The Myth of Security through Expansion

Great powers in the industrial age have shown a striking proclivity for self-inflicted wounds. Highly advanced societies with a great deal to lose have sacrificed their blood and treasure, sometimes risking the survival of their states, as a consequence of their overly aggressive foreign policies. Germany and Japan proved so self-destructive in the first half of this century that they ended up in receivership. Most other great powers, including the United States and the Soviet Union, have exhibited similar tendencies from time to time, but they were better able to learn from the adverse reactions their aggressive behavior provoked.  

In this book I try to explain why overexpansion has been so common among the great powers, and also why some states have been particularly inclined toward extreme overexpansion. I offer a two-step explanation, stressing the role of strategic concepts and their function as ideologies in domestic politics.

Counterproductive aggressive policies are caused most directly by the idea that the state's security can be safeguarded only through expansion. This idea, the central myth of empire, was the major force propelling every case of overexpansion by the industrialized great powers. In the more egregious cases, the belief in security through expansion persisted tenaciously despite overwhelming evidence that aggressive policies were actually undermining the state's security.

The myth of security through expansion originated in each case as a justification for the policies of domestic political coalitions formed among groups having parochial interests in imperial expansion, milit

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1. This history of overextension is recorded in Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York, 1987); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, 1981); and Michael Doyle, Empires (Ithaca, N.Y., 1986).
Military preparations, or economic autarky. These groups, including economic sectors and state bureaucracies, logrolled their various imperialist or military interests, using arguments about security through expansion to justify their self-serving policies in terms of a broader public interest in national survival.

These opportunistic strategic justifications were propounded not only by the narrow interest groups themselves but also by the statesmen who tried to reconcile the groups' competing programs within the ruling coalition. Often the proponents of these strategic rationalizations, as well as the wider population, came to believe them. The political and intellectual entrenchment of these myths hindered strategic learning and reinforced the impetus toward overexpansion. Even the pro-imperial elites became entrapped in this political and ideologically dynamic, which in several cases hastened their departure from positions of power and privilege.

Understanding the myth of security through expansion and its origins is the first step toward solving the recurrent problem of self-defeating aggression among the great powers. This introductory chapter identifies the recurrent myths of empire, describes the varieties of overexpansion those myths have led to, and sets my arguments in the context of traditional explanations for overexpansion offered by historians and political scientists. The next chapter lays out competing theories of overexpansion in more detail. Subsequent chapters test those theories in the light of case studies of Germany, Japan, Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States at the height of their expansionist impulses.

Hydra-Headed Rationales for Expansion

Statesmen and strategists have typically envisioned a world in which security is scarce and expansion is the best route to it. Like Catherine the Great, they have commonly contended that empires must either expand or die: "That which ceases to grow begins to rot." They have often argued that costly wars must be fought in the hinterlands to prevent the empire from collapsing like a row of dominoes. Encircling alliances can best be broken up, they have claimed, by threats and preventive aggression rather than by appeasement. Reasoning this way, statesmen and strategists have recurrently created situations in which expansion and war have seemed unavoidable, even for states motivated primarily by the desire for security.2

In making these arguments, statesmen have exaggerated the benefits of expansion for both themselves and their opponents while underestimating costs. Likewise, they have exaggerated the probable success of offensive or expansionist strategies while underestimating the prospects of defensive measures and retrenchment.3 Such views, though present to some degree in all the great powers, have been most extreme in Germany and Japan.

Underpinning the central idea that security requires expansion are a variety of more specific strategic conceptions that in varying mixtures have provided hydra-headed justifications for aggressive policies. These concepts can be grouped under three general premises: gains and losses are cumulative; the offense has the advantage; and offensive threats make others more cooperative. Together, these assumptions portray the international system as a place where the balance of power does not operate and where opponents are made more tractable by having their vital interests threatened.

The Domino Theory: Cumulative Gains and Losses

The first category of myths of empire, cumulative gains, purports to explain why expansion will add to the state's strength and, consequently, to its ability to defend itself.4 Conquest increases power, in this view, because it adds resources, both human and material, that can be used in further competition against other great powers. Vulnerable areas at the periphery are depicted as El Dorados, cheap to conquer yet harboring vast resources that must be acquired lest they fall into the hands of opponents. The lure of conquest is especially strong for states that are just short of self-sufficiency in the resources needed for war, since it can be argued that a grab for autarky can fundamentally improve their security. Imperial Japanese expansionists in particular stressed this rationale, though they found that with each outward push autarkic security was still out of reach.

Just as proponents of expansion have promised that cumulative gains will lead to imperial security, so too they have warned that losses in the empire's periphery can easily bring a collapse of power at the imperial core, through any of several mechanisms: a cumulative erosion of economic and military resources; the increasing difficulty of imperial defense owing to the loss of strategic forward positions; or the progressive abandonment of the state by its allies, who might infer that it would not live up to its commitments.


3. Van Evera, "Causes of War."

Relatively satisfied powers like Britain and the United States have been especially prone to this domino theory. In a particularly inventive instance, accepted even by the skeptical and astute prime minister Lord Salisbury, Britain anticipated that a handful of French explorers might claim the outpost of Fashoda in the trackless hinterlands of the Upper Nile and somehow dam the river, destroying Egypt's economy and provoking an anti-British revolt that would lead to the loss of the Suez Canal, thus cutting the Royal Navy off from India, which would lead in turn to an Indian mutiny and ultimately to the collapse of the entire British economy. Though none of the steps in this chain of reasoning stands up to scrutiny, it seemed plausible enough to both the French and the British to bring them to the brink of war in 1898.  

Offensive Advantage

A second category of imperial myths holds that the best defense is a good offense. This view asserts that cumulative gains in the imperial periphery can be reaped through aggressive action, whereas passivity will bring cumulative defeats. For example, the solution to security problems at the "turbulent frontier" of the empire is to conquer still more territory in order to punish or prevent harassment by contiguous barbarians. Likewise, it is held that the cheapest way to forestall cascading dominoes is to prevent the fall of the first one by a forward defense. Like the deployment of a few good Greeks in the pass at Thermopylae, active measures at the periphery allegedly allow a cheap defense of empire, whereas defending farther back, after the dominoes gather momentum, might be impossible at any price. Over the past two centuries, great powers have repeatedly fought costly, unsuccessful wars in Afghanistan, all justified by the alleged cost-effectiveness of forward defense of vulnerable imperial holdings.

Likewise in direct military showdowns between great powers, attack is often held to be advantageous. States must always be prepared, in this view, for preventive aggression against competitors whose rising power might someday outstrip them. Moreover, the benefits of sur-


Paper Tigers and Bandwagons: Faith in Threats

A third contribution to the belief in security through expansion is the idea that threats make other states compliant. This belief leads to the paper tiger image of the adversary: the main opponent is seen as an implacable foe posing an immense security threat, yet at the same time as too weak, inert, or irresolute to combat aggressive countermeasures. Applied to allies and neutrals, this idea leads to "bandwagon" predictions. That is, third parties, instead of forming alliances to balance the power of the most threatening state, are expected to jump on the bandwagon and support its emerging hegemony. Threatening behavior is expected to attract allies and to intimidate opponents. In other words, the basic principles of the balance of power are held to operate in reverse.

Though moderate forms of such paper tiger and bandwagon beliefs have been common among most great power statesmen and strategists, they have been most extreme in Germany and Japan. Wilhelmine naval strategists argued, for example, that Britain would use its naval superiority to strangle Germany's world trade, yet would not seriously contest a German attempt to close the gap. Likewise, the Germans saw the encircling Entente as unalterably bent on Germany's destruction, yet so irresolute that a showdown would lead to the Entente's humiliation and disintegration. The Japanese concocted similarly paradoxical views of their opponents. Colonel Ishiwara Kanji, a staff officer who played a key role both in instigating the occupation of Manchuria and in devising a strategy for an autarkic empire, decided in the early 1920s that all-out war between Japan and the United States was inevitable, given America's inherently rapacious nature. At the same time, Ishiwara counted on the United States and Japan's other foes to be so somnolent that they would allow Japan to conquer, piecemeal, the resource base that would let it successfully prosecute this war.

Soviet theories of détente under Khrushchev and Brezhnev had a similar ring: the United States was so aggressive that it would accept détente only if handcuffed by a shift in the military and political "correlation of forces" in socialism's favor; yet it was so passive that it would allow the handcuffs to be slipped on.13 The main difference is that the Soviets retreated when this image of the United States was disconfirmed, whereas the Germans and Japanese pushed the theory to its ultimate test, hoping that a preventive war would decisively weaken their paper tiger opponents.

Together these strategic concepts create a powerful justification for a policy of security through expansion. If the world really were as these ideas portray it even status quo states would have to embark on endless war and expansion to maintain their security. This book will show that imperial overexpansion correlates closely with the prevalence of these concepts in a state's discourse on national security. The states in which these ideas were most prevalent adopted the most self-defeating aggressive policies and were the least able to correct their overexpansion."

OVEREXPANSION: THE CONSEQUENCE OF IMPERIAL MYTHS

The strategy of gaining security through expansion is rarely effective because the ideas underlying it contradict two of the most powerful regularities in international politics: the balance of power and the rising costs of expansion. Statesmen who base their strategy on the myths of empire are likely to undermine their power and security by provoking an overwhelming coalition of opposing states, which I call "self-encirclement," and by persistent expansion into the hinterland beyond the point where costs begin to outstrip benefits—or "imperial overextension."

Scholars have typically treated these two problems separately; some studies address the great powers' wars in Europe, for example, while others study "imperial overstretch" at the periphery. But since I argue that the two have common roots in strategic myths and domestic politics, I refer to them jointly as overexpansion. Some states, because of their strategic situation and domestic political alignments, have suffered primarily from self-encirclement; others, primarily from imperial overextension; some have experienced both.

Self-encirclement results from a basic principle of the balance of power: that the most aggressive states make the most enemies.14 When a state indiscriminately threatens many of its neighbors, they normally coalesce against it. In response, if it is incapable of evaluating its own role in causing the encirclement, it may embark on "preventive" war to break the ring. But if the balance of power works as it normally does, this attempted breakout will entail high risk and a low probability of success, and the aggressor will normally find overwhelming power ranged against it. For example, at the onset of war in 1914, Britain, France, and Russia enjoyed a three-to-two advantage over Germany and Austria in most indicators of industrial capacity. Even after Germany knocked Russia out of the war, the ratio climbed to five to two once the United States joined in.15 Similarly, in the Second World War, Germany, Japan, and Italy provoked an opposing coalition that by 1943 was outstripping them three to one in armaments production, despite the conquests by the Axis powers.16

States that are better learners may provoke an encirclement but then shy away from war or even begin to appease some of their enemies. Britain, for the most part, has been a good learner and an astute appeaser, which explains, as Paul Kennedy put it, "why the British Empire lasted so long."17 When Lord Palmerston flirted with the idea of expanding the Crimean War into a world war to extinguish Russian power permanently, neutral powers and Palmerston's own allies objected and the British cabinet convinced him to sign a compromise treaty.18 Likewise, Britain's aggressive colonial expansion in the scramble for Africa left it at odds with every major European power by the turn of the century. Calculating the disastrous erosion of the naval balance this could cause, Britain quickly ended its "splendid isolation," settling disputes with Japan, France, and Russia and thereby strengthening its hand in the competition with Germany.19

Some argue that Britain learned the lessons of appeasement and retrenchment too well between the world wars, jeopardizing its security through strategic passivity. In this view a preventive war against

14. Realist theory has been ambiguous about whether states balance against the most powerful state or the most threatening state, taking into account both power and intentions. Walt, Origins of Alliances, 21-26. 263-66. argues unambiguously and persuasively for the latter view.
16. Kennedy, Rise and Fall, chap. 7.
18. This is argued most vigorously by Winfried Baumgart, The Peace of Paris, 1876 (Santa Barbara, Calif., 1981), though note the qualifications that I add in chapter 5.
Germany in 1936 or 1938 would have forestalled the conquest of France and enhanced Britain's security. Indeed, if there was any instance of 'underexpansion' by the great powers in the industrial era, this was it. But even this case is doubtful. Britain and France may have been too weak to launch a preventive attack, which would have been counterproductive and onerous diplomatically. Moreover, one of the reasons Neville Chamberlain had to appease Hitler at Munich was that so much of Britain's strength was diffused throughout a far-flung empire. France had similar problems. So pervasive is overextension that even the archconservatives and archretrenchers suffer from it.

Another state that combined overassertiveness with quick learning is the Soviet Union. Belligerent behavior in the Berlin crises, the Korean War, and the Sino-Soviet rift provoked an array of potential enemies that outnumbered the Warsaw Pact nations by more than three to one on national income. But the Soviets have been good learners in the last run and have followed each of their counterproductive military moves with attempts to defuse opposition through self-restraint and gestures toward detente.

There is also imperial overextension. Aggressors get into trouble not only because they provoke balancing coalitions by other great powers, but also because they get stuck in quagmires in the hinterland. Up to a point, imperial expansion may be a paying proposition for a strong power. Sometimes resources and markets can be gained more cheaply and reliably by military than by economic means. The historical experience of all empires shows, however, that at some point the costs of additional expansion begin to outstrip its benefits. Easy, nearby targets that yield a high return are exhausted. The logistic burdens of further expansion make it easier for an opposing coalition to impose heavy costs by resisting.

