, that is the real threat, not theinsurgency which we can stamp out if we really go after it.
 Even if we install a democracy in Iraq, can we assume that it will act in our interests?  
No, but it is most likely to do so because it will want the US as a friend because of hostile neighbors. MiddleEastern regimes are not likely to be fond of another democracy in their midst.
 Having enraged the Arab/Muslim world we are faced with the reality that a genuine democracy in the region means  anti-American policies. 
Absolutely not. Surveys (see a book by Telhami called "The Stakes") consistently show that people admire our valuesbut seem to dislike our policies. Yet, a democracy in Iraq would go a long way to rectifying that. Not only willthe US have shown itself non-imperialist, but people would be able to see, for the first time, what a seculardemocratic regime can do for its citizens. 
   Which may be morally acceptable as a price for spreading freedom, but contradicts your real-politick approach.  
Ah, I get labeled a realist. But my pro-freedom arguments here and in class are anything but :)
 Iraq in particular, after a five-year occupation, will have  particularly good reasons for hating us. They will have died in large numbers at our hands, and larger  numbers by each other?s hands on our watch.  
I disagree about the first sentence and agree with the second. Iraqis die in larger numbers at each other's hands.How is this our fault? Should we institute a SH-like regime that would give them security without freedoms? No.They may blame the Americans for failing to prevent these killings but in the end they know that it is their fellowIraqis who are killing them. Instead of worrying about that, we should eliminate these insurgents. Maybe they'dlike us more if we rid them of these elements?
 We can?t help but be held responsible for the difficulties that we have triggered, especially since, as  you say, it is hard to weigh what did happen against the counter-factual.  
But we don't need a counterfactual here. We know what life under SH was like. The number of people killed in thewar is very far below the number this guy systematically butchered. The difficulties you are talking about areonly problems in comparison with a functioning state, which SH's Iraq was not. Well, people had running water butthey also had prisons in which thousands disappeared without a trace. Even our abuse does not come close to that.We may have unleashed hatreds toward other Iraqis that were suppressed by SH, much like Tito managed to suppressSerb hatred of Croats and Bosniacs. It will be our fault if we withdraw and allow them to slaughter each other,but it will be to our credit if we stay there to teach them to live in peace.
 (By the way, does Iraq have a secular tradition to draw on?)
Yep, the best in the region. Before SH came to power (and even for a while after he did), Iraq had the mosteducated elite. The socialists gained control in 1968 (11 years before SH took over).
 that if 9/11 did anything it gave GWB the political currency to go  into Iraq - something he had apparently been trying to do since the first few weeks  of his term. 
I doubt that this was the case. Wolfowitz probably did, but GWB ran on an anti-interventionist platform anduntil 9/11 seriously tried to implement it. I, for one, was quite worried that he might succeed in pulling theUS out of commitments that were truly important. I almost had a heart-attack when he pulled the US out of theABM treaty.
 Next you argue that the statistical probability that Saddam was a danger does not matter and that confuses me because according to the  models we have been learning in class the decision to go to war is made by  rational actors who weigh the pros and cons of all things.  
It does not matter in the following sense. Say the chance of another Arab terrorist attack is small, 1%. Supposethat there's a 1% chance that SH may help them (as per argument above). This now brings it up to 2%. Smallprobability but when 30,000 lives are at stake, even it looms exceedingly large. As you point out, we do have totake into account the possibility that going to Iraq would energize others, but I doubt it. Here's why. Thesuicide terrorists do not need another excuse to go after us. We exist, therefore we must be targeted. They maytalk about the Iraq war, but this would simply be yet another exercise in rhethoric. Many Iraqis (much more thanshown on TV and reported by journalists) support the Americans and many realize what would happen if we leave.Suicide bombers are not likely to come out of their ranks. Iraqis that are fighting the US now are not fightingfor liberation, they are fighting for the freedom to kill their fellow Iraqis. Would they send a suicide bomberto the US? They could, but it would be extremely stupid. Do you think Americans are Spaniards? Do you think we'llsay "Oops, sorry. Now that you've blown up another several thousand of us, we are firmly convinced that going toIraq was a bad idea. You win, we withdraw." Or do you think we'd go "To hell with these guys" and then flattenFalluja? Iraqis have no interest in terrorism against the US as it would only make matters worse for them. 
 particular. (Honestly, do you think we are now more or less likely to have an Iraqi  suicide bomber show up in this country?)  
