

POLI 243
International Security

Winter 2002

9:00-11:50

<http://polisci.ucsd.edu/slantchev/courses/is/>

SSB 353

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DESCRIPTION: This course is intended for graduate students who have already taken the international relations core seminar. Knowledge of basic theories will be assumed. The goal is to expose the students fully to a comprehensive view of international security, with some reference to the past of the discipline, but mostly emphasizing the current state of the art theorizing in the area by providing a unifying conceptual framework for analysis.

REQUIREMENTS: The course requirements consist of class presentations (25%), participation (25%), and a paper (50%). The paper must be original research and is intended to fulfill the requirement for the comprehensive examination. Students must clear the topic with me first. I am not interested in reading lengthy literature reviews: Students will be expected to demonstrate ability to (i) identify a potential topic, (ii) formulate a plausible research design, (iii) carry out, at least in draft form, the required research. This is the most important accomplishment you can expect to take from this course.

GUIDELINES: This is a seminar and considerable participation by students is expected. The class format will be that of student presentations and discussions. Each student will be assigned a set of different readings and will be responsible for presenting them to the rest of us. Usually, between 3 and 4 papers can be usefully presented and discussed, although we shall probably be able to handle a few extra ones here and there. Everyone will be expected to come prepared to intelligently discuss the ideas, scope, and research design in the various readings.

I am not interested in critiques! I cannot emphasize this strongly enough. Graduate students are trained as attack dogs and are usually fairly good at being picky about obscure details. I could not care less. What I want to see is students understand how the different topics relate to each other, what the underlying strategic situation they describe, how one goes about developing theories, and how one can improve upon existing work.

READINGS: The readings will be drawn from a number of books and articles. The articles will be made available for download from the course website, either through JSTOR or locally. The following books are *strongly* recommended for purchase; we shall go over them in detail.

- Powell, Robert. 1990. *Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- Powell, Robert. 1999. *In the Shadow of Power*. Princeton: Princeton UP.
- Schelling, Thomas. 1960. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge: Harvard UP.
- Schelling, Thomas. 1966. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven: Yale UP.
- Downs, George W., and David M. Rocke. 1995. *Optimal Imperfection? Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions in International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton UP.
- Downs, George W., and David M. Rocke. 1990. *Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Blainey, Geoffrey. 1988. *The Causes of War*. 3rd Edition. New York: The Free Press.
- Rotberg, Robert I., and Theodore K. Rabb. 1989. *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- Jervis, Robert. 1970. *The Logic of Images in International Relations*. New York: Columbia.

SCHEDULE:

WEEK 1: ORGANIZATIONAL MEETING AND GAME THEORY

WEEK 2: DYNAMIC CONSISTENCY, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, BARGAINING

WEEK 3: TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

WEEK 4: BARGAINING THEORIES OF WAR AND THE ORIGINS OF PEACE

WEEK 5: CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

WEEK 6: CRISIS BARGAINING

WEEK 7: DOMESTIC POLITICS

WEEK 8: ALLIANCES

WEEK 9: ARMS RACES AND ARMS CONTROL

WEEK 10: REVIEW OF STUDENT PAPERS