All the industrial great powers have at times expanded past the point where marginal costs equal marginal benefits, in terms of both economic and security interests. Even Britain had its Boer War and its recurrent forays into Afghanistan in the face of repeated lessons that this remote land was beyond the perimeter of Britain's sustainable power. Britain, however, was relatively successful at calculating the marginal costs and revenues of expansion; it almost always learned to retreat in the face of negative feedback. Similarly, the Vietnam War caused most of the outcomes it was designed to forestall: it touched off more than a decade of inflation, starved America's regular military forces of funds, demobilized domestic support for America's global role, sowed dissension in NATO, and encouraged Soviet geopolitical assertiveness in the 1970s. As a consequence, Americans learned fairly quickly that Vietnam, and many other places in the Third World, were beyond America's sustainable perimeter of empire.

Britain and America were good learners, but Japan drew exactly the wrong conclusions about overextension. Japan strove to conquer China so as to have an autarkic military-industrial base. By 1937 the China campaign was in fact eating up Japan's industrial base, diverting expenditures from industrial investment into current military consumption. But unlike Britain, Japan did not appease and retreat. Instead it gambled on still more expansion to cut off supplies to China and conquer resources even farther afield, in Southeast Asia. As a consequence, Japan wound up both mired in China and with an overwhelming great power, the United States, against it.

**The Origins of Overexpansion and Imperial Myths**

Why has self-punishing overexpansion been so prevalent among the industrialized great powers? And why has the myth of security through expansion been so widespread? Existing explanations are inadequate for several reasons. Many writers fail to distinguish between the

25. Lake, *The State and Grand Strategy* (forthcoming), argues that this is especially true for certain types of "rent-seeking" states.
26. Gilpin, *War and Change*, chaps. 3 and 4, argues that states expand to the cost-benefit equilibrium, but then the equilibrium line recedes as a result, inter alia, of the diffusion of the expansionist's technological and organizational innovation to its competitors and subjects. In this interpretation, disequilibrium comes not from expanding past the equilibrium line, but from the failure to retreat when the equilibrium line recedes. Though the process Gilpin describes undoubtedly occurs, in the cases I examine states also overexpand in the direct sense of pushing beyond the cost-benefit equilibrium in the first place.
27. For example, see Yapp, *Strategies of British India*, 335, 341–43.
28. This is apparent in Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger's exclusionary criteria for the use of American military forces abroad; see *Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1987* (Washington, D.C., 1986), 78–79.
specific problem of overexpansion and the more general "imperialism" or "expansionism." Much imperial expansion is unproblematic: the strong conquer the weak because it pays. And many explanations are flawed because they take the justifications of statesmen and strategists at face value—they accept the myths of empire advanced by imperialists as plausible depictions of the realities of international politics and hence as adequate reasons for overexpansion. For example, Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, extremely influential historians of Victorian overseas expansion, argued that "if the papers left behind by the policy-makers are to be believed, they moved into Africa, not to build a new African empire, but to protect the old empire in India." But newer research suggests that those papers are not to be believed: the oblique and strategic justifications found in them were largely debating points masking a variety of economic, bureaucratic, and political interests. Finally, some theories do treat strategic ideas as myths, but they omit key aspects of the origins and workings of those myths. Though on the right track, these accounts are not fully satisfying, theoretically or empirically.

Interpretations of overexpansion offered by historians and political scientists can be grouped into three general types: "Realist" explanations, stressing the exigencies of the state's position in the international system; cognitive explanations, stressing purely intellectual errors in strategic assessment; and domestic political explanations, stressing interest groups, ruling classes, and the strategic ideologies they propound.

Realist Explanations

Realism contends that the costs and risks of aggression may be unavoidable in an anarchic international environment that forces states to use warlike means to guarantee their own security. Realists argue, in essence, that the "myths of empire" are not always myths. Sometimes offense really does have an advantage, and dominoes do fall. Sometimes it does make sense, they claim, to seek a more self-sufficient empire with a more geographically defensible frontier. In general, they argue, the more vulnerable states are to the depredations of others, the more aggressive they must become, if only in self-defense.

On its face it sounds paradoxical to explain counterproductive overexpansion as a rational expedient, but it is not. Political scientists, drawing an analogy between international politics and the mathematical game "Prisoners' Dilemma," have shown how states' rational, defensive choices can draw them into competitive interactions that leave everyone less secure. If a nonexpansionist policy would have left the state even more vulnerable to its competitors, a grab for security through expansion would then be rational despite its predictably high costs and low chance of success.

Historians have sometimes explained instances of overexpansion in much this way. Germany and Japan, for example, are sometimes portrayed as driven to expand by the logic of their disadvantaged, vulnerable position in the international system. Surrounded by potential enemies on whom they were economically dependent, these latecomers to imperial competition had little choice but to use force to break out of the hostile encirclement. Though their bids for security through expansion may have had relatively little chance of success, less aggressive strategies might have been even riskier.

There are two general problems with Realist explanations for overexpansion, one logical and one empirical. The logical difficulty is that Realists themselves claim that states typically form balancing alliances to resist aggressors. Therefore, at least in the long run, the balance of power that arises out of international anarchy punishes aggression; it does not reward it. Consequently, strategies of security through expansion violate the basic principles of international politics that the Realists themselves have articulated.

To resolve this contradiction, it may be helpful to distinguish between two variants of the Realist argument. Both accept that security is normally the strongest motivation of states in international anarchy, but they have opposite views about the most effective way to achieve
overexpansionist empire builders.\textsuperscript{38} Open-eyed, they gambled for great stakes but lost. The problem with this view is that such statesmen and strategists rarely were open-eyed or candid about the security risks of their aggressive policies. On the contrary, they always argued that expansion was the best way to solve the state's security problems. Retrenchment and stand-pat passive defense were always portrayed as riskier than aggression.

Judging from the experience of the industrialized great powers, rational reaction to compelling international circumstances never suffices to explain overexpansion. Yet international conditions, including the behavior of other great powers, did increase the plausibility of myths of empire. The more closely the real international system approached the Hobbesian caricature of it, the easier it was to sell imperial myths in domestic political debates.\textsuperscript{39} In this sense, I do not deny that international conditions affect grand strategy. I simply argue that they are not by themselves an adequate reason for overexpansion or for the conflictual character of great-power relations.

Two additional theories, rooted in cognitive psychology and in domestic politics, agree that the belief in security through expansion is erroneous. They disagree, however, about the source of the error.

\textbf{Cognitive Explanations}

It is sometimes claimed that the ideas I call the myths of empire have their origins in purely intellectual biases—that strategic ideas, like other beliefs, are learned from formative experiences. For simplicity, people reduce these lessons to schematic, ossified axioms that persist in the face of disconfirming evidence.\textsuperscript{40}

Consequently statesmen and strategists—indeed, whole generations—might come to believe in falling dominoes, bandwagons, and paper tigers if they faced such conditions during their intellectual development. The Munich analogy, for example, is often blamed for the United States' exaggerated concern over the disgrace of backing down in peripheral disputes. Historians of other empires as well often identify some purportedly formative lesson that predisposed imperial statesmen toward costly, self-defeating strategies.

Yet though such lessons should be rare, the myths of empire are common. Formative experiences might occasionally lead to a belief in

\textsuperscript{38} For example, see the characterization of Adolf Hitler by Robert Jervis, \textit{Perception and Misperception in International Politics} (Princeton, N.J., 1976), 51.

\textsuperscript{39} See Jack Snyder, "International Leverage on Soviet Domestic Change," \textit{World Politics} 42 (October 1989): 1-30.

\textsuperscript{40} Jervis, \textit{Perception and Misperception}, esp. chap. 6.
security through expansion, but overall the available stock of lessons points in the other direction. Any straightforward reading of history should produce many more statesmen predisposed against such strategies than in favor of them.

In fact, statesmen pick and choose among the available lessons of history until they find one that fits the strategy that they want, for other reasons, to adopt. For the same reason, moreover, the lessons they draw from events are often perverse. Observing the fate of Germany in World War I, for example, the Japanese military concluded that aggression leads to diplomatic isolation and defeat, but that Japan needed to conquer an autarkic economic base in order to fight a long war successfully.41

Purely intellectual errors may sometimes contribute to imperial myths, through the influence of formative lessons as well as other kinds of cognitive biases.42 But the beliefs of imperial policymakers—the "official mind" of the Victorian empire builders, the "operational code of the Politburo," the Japanese Bushido warrior code, and the American Cold War consensus—must be understood primarily as social, political, and ideological, not cognitive.

Domestic Political Explanations

Existing domestic political explanations for overexpansion contend that self-serving imperialist groups "hijack the state" and pervert national policy in the pursuit of private interest.43 Two of the most famous theories of imperialism are of this type: the Hobson-Lenin thesis blames the drive of monopoly capitalists to export surplus capital so as to forestall declining returns to investment, and the Schumpeter thesis blames atavistic military-feudal elites whose social predominance depends on maintaining a rationale for their obsolete warrior function.44

Though they point to different culprits, the logic of these two theories runs parallel and can be expressed as a more general explanation: though overexpansion hurts the society as a whole, it is attractive to some groups within society. The benefits of expansion are disproportionately concentrated in their hands, while the costs of expansion are largely borne by the state and thus diffused throughout the society in the form of taxes, conscription, or (for imperial tariff protection) higher prices for consumer goods. By justifying their parochial interests in terms of national security, imperialist and military interest groups seek to pass the costs of aggressive policies on to society as a whole. The more powerful and persuasive such groups are, the more the state will be inclined toward self-defeating aggression.45

The problem for this kind of theory is to explain how narrow interests can succeed in hijacking state policy. Groups with very narrow interests normally lack the power or authority to harness the state for their own ends. Other interests that are harmed by costly, counterproductive imperialist policies—not least the interests of the state itself—should stand in their way. Effective propaganda might sometimes persuade the people and their leaders of the benefits of expansion, but studies have shown that interest groups' direct appeals are viewed skeptically. The credibility of narrow interest groups normally is far outstripped by that of national leaders, if they are popular, and disinterested experts.46 For these reasons, interest group theories bear a heavy burden of proof in showing how narrow groups can dominate state policy and national perceptions.

Another kind of domestic explanation faces the opposite problem. These theories blame not a particular narrow class or sectoral interest, but the state apparatus or the ruling class as a whole. They argue that the governing elite may exaggerate foreign threats and glorify imperial projects to justify extracting resources from society, to cloak its rule in the legitimacy of nationalism, and to defuse domestic challenges to its domination. The ruling elite, in this view, does not necessarily benefit from war and expansion per se, but it profits from the nationalism, social solidarity, and social mobilization that go along with it. War and overexpansion are merely the unintended by-product, produced when the governing elite or the society comes to believe the mobilizing propaganda, or when other states react aggressively to the social-imperialist fanfare.47

41. Some historians, insufficiently critical of documents written by the officials they study, accept these "lessons" at face value. Even a tough critic of Japanese militarism like Michael Burhanshults into this error. See, for example, Burhanshult, Japan Prepares, 9, 18, 19, on Japanese learning from World War I.

42. The historiographical literature stays mainly on the plane of beliefs and historical lessons. Therefore, in the case studies, this is the only cognitive explanation I try to test. In chapter 4, however, I pull together a somewhat broader cognitive explanation for strategic misperceptions based on hypotheses in Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1980); Jervis, Perception; and Deborah Welch Larson, The Origins of Containment (Princeton, N.J., 1983).


44. J. A. Hobson, Imperialism (1902); V. I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916); Joseph Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes (1919).

45. The progenitor of this line of argument is Hobson, Imperialism. Closer to my own formulation of it is Van Evera, "Causes of War." My use of the terminology of rent-seeking cartels to describe imperialist interest groups derives from Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven, Conn., 1982).


Myths of Empire

These theories have no trouble explaining how the governing elite harnesses state power or exploits the inherent credibility and vast propaganda resources of the state. Their problem is not with power, but with motivation. Powerful interests such as “the ruling class” have a major stake in the long-run health of the society as a whole. They suffer directly from the costs of overexpansion. Up to a point, these costs can be passed on to the society at large, but this risks alienating the population and undercutting its productivity. Unless quickly corrected, this is a self-defeating strategy for the ruling elite. Theories of this type, therefore, must demonstrate how a unified elite that is rational enough to devise a strategy of social imperialism nevertheless loses the ability to pull back when the costs of the strategy outweigh its benefits.

There is thus a paradox in existing domestic theories of overexpansion. The power to implement a strategy leading to overexpansion is inversely related to the motive for doing so. Theories that focus on narrow imperialist interest groups can easily explain the motive, but they must strain to explain how the groups gain power over policy. Conversely, theories that focus on the social imperialism of the state have no trouble explaining the power to implement the policy, but they find it hard to explain why the state fails to pull back when costs mount.

This paradox is not necessarily crippling; various supplementary hypotheses can be invoked to explain it away. This can be done by showing, for example, that parochial groups enjoy huge propaganda advantages owing to monopolies of information; that state mythmakers somehow come to believe their own propaganda; that the domestic legitimacy crisis is so grave that long-run foreign policy consequences must be disregarded; or that precipitous reactions of other states cut short the opportunity to pull back. The case studies in this book suggest there is some truth in all these arguments. Indeed, some of them play major roles in explaining one or another of the cases. Nevertheless, this ad hoc mixture of auxiliary hypotheses lacks a unifying logic.