Very unlikely. We were not getting blown up by Iraqis but by radical religious zealots who could not care lesswhat happens to Iraq. I could be wrong, of course, but I sure hope not. As per argument above, we should worryabout the fundamentalists that are bred in Saudi-sponsored madrasses.
 9/11 was a tragedy in proportions that I hope the US never sees in my lifetime but many things have come to light since the war  began that show Saddam Hussein had nothing to do with it.  
I don't think SH had anything to do with 9/11. But the Taliban did, and once we went to Afghanistan, the trickleof escapee terrorists would find its way to Baghdad, and we simply could not take the chance. Woodward's new bookseems to show as much in GWB's reasoning. Don't know about Wolfowitz but then again, he's not the president.
 previous paragraph the invasion is as likely to cost 30,000 lives as it is to save them.
I disagree. I simply do not see thousands of US deaths in this war. The recent months have been quite deadlyrelative to everything but a real war.
 used to have principled arguments for objecting, and now we seem supportive of Russian and Chinese ?wars on terrorism.?  We have also 
True. 9/11 woke us up to some of the realities that the Russians are facing. I am not keen on supporting Chinaon Tibet. The monks don't engage in terrorism. The Chechens, however, do, and were famous for it. Stalinresettled them precisely because they were so dangerous. Once they were allowed to return, they reverted totheir medieval clan structures and revenge binges.
 doctrine that vague fears justify invasion, which seems
Nope. There was nothing that vague about going to Iraq, as I tried to point out. There was plenty of uncertainty,but it is quite rational to be unwilling to run large risks when the stakes are so high. Does anyone honestlybelieve that the US will now wantomly go around the world knocking the heads of people it dislikes? (I mean morethan it used to?)
 the long range ? what are the chances that our protests or UN sanctions will deter China from attacking Taiwan if that becomes militarily  feasible in 20 years?  
If we relied on the UN, Taiwan would have been incorporated into the PRC a long time ago. It is American powerthat is keeping it independent, nothing else. If China becomes strong enough to disregard us, then it will alsodisregard the UN. It's not like protests helped prevent the Tiananment massacre or the atrocious treatment ofthe Falun Gong.
 happens when Russia or China attack another small country and cites the Bush Doctrine as justification?  
Nothing happens. Citing a doctrine is not enough and never has been. Every aggression in history was mountedunder a suitable pretext and excuse. Do you really believe that the Bush Doctrine would influence the behaviorof the Russians or the Chinese one way or the other? That if they thought something was in their interest, theywould not do it because Bush had not endorsed preemption? Or that when something is not in their interest theywould do it anyway simply because Bush did endorse preemption? If things were so easy, we could outlaw war rightnow by simply announcing the proper doctrine. No, the Bush Doctrine could be used as justification, but it willnever be the cause of anything. Each state will make its own decisions with or without it. Without it, there willbe plenty of other excuses.
 ourselves. You mention that China likes the fact that we got it into the WTO.  Is this evidence that China is our good friend?  No, rather than  evidence that we have friends, this represents the expenditure of political capital to  wrangle support for an adventure that does not have a clear  pay off.  China is not the only place we can see this cost of the war.  
I am not following. We did not get China into the WTO to win support for our foreign policies. It was simply agreat economic benefit to do it (for both us and them). We did use the WTO to get China to ease up on humanrights abuses, but that did not last: once they got in, they went right back. Some power just isn't fungibleenough.
 Eastern Europeans feel that they owe us a great debt for bringing down the Iron  Curtain, and they see showing up in Iraq as a way to discharge that debt. 
It's not a matter of paying a debt. This is not how support for the US is seen in EE. Rather, Eastern Europeansare cautious about their Western neighbors, and they know that there's great benefits from being friends with theUS. Also, EEs also honestly admire the US (you should go on vacation to Bulgaria and say you're an American, thencompare the way you are treated with the way if you do this in France). America still stands as the symbol ofeverything the communists had denied them. America did not save EE from the Iron Curtain, at least EE people donot usually think that way (after all, most of them lived behind it). However, it did provide the beacon of hopethat kept them going.
