Readings for Week 7

Crisis Bargaining

1. Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model: James D. Fearon
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 2. (June, 1994), pp. 236-269.

2. Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes: James D. Fearon
American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 3. (September, 1994), pp. 577-592.

3. Capabilities, Perception, and Escalation: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Ethan R. Zorick
American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 1. (March, 1997), pp. 15-27.

4. Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining: James D. Morrow
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2. (June, 1992), pp. 153-172

5. Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining: James D. Morrow
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 4. (November, 1989), pp. 941-972.

6. Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games: Jeffrey S. Banks
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 34, No. 3. (August, 1990), pp. 599-614

7. Looking for Audience Costs: Kenneth A. Schultz
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 45, No. 1. (February, 2001), pp. 32-60.

8. Reagan and the Russians: Crisis Bargaining Beliefs and the Historical Record: Russell J. Leng
American Political Science Review, Vol. 78, No. 2. (June, 1984), pp. 338-355