Domestic theories of overexpansion would be more satisfying, consequently, if the paradox of power and motivation could be solved in a way that is more integral to the domestic political process. Thus my


49. Van Evera, “Causes of War.”


theory of coalition logrolling and coalition ideology draws on and subsumes earlier domestic theories, strengthening their explanatory power by rooting them more securely in a rational-choice foundation.

Coalition Logrolling and Coalition Ideology

Overexpansion is indeed a product of the political and propagandistic activities of imperialist groups. The crucial element in the explanation, however, lies not with the power and persuasiveness of these groups taken separately, but with the process by which they form coalitions of several such groups and with how these coalitions justify their policies.

Narrow imperialist interests overcome their weakness and hijack national policy in two ways. First, they gain control over national policy by joining in logrolled coalitions, trading favors so that each group gets what it wants most and costs are diffused to society through taxes imposed by the state. In all the cases examined here, the state’s overexpansion was more extreme than any individual group would have preferred, owing to the compounding of separate imperial programs through the logrolling process. Thus, logrolling was crucial to empowering interests favoring expansion and to exacerbating the overexpansion.

Second, by capturing the state, groups in the imperial coalition can harness its propaganda resources. Selling myths is easier for coalition leaders than for individual interest groups, because the instruments and credibility of the state can be exploited for the task and because self-serving strategic arguments become less traceable to the parochial interests that benefit from them. Moreover, coalition leaders have their own need for mythmaking, since they must justify the overcommitment that is endemic to logrolling.

This perspective explains several of the puzzles presented by other domestic explanations. It explains how narrow interests can hijack state policy: they do it by pooling their power in a coalition. It also explains why the state may be unable to pull back when the costs of imperialism rise: the state’s leadership is not a unitary rational actor, but rather is the manager of a heterogeneous coalition that constrains the leadership’s ability to adjust policy. This perspective explains, moreover, how strategic myths come to capture even those who invent them: because the myths are necessary to justify the power and policies of the ruling coalition, the leaders must maintain the myths or else jeopardize their rule. Overexpansion and imperial myths are so
widespread because logrolling is a feature of most political systems, to one degree or another. By its nature logrolling pays off concentrated group interests and ignores diffuse interests, like taxpayers, which are hard to organize. Since interests in expansion and militarism are typically more concentrated than the interests opposed to them, logrolling is inherently more apt to produce overexpansion than underexpansion.

Coalition theory also explains variations in the intensity of overexpansion and imperial mythmaking. When logrolling is the dominant feature of a political system, self-defeating overexpansion and the myths justifying it are more extreme. The degree of logrolling in a political system depends, in turn, on the distribution of power and interests in the society and on the character of its political institutions. In Wilhelmine Germany and imperial Japan, the social consequences of late industrialization gave rise to logrolling among narrow interest groups, producing overcommitted expansionist policies and extreme imperialist ideologies. In contrast, the democratic systems of Britain and the United States, which are especially characteristic of early industrializing societies, strengthened diffuse interests opposed to overexpansion.

My theory yields weaker, mixed predictions about unitary political systems like that of the Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany. On the one hand, the comparatively unitary Soviet system, whose origins lay in the dynamics of "late, late" industrialization, strengthened the hand of the Politburo oligarchy vis-a-vis parochial imperialist and military interests. As a result, the central leadership was able to keep imperialist logrolling in check. On the other hand, in unitary systems dominated by a single individual, like Hitler and Stalin, there is no countervailing political force to keep the dictator in check. If the dictator believes in the myths of empire, overexpansion is quite possible. When everything hinges on a single, unpredictable personality, there is no political counterpart to correct whatever strategic myths the leader may happen to believe in. Mythmaking begun for purposes of social mobilization, as in Stalin's case, or left as a holdover from an earlier period of imperial logrolling, as in Hitler's case, can spin out of control. For these reasons, democratic systems and systems dominated by a unitary oligarchy have been less prone to overexpansion and strategic mythmaking.

51. On the differences between early, late, and "late, late" industrializers, see Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass., 1962). On logrolling among expansionist interest groups in Wilhelmine Germany, see Eckart Kehr, Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy (Berkeley, Calif., 1977).
52. This argument is derived from Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York, 1957), which is summarized, qualified, and contrasted with logrolling by Norman Frolich and Joe Oppenheimer, Modern Political Economy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1976), 127-30.

These findings have both theoretical and practical significance. Theoretically, Realism must be recaptured from those who look only at politics between societies, ignoring what goes on within societies. Realists are right in stressing power, interests, and coalition making as the central elements in a theory of politics, but recent exponents of Realism in international relations have been wrong in looking exclusively to states as the irreducible atoms whose power and interests are to be assessed. These truncated Realists have also been wrong in ignoring the role ideology plays in enhancing the power and shaping the perceived interests of political groups, especially when information is monopolized and interests are uncertain.

Machiavelli, Thucydides, and even Hans Morgenthau understood political realism in this broader way, but for the most part more recent Realists have not. Morgenthau believed that "domestic and international politics are but two different manifestations of the same phenomenon: the struggle for power." Contemporary political scientists are beginning to conceive of the state not as a unitary billiard ball in a system of other billiard balls, but as a pivot adjudicating between international and domestic pressures. But even if this view is accepted, Kenneth Waltz argues that the international game board is decisive. "In self-help systems," he says, "the pressures of competition weigh more heavily than ideological preferences or internal political pressures."

54. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, has presented the most sophisticated justification of this narrow view of Realism, though he did not invent it. The "primacy of foreign policy" over domestic politics has a long history in German Realist thought.
The classics of realist political philosophy and contemporary research findings both cast doubt on this view. Hobbes himself argued that individuals formed a state precisely in order to mitigate the pressures of anarchy. And Adam Smith, in noting that “there is a great deal of ruin in a nation,” understood that the survival of great states does not normally hang by a mere thread. More recently, Peter Katzenstein has found that the domestic political arrangements of small states are determined by their vulnerable position in international markets; conversely, the domestic structure of large states determines their strategy in world markets. My own work finds that, among the great powers, domestic pressures often outweigh international ones in the calculations of national leaders.

This book’s findings also have practical significance. A new understanding of the domestic political origins of strategic myths should affect how people assess strategic debates in their own states, and how policies affect strategic mythmaking in opposing states. A theory of the link between domestic politics and foreign policy is indispensable for thinking through the international consequences of Mikhail Gorbachev’s domestic innovations and the appropriate American response to them. More broadly, such a theory can help in assessing claims that the end of the Cold War division of Europe reflects the growing obsolescence of great-power war, as well as counterclaims that it may mean the end of the long post-1945 peace. The practical and theoretical implications of my findings will be taken up in the concluding chapter.


The idea that security can be achieved through expansion is a pervasive theme in the grand strategy of the great powers in the industrial era. What explains the prevalence of this idea and variations in its intensity?

The Realist Explanation: Rational Response to Anarchy

Realists argue that statesmen who believe expansion is the best means of achieving security are often making reasonable judgments. In their view states are doomed to unending competition in an anarchic setting, like Hobbes’s state of nature. In the absence of a supranational sovereign to enforce rules, states must constantly be wary of depredations by others, looking to themselves for security and material strength. Even status quo powers may resort to aggression to gain control over scarce resources that might otherwise be turned against them. Thus, though aggressive behavior may make life “nasty, brutish, and short,” the scarcity of security in an anarchic environment often makes preventative aggression necessary.

Even when hindsight shows that a bid for security through expansion turned out to be a costly failure, Realists could—and do—argue

1. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30 (January 1978): 167-214, argues that the requirements of self-help under anarchy may force even status quo states to become aggressors. Likewise, Kenneth Waltz says that “states facing global problems are like individual consumns trapped by the ‘tyranny of small decisions.’” He also remarks that “early in this century Winston Churchill observed that the British-German naval race promised disaster and that Britain had no realistic choice other than to run it.” See his Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass., 1979), 110-11.
that the attempt was a rational response to international circumstances. Given the information available, they argue, it may have been reasonable to take a risk on achieving security through expansion, if statesmen had good reason to believe retrenchment would have been even riskier. For vulnerable states in a highly competitive anarchic environment, all strategies for achieving security are likely to have low success rates. In this sense it may not be contradictory to argue that a case of overexpansion was a rational response to the objective constraints and incentives of the state’s international position.

But anarchy is not in itself sufficient to predict an expansionist security strategy. Realist scholars argue that the normal response to threat is to form a balancing alliance. Therefore states should expect that expansion will reduce their security insofar as it threatens other states and provokes an opposing coalition. In light of that, the simple facts of anarchy and insecurity should not be enough for a Realist to expect states to adopt strategies of expansion. Other conditions, which would outweigh or nullify the fear of a balancing response to aggression, must be added to explain this strategic choice. Some might be conditions that prevail throughout the international system at a particular time, encouraging aggressive solutions to security problems for many states. For example, when the prevailing military technology available to all the great powers makes offense easier than defense, strategies of security through expansion should be widespread. Some of the conditions promoting expansion might be peculiar to the position of the individual state, giving it special incentives to solve its security problems through aggression.

The following Realist hypotheses about conditions that should give rise to expansionism are derived from the theories of political scientists and from historians’ interpretations of individual cases. When these conditions are present, Realists would expect the state to adopt a strategy of security through expansion; when they are absent, Realists would expect the state to adopt a nonaggressive strategy.

Offensive Advantage

Whenever prevailing military technology favors the attacker, expansionist security strategies should be attractive. An aggressive strategy

would allow states to capitalize on surprise and exploit the advantages of the attacker to compensate for weakness. They would have strong first-strike incentives to destroy opponents’ military forces and seize their war-making capacity before others did the same to them.

Such situations of global offensive advantage are rare, however. Authorities on ground warfare usually claim that the defender almost always enjoys a net advantage, which may be smaller or larger depending on various technological and geographical conditions. Air power theorists predicted that the rise of long-range bombers and later of intercontinental missiles would create first-strike incentives if the forces of one side were vulnerable to a preemptive attack by the other. In fact, first-strike knockout blows have been rare. Though surprise attacks often succeed tactically at the outset of a war, the attacker normally finds that the diplomatic orus of aggression outweighs its fleeting operational benefits. Most theorists argue, moreover, that the nuclear stalemate aids the side that is defending the status quo, since the threat to use nuclear force in defense of vital interests is more credible than its use in conquest. In short, technological conditions aiding the attacker may exist in isolated instances and therefore may help explain some cases of expansionist strategies. Overall, however, they have not been common enough to account for the more general inclination toward such strategies.

Geography may place greater or lesser obstacles in the path of the attacker. In land warfare, rough terrain and narrow frontages aid the defender, whereas flat terrain and wide frontages aid the attacker. In all forms of warfare, the logistical burden of projecting power over a distance tends to reduce the relative fighting power of the attacker. But if the attacker is invading weakly defended territories near its own home base and the defender must transport forces to support a distant client, distance will aid the attacker.

4. On the reasons for the defender’s advantage, see John Mearsheimer, “Why the Soviets Can’t Win Quickly in Central Europe,” International Security 7 (Summer 1982): 15-20. Richard Betts, “Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty and Policy Confidence,” World Politics 37 (January 1985): 153-79, has shown persuasively that surprise gives the attacker significant advantages at the outset of a military campaign. In all of his cases in which numerically inferior attackers won opening engagements, however, surprise proved to be a wasting asset—that is, the attacker ultimately lost the war, especially as a result of balancing behavior that the aggressor’s victories provoked.


7. For a complete listing of the conditions in which offensive strategies are necessary or enjoy an advantage, see Stephen Van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and Deterrence: When Is Offense Best?” paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1987.
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Geography and technology may interact in shaping the incentives for expansionist strategies. For example, innovations in transportation technology, such as the building of railroads in the colonial periphery in the 1890s, may reduce the difficulty of projecting power into the hinterlands and thus bring new territories and new strategic resources inside the cost-benefit frontier of the empire. Nonetheless, security problems on the turbulent frontier opened up by the new technology may still lure the empire beyond the cost-benefit equilibrium.

Political conditions may also affect a Realist’s calculations about offensive security strategies. Even if the defender enjoys military advantages, the instability of the political status quo may make a positional defense impossible. After the Second World War, for example, the political status quo in Europe was fluid. Each side had potential fifth columns in the other’s camp, and the dividing line between the blocs ran down the middle of formerly united countries. Moreover, many of the European states were weak internally and militarily and consequently would have reason to join the bandwagon with the rising power rather than balance against it. Given this fluid situation, there were plausible reasons to believe that a political offensive was the best defense.

Cumulative Resources

Whenever states can make significant net additions to their power resources through conquest, Realists would expect them to adopt strategies of security through expansion. But open-ended strategies of cumulative gains, counting on a never-ending cycle in which new conquests provide the resources for still further conquests, are highly dubious. At some point, according to Robert Gilpin’s historical review of the experience of empires, costs always outstrip revenues from additional conquest. Yet under some conditions more limited attempts to strengthen the state’s position through conquest might in principle be worthwhile.

