

FINAL EXAMINATION

*Write your name and ID number on the front of the blue book. Answer both parts of the exam. This is a double-sided page. Write legibly. You have 3 hours to complete the exam.
Good luck!*

A. Answer any four of the following five questions.

1. Indicate the chief author for each of the following policies, publications, or pronouncements. (Put each answer on a separate line on the first page of the blue book.)
 1. Defense Perimeter speech
 2. No-Cities Doctrine
 3. Hungarian Revolt
 4. Alliance for Progress
 5. Peaceful Coexistence
 6. Nationalization of Suez Canal

2. From the class discussion and Richard Smoke's *National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma*, indicate which U.S. administration was chiefly responsible for initiating each of the following policies. (Put each answer on a separate line on the first page of the blue book.)
 1. Massive Retaliation
 2. Strategic Defense Initiative
 3. Flexible Response
 4. Containment
 5. Strategic Sufficiency
 6. Domino Theory

3. In their *U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies*, Watman and Wilkening argue that the most effective strategies for deterring regional adversaries from threatening U.S. interests may well be quite different from the deterrence strategies developed during the Cold War for dealing with the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Briefly, what is their argument?
4. Explain the difference between first and second-strike capabilities. How do these relate to the concept of MAD and the Strategic Triad doctrine?
5. In his book *Intervention*, Richard Haass makes a case both for the **timing** and the **amount** of force used in foreign interventions. Briefly, what does he argue?

B. Write a short essay on one of the following topics, but not both.

1. Discuss and evaluate the following argument. Whatever argument you wish to make, you should deal with potential counter arguments. Give historical evidence.

The history of the first 25 years after the Second World War suggests that the United States tended to take the Communist threat too seriously. It tended to see the Communists as far too potent and effective, and overestimated their military strength when the Soviet eagerness to pursue détente in the early 1970s clearly indicated their desire to live peacefully with the United States. It saw China as an effective enemy when China was undergoing disasters and famine. It overreacted in the Cuban Missile Crises when the Soviet Union, after all, only made a rather minor and understandable efforts to adjust the nuclear balance. A mellower, less hysterical policy should have been formulated to deal with the Communists.

2. During the Cold War, the nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union went through several stages, and each was associated with an American strategic doctrine. What were these stages and **main** doctrines? What were the issues a credible nuclear deterrence strategy had to deal with? What were some of the strategies pursued in the implementation of these doctrines? You can use insights from the film *Fail-Safe* to illustrate your argument about credibility.

Scoring Instructions

Each question in Section A is worth 12 points. The identification questions get 2 points for each correctly answered part unless indicated otherwise. The short answer questions get credit depending on the completeness and correctness of the answer. These are not meant to be too rigorous, so do not be too stingy with the points.

For the essay in Section B, use the following rough guideline:

- 43 points: A (solid, imaginative, thorough)
- 30 points: B (generally good)
- 18 points: C (sort of knows what's going on, notably flawed, quite incomplete)

If the essay is exceptionally good, you can award extra points, up to a total of 52. Usually there aren't more than several essays that will make this distinction.

Maximum score on the exam is 100: 48 for the first section and 52 for the second.

When grading, use a red pen and write the number of points awarded for each question in the margin next to the question. If you feel like it, add a brief comment explaining reasons for deductions. If you deduct more than 50% of the points for the question, you should definitely add a comment. This will help with the inevitable complaints afterward: You will be able to remember why you deducted points. Writing comments on the essays is especially helpful. Feel free to praise as well as criticize.

When done scoring an exam, write the total number of points for section A and the points for section B on the inside front cover of the first blue book. Write the total points for the exam underneath and circle that number. I will assign the letter grades after I correct for the differences between you and the other grader.

If there are some common mistakes that students repeatedly make, either in the short answers or the essays, let me know. You can email me with the information so I can take into account for the grading and include it as an explanation with the answers.

You have three days to grade the exams. I will need them back on Sunday, December 15, so I can assign the letter grades and submit them on Monday.

ANSWERS

1.
 1. Dean Acheson
 2. Robert McNamara
 3. Imre Nagy
 4. John F. Kennedy
 5. Nikita Khrushchev
 6. Abdel Nasser

2.
 1. Eisenhower
 2. Reagan
 3. Kennedy (1 pt. for Johnson)
 4. Truman
 5. Nixon
 6. Truman

3. See Watman & Wilkening, pp. 3-6. This does *not* require an explanation of the strategies themselves. A complete answer would mention all of the following and connect them to deterrence. The adversaries today, in contrast with the USSR, may (i) not understand the dangers and capabilities of modern weapons; (ii) not care much about the well-being of their citizens; (iii) be perceiving the status quo as disadvantageous and worsening. Any of these make them harder to deter because they either reduce the value of the status quo, the perceived ability of the U.S. to cause damage (and so undermines the credibility of the deterrent threat), or reduce U.S. ability to inflict pain.

4. First-strike capability is the ability to disarm the enemy completely (or almost so) with a first strike. A second-strike capability is the ability to survive an attack by the enemy and then deliver an effective retaliatory strike. Under MAD, both sides have second-strike capability (and so neither has first-strike capability). The Strategic Triad doctrine maintained that each of the three nuclear forces (ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers) could deliver a punishing nuclear strike on the USSR independently of the other two, providing a secure second-strike capability to the U.S.

5. See Haass, pp. 88-94. Haass argues for an early use of force instead of waiting for all alternative policies to fail because waiting may give the opponent an opportunity to prepare, among other things. Also, decisive use of force early on (even if this requires “too much” of it) is better than gradualism or too little force for military reasons.

ANSWERS

1. The argument can go either way, but it should deal with counter arguments for full credit. Also, each of the points mentioned in the statement must be discussed. Look for appropriate use of historical evidence.

Agreement might point to notions, such as those from Kennan, that suggest that Communism was fatally flawed, the economic system was spotty, there were problems with leadership, and that eventually the system would collapse. Much of Khrushchev's threats were empty bluffs, deriving from fear rather than strength. The split with China clearly indicated possibilities to weaken the bloc from within. The Soviets wanted détente because of domestic economic problems, worsening relations with China, turmoil in Eastern Europe.

Disagreement might point to the value of erring on the safe side, that the U.S. policymakers did revise policies when they learned more about the USSR and a lot of the most aggressive stance was taken when there was not enough information about the Soviets, which seemed fairly potent. The essay might point to the Korean War as an example of premeditated aggression. China encouraged wars of national liberation, which also threatened U.S. interests. The desire for détente was also a desire to get breathing space and build a formidable military with which to stand up to the United States.

2. The essay should display understanding of the evolution of strategic doctrine, which was prompted by the changing nuclear balance. As the United States went from nuclear monopoly to parity with the USSR, the requirements of deterrence also changed. The students should identify (i) monopoly until 1949; (ii) overwhelming superiority until 1957; (iii) the "missile gap" period; (iv) the second era of superiority until the 1970s; (v) the Soviet buildup during the 1970s; (vi) Reagan's buildup in the 1980s. The doctrines listed should *at least* include Massive Retaliation, Flexible Response, and MAD (these three are required). Other possibilities include Graduated Deterrence, Flexible Targeting, Strategic Sufficiency, Countervailing Strategy, and SDI. A discussion of the delicate balance of terror, damage-limiting, counterforce/countervalue strategies should earn bonus points. From the perspective of deterrence, the essay should emphasize how each doctrine had to deal with the credibility of the U.S. deterrent threat given first-strike and/or second-strike capability. Some of the strategies designed to implement these capabilities were: ground/air alert, fallout shelters, evacuation, silo hardening, and missile defenses.