 About Europe.  Even if we don?t care what they think today, we will tomorrow.  It would be a remarkable historical precedent if  we remained this dominant indefinitely, especially since we are pushing others  into catching up by making them resent us unnecessarily.   
For our purposes, we will be dominant for quite some time, many, many decades. It is not just a matter ofresources, it's a matter of culture, secular rational organization, market capitalism, and a host of otherthings that one cannot imitate. In order to catch up with the US, a country would have to match all thesedimensions, and there is no country that can do that. United Europe, maybe, but that will not happen in this(or the next) lifetime. Our dominant role is a product of a complex set of forces, not mere physical resources.The USSR was rich in resources, and it did not help it. Our Western way of life has produced something that onlyanother Western nation can do. 
 protection??  If Germany and Japan are militarily weak today, we should remember that they nearly conquered the world within living  memory.  
Not the world: the Americas were never touched. You should remember that it was not the Germans or the Japanesewho went halfway across the world to conquer enemy territories. Americans did it. Even the British broke theirteeth on Afghanistan, and they were much closer. Never mind the Russians. And yet this country could deploy forcesat unimaginable distances and win wars on enemy territory. Once America geared up for war, Germany and Japan werelost for good. Never stood a chance. Trust me on this one. It does not matter how disciplined a worker you are,you cannot match what America can do when it mobilizes for war.
 hostages for fifty years, we have to accept the possibility that the next shift in technology might again shift the balance of power. 
Possibly. Except that this technological innovation will not come from a power unfriendly to the US. Do you thinkother nations can match the West in technical innovation? History shows that even in the rare circumstances thatthis happens, the West is usually quicker at borrowing, adapting, and improving than anyone else. Again, this isall due to social institutions that we've largely inherited from the Greeks and the Romans.
 happen soon.  What will happen is a strengthening of the EU as a counterweight to US dominance, and a broader unwillingness to  follow the American lead in areas of cooperation we have taken for 
Nope, the EU will not become a counterweight. For all the talk of unification, European governmentswill remain divided bitterly over foreign policy. Some may agree on being anti-American in some respects,but that's about it. The sheer number of languages, different cultures (all jealously guarded) prevent the sortof national unification that would be necessary for something like that. The EU is also deeply anti-democratic(it is run by an unaccountable technocratic elite) and hence viewed with deepening suspicion in Europe too. Iwould not worry much about that. The EU common defense has been talked about for years. The best they wouldmanage would be an expeditionary force of 30,000, if even that. Hardly a counter to anything.
 granted. After 9/11 we had tremendous world support for the War on Terror but now we have completely lost any ability to persuade anyone on our  good merits alone.  
Perhaps. But then again, we have a friend in Russia in these issues. Nothing to sneeze at. I also think thateventually the Europeans will come around. At some point the gloating over US difficulties in Iraq would haveto give way to concerns about the Iraqis, so they would have to step in and help.
 Worse, we have stretched our military out so thin that if a genuine crisis erupts who knows where we will get the troops and  weapons to respond. 
This is a genuine concern. Of course, there are still large untapped manpower resources in the US. Further, alot of the troops stationed throughout the world can probably be relocated if need be. 
   The administration could not even get a small peace keeping  force together to send to Liberia when it was obviously needed.   Our force  structure has been designed to handle ?one-and-a-half? wars, and  between Iraq and Afghanistan our hands are full doing just that.
Well, that's precisely what Rumsfeld's big contribution is: he restructured the armed forces turning them froma heavy troglodyte into a maneuverable force suitable for rapid deployment. That's why the army did not likehim much. He changed everything for them. I recommend the book 'Rumsfeld's War' for more on this.
 What was and remains unclear to me is whether we have gained anything at all to balance out the sunk costs in blood, treasure, and 
I hope this discussion is helping at least a bit. I am struggling with some issues myself.
 embellishment. In conclusion, please don?t flunk me.  I make this argument out of complete respect to further the discussion among my fellow students.  
Are you kidding? Why would I flunk you? I find this exchange quite interesting, otherwise I would not havebothered reading and responding at such length (and still would never have thought of flunking you).
 Thank you for drawing all of our attentions to this critical topic and
It is critical and it is devilishly difficult too.
Best,Branislav L. SlantchevAssistant ProfessorDepartment of Political ScienceUniversity of California, San Diego9500 Gilman DriveLa Jolla, CA 92093-0521