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The clearest case is a situation of near autarky. If a state could achieve direct physical control over the resources it needs to fight a long war against its strongest opponents, its security would be greatly enhanced. Blockades would not deprive it of crucial war matériel or food for its population. Moreover, once autarky was achieved, the state could take advantage of all the tactical and operational benefits of standing on the defense. Consequently a strategy of limited expansion might make sense for a security-conscious, nearly autarkic power. Still, this incentive would have to be weighed against the risk of provoking an overwhelming balancing alliance.

Similarly, expanding to achieve a natural defensive frontier or to seize a strategically crucial defensive bottleneck might make sense for a security-conscious state. The problem is, however, that other states are likely to want to hold the strategic point, such as the Turkish Straits, for their own defensive reasons. Holding the position might make defense easier, but fighting to seize it may undermine security. In the extreme case, such a position could be so crucial that whoever holds it can render the other insecure, so that the opponents must fight over it, even if the fighting itself endangers their security. But in many cases the strategic value of the bottleneck may be exaggerated, and the struggle for it counterproductive.

Shifts in Relative Power

A state has an incentive for preventive aggression whenever its relative power is expected to decline. By attacking immediately and conquering its rising opponent, the state can enhance its chances for long-run security. This should be true even if the chances of success in the preventive attack are low, as long as the chances of success in a defensive war later would be lower still. But this incentive must be weighed against the diplomatic and operational disadvantages of being the attacker. It must be compared, moreover, with the alternative strategy of appeasing the rising power.

11. Van Evera, “Causes of War,” has the best discussion.
In calculating their incentives for preventive aggression, states assess not only long-run shifts in underlying power resources, but also short-run shifts in the degree to which those resources are mobilized for war. The paper tiger image of the opponent rests in part on the argument that the opponent, though hostile, is not yet fully mobilized for war, materially or politically. Therefore there is an incentive to conquer the resources needed for self-defense, or to defeat potential enemies piecemeal before they are ready to move. The problem is that these conquests are likely to provoke the feared mobilization. Even so, if the mobilization is really inevitable in the long run, and if sufficient resources can be conquered in the short run, the strategy can in principle be a rational response to the state’s international situation.

**Multipolarity**

Strategies of security through expansion make more sense in multipolar situations than in bipolar ones. In multipolarity, an expansionist power may be able to defeat its opponents piecemeal if they fail to unite because they cannot agree on who should bear the costs of resistance. At the same time, great powers in multipolarity may have strong incentives to expand to achieve autarky, since they are less likely to be self-sufficient in the resources needed for national security than are bipolar powers. The most dangerous situation would be one in which some great powers were autarkic in security resources but others were not. To avoid one-way dependency, the latter would have a strong incentive to expand. Arguably, this aptly describes the situation of Germany and Japan vis-a-vis the United States and the Soviet Union before the Second World War. Yet the failure of their bids for autarky, snuffed out by the balancing reaction of the other powers, shows that this incentive must be weighed against other factors that affect its probability of success.

**The Cognitive Explanation: Misleading Mental Shortcuts**

Some common strategic myths may be artifacts of the shortcuts the human brain takes when processing information under uncertainty. To simplify decision making, people focus inordinately on the most available data, use ready-made theories to impose order on the data, and employ rules of thumb to draw inferences. Some of these shortcuts may introduce biases that predispose decision makers toward overexpansion.

Cognitive theory, unlike the Realist theory discussed above, is not organized in a tightly deductive form. Nor has anyone attempted to show systematically how hypotheses deduced from cognitive theory can explain patterns of great-power overexpansion. Implicitly, however, many of the explanations offered for individual instances of overexpansion—those stressing beliefs and lessons of the past, for example—are cognitive in nature. Consequently it should be worthwhile to try to establish a coherent theoretical basis for these interpretations and to derive testable hypotheses from it.

Most cognitive hypotheses can be at least loosely derived from what is called the “cognitive miser” model. Its central principle is economy of cognitive operations. Under complexity and uncertainty, people use several devices to simplify assessment and choice. The ones most pertinent to the study of strategic myths are, first, belief systems, and second, cognitive heuristics and biases.

People store what they have learned in simplified, structured form in belief systems. Incoming information is categorized in accordance with the preestablished categories of these beliefs. Consequences of alternative courses of action are assessed with the aid of causal beliefs. Belief systems serve the need for cognitive economy in several ways. They reduce the need for information, since expectations embedded in the belief system can be used to fill in gaps in information. They promote efficient theoretical thinking by organizing beliefs into hierarchies, subordinating a plethora of details under more general concepts. Moreover, stable belief systems protect against the mental burden of constant fundamental reassessments by resisting change in the face of disconfirming information. When disconfirming evidence is so overwhelming that it cannot be ignored, its disruptive impact on the economy of cognitive operations is managed by first adjusting only the beliefs lower down in the hierarchy of generalization, revising more central concepts only when absolutely necessary, and perhaps not even then. In this way the decision maker, though partially responsive to

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18. Ralph White, *Fearful Warriors* (New York, 1984), is a quasi-popular book that uses several cognitive hypotheses to explain great-power conflict and enemy images.

information from the environment, is buffered from the intellectual burden of dealing with its full complexity, uncertainty, and variety.

This system has tremendous advantages for cognitive economy, though its benefits are purchased at the price of being heavily dependent on the initial structuring of the beliefs. Future events will be seen as reruns of formative experiences or as the playing out of patterns instilled in early training. Consequently, for explaining strategic ideas and behavior, formative lessons drawn from early, vivid, or firsthand experiences take on special importance. When a whole generation undergoes the same formative experiences, such as the lessons of Munich, the strategic policy of the whole state is likely to be affected for many years. 20

Such a process could explain variations in beliefs about the wisdom of strategies of security through expansion. When formative experiences of pertinent decision makers have taught them that dominoes fall, that states join bandwagons, that attackers win, quickly through surprise, or that passivity jeopardizes security, then the belief in expansionism should be prevalent and difficult to reverse. A generation steeped in the lessons of appeasement at Munich would be quick to imagine dominoes falling and would feel a need to nip an opponent's growing assertiveness in the bud. Conversely, the opposite formative experiences should lead to the opposite strategic beliefs. A generation raised on the lessons of Vietnam would be quick to foresee quagmires resulting from an overextended containment policy.

At least some historians and area specialists have tried to explain the American Cold War belief system, the Bolshevik operational code, and German and Japanese imperialism in terms of such formative lessons. To test these explanations, I examine whether people learned the same lessons from the same experiences, whether they drew conclusions in a logically plausible way, and whether their conclusions preceded or followed the adoption of policies implied by the lessons.

Formative experiences could in principle explain why imperial myths have occasionally appeared, but it is puzzling that such beliefs should be fairly common among all the great powers. If lessons were being absorbed in an unbiased way, then paper tiger and domino beliefs should be widespread only if they were generally true. Since these beliefs contradict fairly well-established scholarly knowledge about the balance of power, it is necessary to explain why conclusions might be drawn in such a skewed way. Some additional features of information processing by the "cognitive miser," called "heuristics and biases" in the psychological literature, might in principle explain this.

For example, the common tendency to adopt a paper tiger image of the adversary might be explained by typical biases in the way we attribute causes to behavior. People tend to explain their own actions in terms of environmental constraints (a "situational attribution"), whereas they explain others' actions in terms of innate disposition (a "dispositional attribution"). A purely cognitive explanation is that environmental pressures stand out in our minds when we reconstruct our own actions, whereas the actor is the most salient object in the field of vision when we reconstruct the actions of another. 21 Situational attributions consequently require less mental work in explaining our own actions, but more work in explaining others'. In conflict relationships, this leads to attributions like "he acted aggressively because that's his nature, but I stood firm because circumstances forced me to." 22 Raymond Garthoff has extensively documented this kind of mutual double standard in how states cast blame in his study of the decline of Soviet-American détente in the 1970s. 23

Some psychological studies suggest that people make dispositional attributions when adversaries behave aggressively but situational ones when they behave cooperatively. A purely cognitive explanation is that we expect our own actions to elicit the desired results, so that when they do we say, "My strategy worked." But if our actions are counterproductive, we blame the other person for being incorrigible rather than our own actions for being ineffective. 24 Over time, this bias in historical bookkeeping could foster an image of the enemy as an innate aggressor who will bow to forceful resistance—a paper tiger. For example, this fits perfectly Brezhnev's "correlation of forces" theory of détente: when America behaved as Brezhnev desired, he said it was because the power of the socialist camp gave America no alternative; but when America misbehaved, it was a reflection of the innate aggressiveness of capitalism.

Satisfying cognitive explanations for the domino theory are harder to think up. Laboratory findings suggest that people overrate the cumulative probability of a series of events. Thus, if three events must occur to produce an outcome and the independent probability of each is 0.8,
people tend to estimate the probability of the outcome as 0.8, when it
is in fact only 0.5. This might help explain the ready acceptance of the
domino theory.

One test for this argument is whether statesmen who exaggerate
cumulative probabilities in the domino theory also exaggerate it in
other circumstances. For example, the same bias should lead them to
fear that firm deterrence strategies might set off a conflict spiral with
the adversary. For example, a statesman who estimated that the chance
of provoking a military mobilization was 0.8, that the chance that a
mobilization would inadvertently trigger a war was 0.8, and that the
chance that the war would become nuclear was 0.8, would erroneously
calculate the cumulative probability of the whole chain as 0.8. In fact,
people who worry the most about connections between falling domi-
noes probably worry the least about connections between rungs on the
ladder of escalating hostility, and vice versa. If so, this suggests that
some different, probably noncognitive dynamic drives the domino
theory.

More generally, the case studies in this book will cast doubt on
cognitive explanations for strategic concepts by showing that beliefs
and “lessons” correlate more strongly with personal and institutional
interests than with formative experiences. It is more accurate to say
that statesmen and societies actively shape the lessons of the past in
ways they find convenient than it is to say they are shaped by them.
Both Germany and Japan had numerous opportunities to learn from
their own experiences that big stick diplomacy provokes opposition
and that defenders attract allies while aggressors lose them. Bismarck
was misremembered by subsequent German militarists as the man of
“blood and iron, who used his sword to cut the tangles of politics on
the battlefield,” whereas in fact he had been careful to isolate his
opponents by making them appear to be the aggressors. Similarly,
Japanese militarists might have learned a lesson when their assassina-

26. Tversky and Kahneman attribute bias in assessing cumulative probability to the
“representativeness heuristic,” which suggests that people classify events and their
causes in terms of superficial resemblance rather than a deep analysis of underlying
processes. For example, the fall of Vietnam “resembles” the fall of Western Europe
and thus seems like a plausible cause of it. But the war in Vietnam also “resembles” a
Soviet-American war over Europe, and so by this same psychology should be seen as a
cause of it—and a deterrent to intervention.

(Summer 1987): 163-64.

30. Van Evera, Causes of War, devotes a chapter to the subject of strategic
nonevaluation. On Bulow’s learning and political problems, see Gerhard Ritter, The
Sword and the Scepter, vol. 2 (Coral Gables, Fla., 1969), 161; Geoff Eley, Reshaping the
German Right (New Haven, Conn., 1981), chap. 9.

[30]
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mythmaking. Since interests favoring expansion tend to be disproportionately represented in such systems, overexpansion is more likely. In democratic systems, by contrast, power is diffused widely by the ballot and by norms of free debate. Diffuse interests opposed to expansion are more strongly represented and are more able to check the logrolling and mythmaking of concentrated imperial interests. In unitary systems, power is concentrated in the hands of a single dictator or a unitary oligarchy, which has diverse interests in a variety of economic and bureaucratic sectors. This concentration gives the unitary elite a relatively encompassing view of the state’s interests and an incentive to keep overexpansion, imperialist mythmaking, and imperialist logrolling in check. In the case of the single dictator, however, incentives rooted in distributions of power and interest yield weak predictions, since there are no political checks on whatever strategic notions the dictator may happen to hold. Though overexpansion is not structurally required in this case, there is no political counterweight to prevent it.

The experience of the industrialized great powers suggests that coalition politics and ideology offer the single best explanation for the strategic ideas that contribute to overexpansion. Though the international factors stressed by Realism also play an important role, their effects are skewed by domestic coalition making and ideological mythmaking.

Political Advantages of Imperialist Groups

Overexpansion and imperial myths are common among the great powers because groups benefiting disproportionately from expansion or from the ideas that promote it often enjoy advantages in organization and persuasiveness. These advantages help such groups to sell imperial myths to state leaders and the public and thus to “hijack” state policy. Though the extent of these advantages varies greatly over time and across political systems, imperialist groups normally enjoy at least some net political advantage over anti-imperialist interests. In particular, pro-expansionist groups typically enjoy (1) organizational and motivational advantages owing to the comparative compactness and concentration of interests of those who benefit from imperialism; (2) a partial monopoly of information bearing on the costs and benefits of imperialism; and (3) close ties to the state.

Compact groups with concentrated interests. The benefits of empire are normally more concentrated than its costs, which are in most cases diffused through taxes. Private investors in imperial enterprises pay their own operating costs, but it is the state—the taxpayers—that pays

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for infrastructure and military protection. This diffusion of anti-imperial interests among all taxpayers is in itself a major reason for their chronic political weakness. The theory of collective goods explains that it will be easy to organize a compact group, in which each member derives a large benefit from the successful promotion of the shared interest. But when benefits are diffused throughout a much larger group, each member will have a weaker incentive to work for the common goal, and coordinating common action will be more cumbersome. An exhaustive study of the costs and benefits of the British Empire in the late nineteenth century has borne out these predictions of the theory of collective action. During this period the empire served to transfer income from a large number of middle-class taxpayers and regional economic elites to a more compact London commercial elite who had invested heavily abroad. Military expenditure in defense of foreign economic interests was the most costly item in what the authors call the “imperial subsidy.”

Both economic sectors and bureaucratic organizations may have concentrated interests in expansion. Militaries and colonial bureaucracies are especially prominent throughout the case studies as compact groups having concentrated interests in expansion, big stick diplomacy, and arms races. Though militaries may not want war per se, their interest in organizational growth, wealth, prestige, and autonomy is usually served by ideas and policies that tend to create war as their “waste byproduct.” Thus Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, the chief of Wilhelmine Germany’s naval staff, sought a fleet that inadvertently made war more likely because it provoked Germany’s encirclement, then found himself unable to head off the war that he knew the fleet was unprepared for. Likewise, the Kwantung army sought Manchuria as its own quasi-autarkic industrial empire to enhance its autonomy from the vagaries of politics in Tokyo, but in doing so it led Japan down the path to an open-ended war on the Asian mainland. The relative compactness of


[33] Davis and Huttenback, Mammon, 304.

[34] Van Evera’s phrase and analysis, from “Causes of War.” See also Barry Fosen, Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984).


[36] On this point, in addition to Barnhart, see Sadako Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria (Berkeley, Calif., 1964).
the professional military—its hierarchical nature, its habituation to discipline, the lack of an alternative employer for its specialized skills—has enhanced its dedication to and effectiveness in pursuit of its concentrated interests in imperial projects. 37

Economic groups also figure from time to time as compact interests receiving concentrated benefits from expansionism. The motives and characteristics of these groups have been quite varied: in 1882 holders of Egyptian bonds wanted military intervention to secure their investment; in the 1890s noncompetitive Birmingham industrialists and workers sought protected markets in an expanded empire; highly competitive Manchester textile merchants half a century earlier had demanded that force be used to open up closed markets abroad; Ruhr steel makers cared about the German empire only because it justified the steel-hulled fleet. 38

Not all compact economic groups have had a clear-cut interest in expansionism, however. Actively anti-imperialist economic groups appear in some of the case studies, but their motivations regarding imperial overexpansion were typically amoral and changeable. For example, Manchester industrialists mobilized by Richard Cobden funded the popular anti-interventionist propaganda of the Anti-Corn Law League, but once mass pressure was successfully exploited to push through free trade in grain, the industrial magnates dumped Cobden's peace program and instead backed Palmerston's trade-promoting gunboat diplomacy. 39 Likewise, Junkers and some Tory landlords disliked paying taxes for fleets and foreign interventions, but this interest was not their highest priority. The zaibatsu, large trading and manufacturing conglomerates that dominated the Japanese economy of the 1920s, depended on access to American raw materials and markets, and so they favored Shidehara's policy of cooperating with the democracies. But they also counted on expanded access to Chinese markets and resources, so they simultaneously helped fuel the expansionist side of Japanese diplomacy. 40

Because the costs of empire are diffused through the state, few compact groups have strong interests opposed to empire. In light of collective goods theory's conclusions about the difficulty of effectively organizing diffuse interests, this helps explain the endemic bias toward overexpansion.

As collective goods theory would predict, imperial interests were especially concentrated in the two most extreme cases of overexpansion, Germany and Japan. German state-financed colonialism, for example, benefited the navy, Krupp steel, and other contractors while providing essentially zero return on the public's investment. 41 In Japan, very narrow army and navy concerns, spiced by rationalized in terms of the national interest, dominated strategic calculations. 42

British and American internationalist business enterprises fall at the other extreme. As a rule, they made economically productive investments abroad at low military overhead while using cheap food prices or social welfare programs at home to win mass allies away from competing protectionist interests. 43 Thus economic calculations by German and Japanese imperialists and protectionists, who extracted rents from other sectors of society, had no relation to marginal costs and benefits to society as a whole. Calculations by American and British internationalists, who earned profits from productive ventures, came closer to mirroring the costs and benefits to society as a whole.

Information monopolies and other propaganda advantages. Another cause of endemic overexpansion is that self-interested groups favoring militarism and imperial expansion often enjoy an information monopoly. Those who engage in imperial activities and preparation for war automatically gain special knowledge about key elements in strategic cost-benefit calculations, such as local conditions in the hinterland, the strength of the opponent, and the effectiveness of various techniques of fighting.

Such groups exploit their reputation for expert knowledge to justify their self-serving policies in terms of diffuse national interests. Rationales that explain the need for expansion in terms of national security are especially convenient for this purpose. Thus the German navy under Tirpitz invented the theory of the "risk fleet" to explain why naval expansion was needed to forestall imminent stagnation of the German economy. By using the German navy's own internal studies, Paul Kennedy can today destroy the logic of the Tirpitz risk fleet theory in thirty pages. But at the time, those studies were tightly held,
with more diffuse interests. Imperial ideologies have sold best among people whose minds can be swayed by new, persuasive "information," such as groups with uncertain or cross-pressured interests, or those newly mobilized into the political process.

The mass constituencies for the Wilhelmine Navy League and Agrarian League, Palmerston's "liberal" imperialism, Stalinism, and McCarthyism all fit that profile; the case of Japanese militarist populism is especially instructive. Objectively, Japanese farmers suffering from the depression of the early 1930s had little interest in empire as a solution to their problems. Indeed, rice from the colonies of Korea and Taiwan depressed the price of domestically grown rice by about a fifth during the 1920s.51 For this reason, as late as 1930 the platform of the major peasant league featured Marxist-style denunciations of imperial expansion. Nonetheless, farmers were ambivalent on the issue, since wars and the army had traditionally provided one of the few paths of upward mobility for rural youth. Moreover, the wealthier farmers, who played a key organizing role in agrarian organizations, had no sympathy for anything that smacked of Marxist appeals to the rural proletariat. In these circumstances the army's populist imperial propaganda, reinforced by well-established reservist organizations in the villages and the arrest of anti-imperialist agrarian organizers, succeeded in creating an enthusiastic mass base for expansionism.52 In such ways, imperial elite groups have often been able to use their inherent advantages in organization and information to mobilize groups with uncertain or contradictory interests.

Yet groups with concentrated interests in expansion suffer one disadvantage in the propaganda battle: the transparency of their self-interest. At least in America, some studies have shown that obviously self-interested propaganda hurts the case of its proponents, whether business or labor.53 Consequently, unless more credible sources like the press or the state can be bought or co-opted, the group's propaganda may be discounted as coming from an obviously biased source.

The propaganda advantages typically enjoyed by imperialist interests help explain the endemic bias toward overexpansion in all great powers. Extreme advantages help explain the extreme overexpansion in the

47. A. C. Hopkins, "The Victorians and Africa: A Reconsideration of the Occupation of Egypt," Journal of African History 22 (1981): 363–91, at 384, says: "It remained only to make the occupation palatable to parliament and the public. This was achieved by emphasizing the national interest rather than by referring to specific business and financial concerns, and by stressing the spurious danger to the Canal and to the freedom of the seas."
49. Eley, Reshaping, 140–47 and passim, documents and qualifies this.
worst cases. In Germany and Japan, militarists and navalists enjoyed
greater monopolies on strategic information and analysis than did their
counterparts in societies with a free press and systematic oversight by
the cabinet and Parliament. In the Soviet Union, tighter control from
the top counteracted the unavailability of competing analysis from
below. In each case, however, the extent of the propaganda advantage
seems to hinge more on the social environment in which the interest
groups operated than on the characteristics of the groups themselves.

Ties to the state. Another explanation for endemic overexpansion is
that representatives of parochial imperialist groups are often over-
represented in the highest organs holding legitimate state power. In
Britain, financial circles geared toward foreign investment were so
socially intertwined with the political elite that most of them saw little
distinction between national interests and those of the City of London. 54
In the early Cold War years in America, the upper echelons of the State
Department were disproportionately staffed by Wall Street internationalists,
including both Republicans like John Foster Dulles and
Democrats like Robert Lovett and Averell Harriman, who had spent the
interwar years investing abroad, representing European clients, and
setting up global market-sharing cartels. 55 Germany and Japan were
much more extreme cases of interest group penetration of the state.
Meiji Japan was founded by a military coup, and a military clique
oversaw the selection of government leaders, often choosing military
men for key positions. 56 In Germany, Junker landowners, statesmen,
and soldiers likewise formed an elite that mingled parochial interests
and legitimate public authority. Its direct interests, however, were more
noticeably protectionist and militarist than expansionist per se. Much of
the imperialist impetus in Wilhelmine Germany came from bourgeois
groups that were more peripheral to the Junker "power elite."

Arguably, the state itself has an interest in war and empire. As
Charles Tilly has put it, "war made the state and the state made war."
57 War provides a justification for strengthening the state against other
domestic groups so it can compete with other states. In war, the state
commands more resources and gains more extensive legal prerogatives.
This parochial interest is mitigated, however, by the state's
encompassing interest in the long-run health of the society it governs. 58
Sovereigns who squander their nation's resources in unproductive
wars will be impoverished, defeated by other states, and deposed by
their subjects, whom they exploit and fail to protect. On balance, the
interests of the state and of parochial groups tied to the state provide
an endemic, though limited, bias in favor of overexpansion.

Domestic Political Context: Empowering Parochial Interests

The characteristic advantages of imperial groups—compactness,
information monopolies, and ties to the state—are more valuable or
easier to achieve in some political contexts than in others. Without
specifying the broader political context, these characteristics are insufficient
to explain how parochial groups influence state policy for their
own benefit. Compactness and concentration of interests, for example,
can be a disadvantage in some political contexts. A compact group by
definition encompasses fewer individuals than the diffuse groups to
which it hopes to pass the costs of its preferred policies. In a democratic
system, where political power hinges in part on getting a large
number of votes, compactness is at best a two-edged sword. It may
help in organizing lobbying, but it must overcome the inherent lack
of numerical strength. Similarly, concentration of interests by definition
implies that the parochial group's policies are at odds with the interests
of the general mass of voters, most of whom do not share this
concentrated interest. Consequently, persuading the majority of voters
to approve a parochial agenda is inherently difficult. In such a political
system, the power of parochial imperial groups depends greatly on
their information monopolies or on their direct penetration of the state.
But these too depend in part on the broader character of the political
system.

Fully developed democracies normally have institutions that break
down or limit information monopolies. For example, a pluralistic press
guarantees access to a broad range of viewpoints. Universities provide
independent experts to analyze public questions. Representative branches
of government have the right to extract information from state bureaucracies.
Though these institutions can sometimes be captured by lobbyists or
defeated in argument by parochial propagandists, the political

54. This is argued by P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, "Gentlemanly Capitalism and
(February 1987): 1-26; and Hopkins, "Victorians and Africa," overturning the very
narrowly argued view of D. C. M. Platt, Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy,
55. Ronald Pruessen, John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power (New York, 1982); Walter
56. Peter Duus, Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taisho Japan (Cambridge, Mass.,
1968).
58. On encompassing interests, as the opposite of parochial interests, see Olson, Rise
and Decline, 47-53, 93.

[38]  [39]
context makes the parochial group’s task more difficult and limits its success.

The feasibility of penetrating the state also depends on the broader political context. In a democracy, the state must consider the cost in votes of pursuing policies desired by compact groups with parochial interests. If the state is strong vis-à-vis its society, it might be able to ignore such constraints. But at the same time, such a strong state could also ignore the pleas and inducements of parochial groups lobbying for empire. In that case, overexpansion and imperial mythmaking could occur only if the state itself—or “the ruling class”—had a parochial interest in such policies.

A strong state or an encompassing ruling class, with diverse interests spread across various economic and bureaucratic sectors, might have some parochial interests in overexpansion and mythmaking, but they should be limited. The strongest and most persuasive groups, those at the core of the ruling class and those staffing legitimate state institutions, may have an incentive to rake off modest excess profits from imperial activities while passing costs on to taxpayers, conscripts, and consumers. Such groups may also have an incentive to engage in modest inflation of foreign threats to get the population to perceive national conflicts of interests as more salient than class conflicts. They may likewise have an incentive to portray international conflicts and foreign policy fiascos as the fault of another state.

Such groups should have a healthy sense of when to stop, however, lest this behavior kill the goose that lays the golden egg. Unified ruling groups that are firmly in the saddle have almost no incentive to pocket “superprofits” or to propagate nationalistic myths at the cost of ruining their societies in costly wars. “Structural Marxists,” for example, argue that there is no reason to expect Wall Street monopoly capitalists to be so foolish as to run their system into the ground through mindless overexpansion. Instead, it is more plausible to expect them to cede power to the bourgeois state to act in the enlightened, long-term interest of the imperialist system as a whole and the capitalists that derive such disproportionate benefits from it. Indeed, all the unified oligarchies surveyed in this book—the American East Coast foreign policy Establishment, the Soviet Politburo, the

59. Van Evera, “Causes of War,” stresses this motive for mythmaking and the falsification of history.

British Whig oligarchy, and the founding fathers of the reformed Meiji state (the genro)—demonstrated some ability to limit overexpansion for this reason.

In short, there is a paradox in simple interest group theories of overexpansion: narrow, peripheral interest groups have the strongest motives for reckless overexpansion, but their ability to “hijack the state” to that end remains insufficiently explained; conversely, core interest groups have the power but lack a strong motive. Groups with a small stake in the fate of the society as a whole should be the ones most strongly swayed by a parochial interest in passing along the costs of ruinous imperial enterprises. But these groups should be the weakest politically. Almost by definition, their ties to the ruling class and power within the state must be weak if they take such a parochial view of their interests. Thus the power to force through self-interested policies of overexpansion should in most cases vary inversely with the motive for doing so.

This paradox might be resolved in several ways. For example, members of the ruling group might come to believe their own propaganda, or their short political time horizons might leave them insensitive to the long-run costs of overexpansion. A more satisfactory resolution of the paradox stresses the logrolling of individually weak parochial groups into a single, powerful coalition. The following sections examine these various approaches.

Self-delusion, or “blowback” from propaganda. The paradox would disappear if the state and ruling class came to believe the imperialist propaganda they used to mobilize nationalistic support and justify extracting resources from society. Thus a politically strong group could become the agent of extreme overexpansion if cynical, mobilizing elites inadvertently socialized successor elite generations to believe the imperial myths, failing to explain their instrumental origins. It could also happen as a result of subconscious psychological processes, which convince people that what is good for them is good for their country. In either case, the line between fact and fiction could become blurred in the elite’s own mind, an outcome that Stephen Van Evera calls “blowback.”

Indeed, the blurring of sincere belief and tactical argument has been common, and it would not be surprising if the elites purveying such
arguments were unable to maintain the distinction between valid strategic concepts and opportunistic strategic rhetoric. "If we made our points clearer than the truth," said Dean Acheson of Cold War containment rhetoric, "we did not differ from most other educators and could hardly do otherwise..." The purpose of NSC 68 was to so bludgeon the mass mind of 'top government' that not only could the President make a decision but that the decision could be carried out." Likewise, John Foster Dulles wrote in a 1942 pamphlet that all empires had been "imbued with and radiated great faiths" like "Manifest Destiny" and the "White Man's Burden," adding that we too "need a faith... that will make us strong, a faith so profound that we, too, will feel that we have a mission to spread it through the world." Two years before, Dulles had remarked that all states "attempt to cloak self-interest in ways which will appeal to those of its members who have moral standards." Even if the elite avoids internalizing its own myths, it may nonetheless become politically entrapped in its own rhetoric. Insofar as the elite's power and policies are based on society's acceptance of imperial myths, its rule would be jeopardized by renouncing the myths when their side-effects become costly. To stay in power and to keep central policy objectives intact, elites may have to accept some unintended consequences of their imperial sales pitch. For example, Harry Truman and Dean Acheson used the universalist rhetoric of global confrontation with communism to sell their containment policy for Europe, but then were constrained to accept the logic of critics who turned their arguments against them, demanding a similar anticommunist crusade in East Asia and in domestic politics. In this way, the blowback of imperial myths may depend not only on the elite's intellectual confusion, but on the political context that forces elites to live up to their own rhetoric.

Elite time horizons. The paradox between the parochial motive for overexpansion and the power to authorize it would also disappear if the ruling interest group had a short time horizon. For example, a declining core interest group that still controlled some of the levers of military power might use them recklessly to try to retain its slipping position. A long-shot gamble on a successful war might make sense as a last-ditch attempt to shore up the declining elite's prestige and social role. In Germany and Japan, the impending eclipse of traditional oligarchies—the genro, the Junkers, and their military offshoots—might be seen as providing just such an incentive for increasing recklessness. In both these cases, however, the problem was not just that declining oligarchs became reckless, but that their decline left the polity without responsible centralized leadership. The genro and old-style Prussians like Bismarck and the elder Moltke were gone, and with them went their encompassing, long-run social vantage point. In their place were a plethora of contending bureaucracies, military factions, or interest groups, logrolling their concentrated interests in ways that produced expansionist ideas and policies much more overcommitted than any of the interest groups sought individually.

Indeed, at some point in each of the cases, the expansionism that resulted from the process of domestic coalition making was more extreme than that advocated by any single group. Tirpitz wanted a fleet but opposed a preventive war. Colonel Ishiwa, who had planned the 1931 falt accompli in Manchuria, recalled when Prince Konoye's cabinet insisted in 1937 on a quick, victorious campaign to finish the war in China. The Soviet military-industrial complex wanted an arms race with the West, but not the Berlin crisis that Khrouchev cooked up in a misguided effort to head off an arms race. Neither the East Coast internationalists nor the Republican neoisolationists wanted land wars in Asia, but the Cold War consensus forged from the programs and rhetoric of each made such wars hard to avoid. Victorian Toryism and radicalism both had strong anti-interventionist components, but Palmerston's governing formula of 'liberal' imperialism abroad and social stasis at home realigned politics in such a way that reformists and anti-imperialist elements were isolated and checkmated. Thus a simple interest group explanation for overexpansion faces a double paradox: First, how do weak parochial interests hijack the state? Second, how do they produce a degree of expansion that none of the interests individually desires? To explain this fully, it is necessary to look beyond individual groups to the underlying political structures that shape how those groups interact in the domestic political process.

The Cartelized System

Parochial interests in imperial overexpansion have the greatest opportunity to control state policy in a cartelized political system. A
cartelized system is dominated by a number of interest groups or "cartels," each with concentrated interests different from those of other such groups. Because imperial and military interests are commonly more concentrated than anti-imperial and antimilitarist interests, a cartelized political system will give a chair at the bargaining table to imperial interests whereas diffuse groups with diffuse interests, like taxpayers and consumers, are excluded. Although not everyone around the table will be actively imperialist, some are enough, because of the way a group of cartels will integrate their diverse interests.

Bargaining among compact groups with different, highly concentrated interests proceeds by logrolling. In this arrangement each group gets what it wants in return for tolerating the adverse effects of the policies its coalition partners desire. Short-run costs are passed to groups outside the coalition. Long-run social costs remain uncalculated because of the highly parochial perspectives of the groups participating in the logrolled coalition.

Cartelized politics can produce somewhat different forms and degrees of overexpansion, depending on precisely which groups are represented and on the strength of the coalition leaders who act as brokers. Two principal forms of logrolled overexpansion are multiple expansion and offensive détente.

**Multiple expansion.** Multiple expansion means pursuing several distinct imperial projects; each may individually involve some small risk of overexpansion, but when combined they produce an overwhelming strategic overcommitment and self-encirclement. This occurs when several competing imperial or militarist interests sit at the table with neither anti-imperial interests nor strong brokers. Each interest group insists on its own program of expansion, so the result is far more overcommitted and provokes far more enemies than any of the individual interests thinks is wise. Yet none is strong enough to bar the others' programs, and none is willing to sacrifice its own highly concentrated interests to make the national policy solvent as a whole.

A fairly simple example is the case of the Japanese military in the late 1930s. The army insisted on a mainland empire, which created a resource-eating quagmire in China and led to armed clashes with the Soviet Union. This in itself was overextension, which naval policy compounded. The navy did not want to fight a war with America, but they wanted to prepare for one on a massive scale. Given the drain on imperial resources from the China War, the navy could hardly justify maintaining—let alone expanding—its own share of the budgetary pie unless war with America was imminent or the naval operations could somehow extricate Japan from this geopolitical impasse. In this atmosphere, the navy accepted the strategy of a southern advance toward the Indonesian oil fields. Though fearing this would get Japan into a hopeless war with America, the navy leaders recognized that their budgetary and political position would evaporate the instant they admitted that war with America would be unthinkable no matter what resources the navy was given. Separately, the army and the navy would have undertaken moderate overexpansion and a counterproductive arms race, but each might have avoided a fight to the finish with America. But in logrolling and interacting together, they produced a more extreme strategic insolvency.

An overcommitted coalition policy can cause a variety of second-order complications that make the cartels still further. As the consequences of overexpansion become apparent, groups within the coalition jockey to shift the burdens of adjusting to overexpansion onto others. They may use imperialist appeals to mobilize mass allies in support of their own particular program, becoming captives of the success of this rhetoric. At the same time, coalition leaders must invent further strategic myths to explain why the state has become encircled. With multiple groups strongly committed to their own programs and no strong broker to enforce priorities, these secondary effects of the logrolling process deepen the overexpansion.

In the case of Wilhelmine Germany, the interests of the navy and heavy industry in building a fleet made an enemy of Britain, while the army's rigid war plan ensured that France would be an enemy. Russia was an enemy in part because of her rivalry with Germany's ally Austria, but also because Germany kept trying to coerce Russia to accept a one-sided tariff arrangement, excluding Russian grain from Germany to please the Junkers while demanding low Russian tariffs for German manufactures to please the Ruhr. Complicating matters further, neither the Junkers nor the industrialists were willing to bear the tax burden to pay for the land and naval arms races these policies provoked.


[72. The following account draws on Kehr and his modern follower, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, The German Empire, 1871-1918 (Leamington Spa, N.H., 1985), who stress elite interests and social imperialist manipulation, and on Eley, Reshaping, who stresses the autonomous impetus for imperialism from the middle class.]

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Recognizing that the general insolvency of the "marriage of iron and rye" was jeopardizing their individual programs, each cartel used strategic ideologies to mobilize mass support to pass the costs of overcommitment to its coalition partners. In turn, mass groups exploited the elites' imperialist ideologies to argue that if the world was really as the cartels portrayed it, then the old elite groups were not acting aggressively enough to parry its dangers. Coalition makers caught in this maelstrom had to develop their own strategic ideologies to explain how their program would succeed—or later, why it was turning into so much trouble abroad. The more overcommitted Germany's foreign policy became, the more the individual cartels needed to mobilize support to protect their programs, and the more the coalition leaders had to invent myths to justify German overexpansion. The whole process was like riding a tiger: the impetus for overexpansion and its ideological justification fed on itself to the point that the only safe option for the players and the coalition makers was to stay on the tiger, making a desperate gamble that would result in either world power or collapse.

**Offensive détente.** A more moderate outcome of logrolling is offensive détente. In these cases both imperial and anti-imperial interests were represented among the ruling cartels. In Taisho Japan in the 1920s, for example, military and naval imperialists had seats at the table, but so did light industrial trading cartels (zaibatsu), which needed good relations with America and China. The logrolling problem was to devise a formula that would give each of several key players what they wanted most: an autarkic mainland empire for the army, a capital ship building program for the navy, and détente and free trade for the zaibatsu. Shidehara diplomacy, which envisioned America's acquiescence to Japan's gradual "Finlandization" of China, was the strategy for meeting most of these irreconcilable interests simultaneously. Like most strategies of offensive détente, it was too clever by half and broke down by provoking Chinese and ultimately American resistance.

Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev also pursued a strategy of offensive détente. He offered an arms buildup to the military, Third World expansion to the orthodox ideologues, and détente and technology transfer to the cultural and technical intelligentsia. His rationale was the "correlation of forces" theory, which held that unilateral Soviet gains and détente were not only compatible, but mutually reinforcing.

74. Apart from Snyder, "Gorbachev Revolution," the work that comes closest to making this argument is Harry Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1983).

In both of these cases, pro-expansionist and pro-détente cartels failed to cancel each other out and reach a compromise at some midpoint. Rather, each insisted on getting what it wanted most. Incompatibilities were ignored, deferred, or rationalized away. Cartel deals and their legitimating ideologies blocked criticism of dubious imperialist policies by anti-imperialist elites. Thus incompatible or unreachable goals were not evaluated, scaled down, and reconciled, as a unitary rational actor would have handled them, through a value-integrating compromise at some optimum point.

Despite these similarities, the Brezhnev and the Shidehara cases differed radically in their ultimate outcome. The Soviets ultimately learned that the "correlation of forces" theory was, as Gorbachev has implied, a "world of illusions."76 The Japanese pushed on further, still clinging to the paper tiger theory that the rapacious United States would somehow not resist Japanese hegemony until it was too late. The main difference was that in the Soviet case relatively strong central authorities controlled the logrolling, as in the late Brezhnev era, or moved to end the pernicious game entirely, as in the Gorbachev years. With the passing of the genro, Japan had no similar body to impose a more encompassing perspective on the parochial contending factions.77

In most of these examples of cartelized politics, the logrolled policy created an outcome that was disastrous even for the logrollers themselves. In such cases, why don't at least some of the logrollers defect from a coalition agreement that is turning out to have negative payoffs? Several answers are possible, and one or more may apply in any given case of overexpansion. In some, coalition dynamics are central to the failure to retreat; in others, the coalition setting is an exacerbating factor.

Collective action problems within the coalition. Self-restraint among the participants in a logroll contributes to the collective good. But each logroller has a stronger incentive to pursue its parochial interest in expansion than to promote the collective interest in restraint. This problem of collective action is complicated by uncertainty about the long-run costs of expansion. Theorists of logrolling (or "vote trading") note that the negative consequences of a particular deal may be difficult to foresee. Logrollers can easily calculate the direct concentrated
benefits to themselves from the deal, whereas their costs accrue only through the indirect, long-run effects of overcommitment. Once these costs become apparent, the logrollers have three basic choices.

The first is to dissolve the coalition and agree to sacrifice their concentrated benefits in the overall interest of a solvent policy. Any group that follows this course risks discrediting itself by admitting that its former arguments were based on self-seeking myths. It also risks the danger that other groups will continue logrolling even if it defects. In that case it would lose the benefits of logrolling but still bear its costs.\(^78\)

The second option is to jockey for advantage within the coalition, making other groups bear the rising costs of the logroll. This requires intensified mythmaking and mobilizing mass allies, both of which exacerbate the problem of overexpansion.

The third option, which can be combined with the second, is to keep the coalition intact, hoping that some risky gambit will succeed in making the logroll solvent. With luck this might be achieved, for example, by a successful preventive war, by the achievement of cumulative gains through empire, or by successful coercive diplomacy to break the encircling alliance. Justifying this route within the coalition and to the mass public requires still further salesmanship on behalf of the myths of empire.

**Pressure from above and below.** In some political systems, the destructive dynamic of cartel logrolling may be prevented by pressure for imperial retreatment from above (from central state authorities) and from below (from the mass population). But in cartelized systems, such pressure is likely to be part of the problem rather than part of the solution. State leaders are not autonomous, farsighted authorities, focused on long-run state interests. Instead, they are coalition managers whose position depends on keeping the logroll going. Of course, where the broker has significant independent authority, this problem is mitigated. The stronger the coalition broker vis-à-vis the separate groups participating (that is, the more the cartelized system resembles a unitary system), the more likely it is that the state will retrench from overexpansion.

Similarly, mass pressures in a cartelized system are more likely to be a source of trouble than a salutary constraint. Under such conditions, the interests of the general public are not articulated through well-institutionalized, competitive elections. Rather, mass groups are mobi-

\(^78\) Brams, *Paradoxes*, 102-4, argues that even when externalities from other vote trades outweigh the benefits from one's own trade, continued trading may remain rational for the individual, out of fear of exploitation (that others will continue to trade votes anyway).

lized through ideological appeals by elite cartels in ways that simply contribute to the cartelized nature of politics. In the absence of developed democratic institutions, mass mobilization is a spur to reckless political behavior by elites rather than a check on it.\(^79\)

**Blowback.** Mythmakers can become trapped by their own myths in any kind of political system. This is especially likely in cartelized systems, for two reasons. First, through logrolling, parochial interests capture the state's propaganda apparatus and don its mantle of disinterested authority. Thus the state obscures the parochial origins of the myths of empire, which are therefore more likely to be mistaken for truth, even by a large part of the elite. Second, cartels' competitive mobilization of mass groups is especially likely to cause severe blowback. The political position of the cartels may become heavily dependent on their mass backers, who in a cartelized system are unlikely to have access to the information and analysis needed to distinguish myth from reality.

**Inmobile interests and short time horizons.** One reason groups in cartelized systems have such concentrated interests is that their assets are not very mobile. Such cartels frequently find themselves wedged to a narrow economic sector or bureaucratic skill that is becoming obsolete. As a result, they have an incentive to adopt reckless strategies, which sometimes include war and expansion, to recoup waning advantages and forestall social change. Their declining prospects lead them to discount the long-term costs and risks of such policies.

**The Democratic System**

When political power is highly dispersed throughout society, as in an electoral system with universal suffrage and administrative institutions beholden to elected officials, diffuse interests will have a stronger voice.\(^80\) Thus democracy creates checks on concentrated interests that would promote overexpansion.

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In the simplest case, there is a spectrum of voters with interests ranging from strongly pro-imperial to strongly anti-imperial. In a democratic system, parties must present platforms to try to capture the voters in the middle of this spectrum if they are to have a chance to win.\(^\text{81}\) Median voters are likely to have a variety of diffuse interests for and against empire and military programs. They object to taxes and to the conscription of their sons to conquer and administer the empire. Their other interests affected by empire tend to be mixed. Some may have jobs that depend on military programs or imperial trade, and they may have investments in imperial enterprises, but for some their wages may be lower because capital has been exported abroad. They may purchase products that cost less because they come from an exploited colonial economy—or that cost more because they come from a subsidized, protected, autarkic empire. Their physical security may be greater because of astute imperial expansion or military expenditure—or less because of foolish expansion or an arms race. Thus, subject to a plethora of diffuse, cross-cutting interests, median voters face net incentives that reflect those of the society as a whole. On average, they will tend to support only imperial enterprises that are profitable for the society and reject those that are not.

In this they roughly mirror the incentive structure of the unitary rational actor or the ruling oligarchy with encompassing, long-run interests.\(^\text{82}\) The structural incentive to compete for the middle of the spectrum in competitive democratic politics forces politicians to reject the appeals of concentrated interests if they would alienate median voters. Strongly pro-imperial interests therefore have the choice of voting for slightly pro-imperial candidates or not voting at all.\(^\text{83}\)

The classic example is Gladstone’s Midlothian campaign of 1880, the first attempt at modern mass politics after the Second Reform Bill of 1867 vastly widened the franchise. By appealing to the widespread sense that Disraeli’s interventionist policies and costly brushfire wars represented a perversion of the national interest, Gladstone co-opted median voters and won a striking victory.\(^\text{84}\) Although this electoral strategy does not always prevail in mass democracies, that democracy empowers people with diffuse anti-imperial interests is a major factor explaining why the overexpansion of the American and British empires has been moderate.

The “intelligence of democracy” does not always work so perfectly, however. Several impediments may prevent outcomes from matching the predictions of the median voter model. One reason is that cross-pressured median voters, sometimes lacking good information or analysis regarding their own interests, are good targets for demagogic propaganda. Nixon can oversell détente to them, or Truman can oversell the Cold War.\(^\text{85}\) If elite groups collude to withhold information and rig public debates on behalf of a logrolled coalition, formal democratic voting may make little difference.

Another reason is that representative institutions may work imperfectly and create cartelized blocs within different segments of the elected government. In the United States, for example, power over foreign affairs is shared between the presidency and various congressional bodies. Though these institutions are all made up of politicians subject to the preferences of voters, they are elected at different times by different constituencies, some of them parochial or manipulatable. When this is the case, policy-making necessarily involves bargaining among various party and regional factions and specialized legislative committees, as well as unelected bureaucratic professionals. Even in a democracy this bargaining process, which provides opportunities for logrolling, may resemble a limited form of cartelized politics.

A further problem is that some blocs of voters may have concentrated interests in predatory behavior. In Britain in the 1890s, for example, voters in Birmingham’s declining industries were a significant constituency behind Joseph Chamberlain’s bid for a protected, autarkic empire. Junker and Nazi promises of Ukrainian Lebensraum for German farmers had similar effects. If these interests vote as blocs, then democratic politics may resemble cartel politics.\(^\text{86}\)

Finally, as some rational-choice theorists argue, the striving of politi-
cal parties to co-opt the middle of the political spectrum may operate inefﬁciently when opinion is ranged along more than one dimension. There may be no unique, stable strategy when views on empire vary independently from views on, say, tariffs or the welfare state. During partisan realignments in American politics, the existence of competing lines of cleavage has tended to turn voters into cartelized blocs, available for recruitment to a logged coalition. This gives concentrated elite interests, including imperial interests, a chance to lead coalitions in directions they favor. For example, disagreements about European and Asian commitments during the early Cold War period were not settled in a presidential electoral showdown, in part because partisan divisions did not coincide with foreign policy cleavages. Rather, foreign policy disputes were settled through congressional logrolling, in which support for Asian commitments was traded for support for European commitments in a global Cold War consensus. Especially when cartelized blocs are recruited into political coalitions by elite interest groups, outcomes in democratic political systems may resemble a less extreme version of the outcomes found in cartelized systems. 

The Unitary Political System

A unitary system is dominated by a single ruler or by a ruling group sharing common interests, which I will call a unitary oligarchy. As an ideal type, the unitary oligarchy has group interests that are diffuse and encompassing, not parochial. The unitary oligarchy’s interests are diffuse insofar as its assets and skills are mobile across economic and bureaucratic sectors. In managing the flow of resources to and from varied sectors of society, the unitary oligarchy has no parochial reason to back the success of some sectors over others. Similarly, the unitary oligarchy’s interests are encompassing insofar as it is the steward of the whole national economy and has the biggest stake in the long-run survival of the state. Moreover, by deﬁnition, the interests of the unitary oligarchy are relatively homogeneous within the oligarchical group, so it has no parochial factions to engage in logrolling.

In this ideal case, the unitary oligarchy has little incentive for imperial overexpansion. Perhaps such a ruling group might have an incentive to use threat inflation and symbolic victories to enhance its power at home when the legitimacy of its rule is in doubt, but this incentive should normally be held in check by its encompassing concerns. As the proprietor of the national economy, the unitary ruler has a powerful incentive not to provoke a self-encirclement or to drain resources in counterproductive or excessive ways. Thus, the unitary ruling group should tend to weigh both the costs and the beneﬁts of empire from a broadly national point of view. Trade-offs should be resolved not by ignoring diffuse interests, as logrolling cartels would do, but by seeking the optimal point where the beneﬁts of some interests in the pursuit of others is minimized. Calculating in this way might occasionally result in some overexpansion, but it should usually be limited, and corrective learning should be prompt.

This reasoning ﬁts fairly well with the policies adopted by the unitary oligarchies studied in this book—the Meiji founding fathers, the Whig aristocracy, the Soviet Politburo, and to some extent, the U.S. East Coast foreign policy Establishment. In these cases, when interest groups or individual leaders were about to embark on programs of excessive expansion, the oligarchy as a whole tended to check their excesses.

Some qualiﬁcations must be added in moving from the ideal type to the real cases of unitary oligarchy, however. In some cases, the real
unitary oligarchy had a mixture of parochial and encompassing interests, which affected its choices about imperial expansion. These partly parochial interests typically stemmed from the organizational or economic origins of the ruling group. For example, in two cases the unitary ruling group had especially strong connections to a narrow interest: the ties of the Meiji geijutsu to the Japanese military, and the ties of the Soviet Politburo to the Communist party apparatus. The stronger the ties of the unitary oligarchy to a narrow imperial interest, the greater the likelihood that it would tolerate some overexpansion. Still, such ties to narrow interests had to be weighed against the oligarchy’s encompassing interests as the proprietor of the national polity and economy.

An even more fundamental qualification is necessary when all power lies in the hands of one person. As with a unitary oligarchy, the diffuse and encompassing interests of a single dictator should in principle check any inclinations toward overexpansion. But the validity of this hypothesis depends greatly on the dictator’s continuing ability to calculate long-run costs and benefits rationally. Though the dictator may face no social incentive for overexpansion, there may be no immediate social sanction either. Thus there is no direct check on the leader’s personal quirks or strategic mythology. Blowback is a particular risk when the dictator’s political ideas were formed in an environment dominated by mythmaking cartels (as in Hitler’s case) or the use of foreign threats for national mobilization (as in Stalin’s). The logic of unitary rule does not impel a Hitler toward overexpansion, but likewise it does nothing to check him.

Conclusions and Caveats on Coalition Politics

The domestic structure explanation can account both for the endemic bias toward overexpansion and for variations in its intensity. All three types of domestic structure—unitary, cartelized, and democratic—offer some opportunities for concentrated interests in empire, militarism, and threat inflation to push to the fore. Yet concentrated interests in empire have a much greater chance to dominate political decision making in the cartelized system than in the others. It is easier for their programs to get adopted and harder for them to be reversed.

Some qualifications, which may already be obvious from the examples above, should be made more explicit. The three systems are ideal types. Real systems are likely to be hybrids that entail some unique consequences of their own. Thus, Wilhelmine Germany combined

dominant cartels with nascent democracy in a way that made the outcome worse than if the cartels had simply logrolled among themselves. In another hybrid pattern, Brezhnev’s Russia combined some of the stabilizing features of a unitary oligarchy with some of the expansionist characteristics of interest group logrolling. Gorbachev’s Russia has been attempting a different combination, aligning the strong center with democratizing forces against the orthodox ideological, old industrial, and military cartels. If this works, it could produce a favorable alignment for empowering diffuse anti-imperial and antimilitarist interests. The ideal types may yield some gross predictions that help explain very general variations across the cases, but more precise analysis depends on complex variations on the main patterns that are peculiar to the individual case.

Factors Shaping Domestic Structure

Given the different consequences that flow from unitary, cartelized, and democratic political structures, it will be useful to determine the origins of those structures. For example, understanding and evaluating Gorbachev’s attempt to break the Soviet Union’s imperialist cartels requires a theory of the origins of domestic structures and the conditions that promote changes in them. 94

Building on the work of Alexander Gerschenkron, I hypothesize that the timing of a state’s industrialization correlates closely with the concentration of power in its society and with the concentration of its elites’ interests. 95 Early industrialization, as in Britain and the United States, is associated with diffuse elite interests and the development of mass democracy. Late industrialization, as in Germany and Japan, is associated with immobile, concentrated elite interests and cartelized politics. “Late, late industrialization,” as in the Soviet Union, is associated with a hypercentralized political and economic system, producing a relatively unified elite with relatively encompassing interests. 96 This is

94. Snyder, “Gorbachev Revolution.”
95. In addition to Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), this argument also rests on Barrington Moore, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston, 1966), and in part on arguments about the mobility of capital by Jeff Frieden, Debt, Development, and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 1955–1985 (Princeton, N.J., 1991). I do not claim that the timing of industrialization causes a particular distribution of power and interests in society. The reverse seems just as likely. That is, the prevailing distribution of power and elite interests affects the timing and nature of the state’s industrialization. For my present purpose, it is sufficient to hypothesize that they correlate.
In Germany, by contrast, late industrialization correlated with a pattern of concentrated, immobile elite interests and a cartellized political system. Junker economic assets were not diversified into mobile, commercial investments, either before or after Germany's industrialization. Rather, they were tied to the exploitation of immobile factors of production. The “expansion of grain-growing” in East Elbia rested on a repressive labor system using labor dues and serfdom and depended on the “junkers' personal economic control.” This contrasted sharply with the British pattern of enclosures for sheep raising, the “gradual release of labor power” that became available for manufacturing, and the natural diversification of capital from sheep raising into the financing of textile production and other commercial ventures.¹⁰⁸

When Germany finally did industrialize, it exploited what Alexander Gerschenkron has called the “advantages of backwardness,” adopting off-the-shelf technology and knowing in advance what industrialization should look like. Germany’s industrialization was centrally financed by bank capital; it truncated the textile stage to focus on large-scale iron and steel production and proceeded rapidly. This produced centralized industrial structures with concentrated interests and left the preexisting military-feudal elite un integrat ed into the nation’s economic transformation.¹⁰⁹ Rapid industrialization also caused rapidly increasing demands for expanded political participation, which could be accommodated to prevailing elite interests only by the selective recruiting of mass groups as fractious junior partners in elite cartels.¹¹⁰

Japan’s variant of late development was different in many respects from Germany’s but similar in the essentials. Unlike Germany’s rapid industrialization, Japan’s proceeded from a textile base and at the outset broke the power of the top level of the landed elite. Nonetheless, it manifested many of the key characteristics of late, “top-down” industrialization.¹¹¹ It was to a significant degree centrally financed, and it worked through the medium of highly concentrated commercial and industrial cartels, which counted on coercive state power to keep wages down at home and to conquer exclusive markets abroad. The ruling oligarchy provided pork-barrel subsidies for rural landlords in exchange for limited mass support in an electoral system skewed

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against the working class. And most important, the transformation was carried out by a modernizing military elite that retained many of its parochial corporate interests along with its more encompassing national concerns. Thus politics was cartelized among a number of elite sectors with distinct, concentrated interests—especially the army and the navy, but also the local landlords and the zaibatsu.

Russia's variant of the pattern of late development was so extreme that it created a new pattern, different in kind from Germany's. Extreme backwardness led to the destruction of the old elite and urban classes, largely through international competition, allowing a modernizing Bolshevik elite to create and dominate an extremely centralized political and economic structure. But the partial devolution of totalitarian institutions into concentrated military-industrial and party interest groups produced a comparatively mild form of cartelization, mitigated by the relatively encompassing interests of the Politburo elite.

In short, variation in the type and timing of industrialization explains most of the variation on three other dimensions in the causal chain leading to overexpansion. Late industrialization produces a cartelized political structure, which magnifies the effectiveness of concentrated interests in expansion, favors the development of expansionist strategic myths, and promotes self-encirclement and imperial overextension. In contrast, early industrialization produces a democratic political structure, which empowers diffuse interests opposing overexpansion, promotes learning when strategic myths are proved false, and keeps expansion relatively close to the point where its marginal benefits make up for its marginal costs. Late, late industrialization produces roughly similar results by vesting power in a unified elite with relatively encompassing interests.

### Table 1. Timing of industrialization and overexpansion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Elite interests</th>
<th>Type of politics</th>
<th>Strategic mythmaking</th>
<th>Strategic learning</th>
<th>Overexpansion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early</td>
<td>U.S., G.B.</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Prompt</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late</td>
<td>Germany, Japan</td>
<td>Cartelized</td>
<td>Extreme</td>
<td>Backward</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late, Late</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Encompassing</td>
<td>Unitary</td>
<td>Prompt</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The real cases do not conform precisely to the ideal types and often reveal combinations of two patterns.

*By this I mean that failure leads to ever more reckless attempts at expansion.

103. Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness,* chap. 6; Snyder, "Gorbachev Revolution."
tion of the 1930s, there was no pileup of diverse social groups at that point.  

Testing the Competing Explanations

Three competing explanations for self-encirclement and overexpansion have been proposed: Realist, cognitive, and coalition politics and ideology. Five case studies are used in constructing a variety of tests of covariation, many pitting two or more theories head to head in conditions where they should make opposite predictions. The purpose is to eliminate theories that fail many tests and to show in what ways the surviving theories contribute to explaining the outcomes of the cases.

What Is to Be Explained?

All three theories seek to explain counterproductive aggressive behavior—specifically the presence, absence, and extent of “overexpansion.” Overexpansion comes in two general forms, “self-encirclement” and “imperial overextension.” The degree of self-encirclement is measured primarily by the ratio of the war-waging resources of one’s enemies to those of one’s allies: where a country manages to get its side outnumbered, it is said to be self-encircled. Defeat in a major war, persistence in a losing arms race, and counterproductive attempts to break the opposing alliance with threats are corroborating evidence of self-encirclement. “Imperial overextension” means expansion beyond the point where material costs equal material benefits, measured where possible in quantifiable economic and security terms. Where hard measures are elusive, judgments by the protagonists’ successors, by contemporary observers, and by historians serve as surrogates.

All three theories also claim to explain, as intervening variables, decision makers’ advocacy of strategic concepts. These concepts are treated as simple dichotomies: advocacy of security through expansion or through retrenchment; expectation of dominoes or quagmires as the general rule; anticipation of balancing or bandwagoning in response to threats; images of the opponent as threatening but irresolute or defensive but provokable. Public statements and private beliefs are both important sources of evidence in measuring these intervening variables. Since the coalition politics theory argues that politicians may be constrained to act in accordance with their rhetoric, public statements are no less important than private ones in assessing the prevalence of particular strategic concepts.

Measuring the Causal Variables

I use two strategies, one direct and one indirect, for measuring the “independent” or causal variables of the three competing theories in the case studies. First, I measure the causal variable directly. For example, to measure the cartelization of group interests, I report the findings of economic historians regarding the concentration of groups’ assets in particular sectors and their mobility between different uses. Second, I measure the causal variable indirectly, by a process tracing method. Thus, to determine whether the political system is cartelized, I observe the political process to see if groups behave as they would in a cartelized system—that is, whether they logroll.

Case Selection

The five countries chosen have been the main contenders for power in the international system in the industrial era. The imperial behavior of each country is traced over two to four periods, including times of greater or lesser overexpansion. Periods in which the expansionism and the relative power of the country were at a peak are covered in extra detail. I do not cover the problems of decolonization faced by declining powers, though the coalition politics theory might be relevant to this.

France and Italy, powers of a somewhat lesser rank, were excluded to make the research more manageable. They might well fit the coalition politics theory. Italy, a late industrializer with a ruling coalition mirroring the German marriage of iron and rye, was a chronic overexpander, spending twice the government’s annual revenue to conquer useless Ethiopia. Likewise, Napoleon III of France is often portrayed as the prototype social imperialist coalition manager, using a flamboyant foreign policy to help manage a heterogeneous society poised between tradition and modernity. In all likelihood his case would have many parallels with that of Palmerston.

111. Dennis Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire (New York, 1976), 67, 99.
Myths of Empire

Tsarist Russia was also omitted, though it too might fit the coalition theory. Russia's rapid industrialization at the end of the nineteenth century corresponded with a period of imperial expansion, though Russia was expansionist in earlier periods as well. One study of Russian foreign policy-making between 1905 and 1914 shows that Russia was least expansionist in the period of strong unitary government under Stolypin and most expansionist when various bureaucratic cartels advanced their own imperial schemes under weak premiers.113

Preindustrial states, including the prominent case of Napoleonic France, were excluded for two reasons. First, many of them had absolute rulers, and the predictions of the coalition theory are weakest and least interesting in such cases. These cases would not test the main claims of the coalition politics theory. Second, preindustrial societies, lacking modern class, sectoral, and bureaucratic structures, would be more difficult to compare with the contemporary cases that are of greatest interest. Qualitatively different categories would be required for identifying groups, interests, institutions, and cleavages.114

Also absent are cases of overextension or self-encirclement by small powers. I would not expect the coalition politics theory to fit small powers. The literature on political economy suggests that domestic structure is a good predictor of foreign economic strategy for big powers, but for small powers foreign economic circumstances shape domestic political institutions. Cartelization has opposite effects in big and small powers. In big countries, cartels try to use state power to conquer or to "beggar their neighbors." In small countries, cartels work out arrangements for sharing the unavoidable burdens imposed by international pressures.115

The cases permit three kinds of tests of the rival explanations for variations in overexpansion and strategic beliefs. Tests of covariation across countries—extremely overexpansionist powers like Germany and Japan versus moderately overexpansionist powers like the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union—assess whether these variations in outcome match variations in strategic circumstances (the Realist explanation), intellectually formative experiences (the cognitive explanation), or type of political system (the coalition politics explanation).

Second are tests of covariation over time within a country. Do periods of isolation and expansion follow from changes in political structure—for example, Shidehara diplomacy during "Taisho democracy" and the southern advance under militarist logrolling (the coalition theory)? Or do they follow from an intensification of the security dilemma (the Realist theory) or from salient new lessons (the cognitive theory)? Or does a combination of two theories explain the outcome? For example, does a moderate intensification of the security dilemma trigger big domestic changes, which lead to overexpansionism?

Third are tests of covariation across individuals and groups within cases. Do variations in beliefs line up with variations in interests or in information or formative experiences? This test is an important hurdle for the interest group and cognitive theories. It cannot be used to eliminate the rational actor theory, however, because even though the views of many statesmen and strategists may coincide with their parochial interests, the political system may nonetheless have selected the winner of the strategic debate on the merits of the arguments.

Finally, tests can discriminate between the different kinds of domestic politics explanations. Can the outcome of the cases be explained by the process of logrolling alone, without invoking the role of strategic ideology? Conversely, can interest group ideology in itself explain the outcome without reference to logrolling? Or are both logrolling and strategic ideology necessary to explain the outcome?

In principle, these tests might have concluded that only one of the theories had any explanatory power. In fact my findings are more complicated. The single most successful explanation was the theory of coalition politics and ideology. Cognitive explanations were the least successful. By itself, the international system explanation was insufficient to explain the cases of overexpansion. In conjunction with preexisting domestic conditions, however, international circumstances occasionally played a key role in strengthening the hand of imperialist cartels. Realistic adaptation to international conditions explained the behavior of democratic states quite well. For these cases, domestic structure

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115. Peter Katzenstein, in Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, N.Y., 1985) and Corporatism and Change: Austria, Switzerland, and the Politics of Industry (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984) argues that small states' domestic structure is shaped by the need to adjust to the international environment; conversely, Katzenstein, in Between Power and Plenty, shows that large states' foreign economic strategies are shaped by their domestic structures, as shaped in turn by the timing of their industrialization. Also, a Gerschenkron-based coalition theory may not apply to "late, late" developing countries in the Third World, because their resource endowments differ from those of the European states that Gerschenkron studied. Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions, 163–65.
explained why the state was able to adapt well to the incentives of its position in the international system.

Thus the two explanations that achieved some success, the domestic and Realist theories, were both rooted in the concepts of power, interests, and coalitions among conflict groups. Using the broadest sense of the term, these are both realist theories. This pattern of findings suggests a need to develop hypotheses about power, interests, coalitions, and ideology that can operate simultaneously at the domestic and international levels. It is useful to know that the domestic aspects of coalition making strongly influence a state's conflict behavior, but it would also be useful to have a theory that would explain parsimoniously how domestic and international coalition politics interact. I make no attempt to do this here, but my results suggest that it is a necessary next step.

Criteria for Historical Judgments

Primary research covering the domestic and international politics of five great powers over a span of 150 years is not feasible for one author. Therefore I have had to rely on the work of historians. When historians addressed a question I was investigating, and when a consensus existed among them, I have followed that consensus. Often, however, I have asked questions that cut across the categories historians have worked within. In many cases there existed a fairly well developed historical literature on separate aspects of the larger question I was asking. Thus there was typically a literature on strategic ideas, another on domestic sources of foreign policy, another on economic change and political development, and so forth, but there was little available on the connections among them. In most instances I have assembled an overall interpretation of the case that combines existing interpretations of its separate aspects. Thus I have relied on historians and area studies specialists to provide the building blocks for my arguments, but I have combined them in ways that historians, for the most part, have not used.

The most innovative historical interpretation is of the Palmerston case study. Because as a whole it is significantly different from any existing interpretation, I develop the argument in extra detail to demonstrate my case. The other cases offer arguments that are more closely drawn from existing literature, so I often cite sources rather than recite details. In part of one case, Soviet foreign policy in the late 1940s, there is insufficient evidence to choose among competing explanations.

Overall, I make no claim that the case studies in this volume offer a conclusive test of the theories. Because many of the issues I confront are subject to continuing historical debate, and because many others involve questions that historians have not directly addressed, my interpretations are far from definitive. Nonetheless, I do claim that these cases go beyond mere illustrations of theoretical points. They rely on the best, most recent, and—when possible—most widely shared judgments of historians. They are set up as systematic tests, using methods of controlled comparison. In this sense the cases constitute a preliminary test, subject to further historical and theoretical scrutiny.
island of Grenada. Consequently the "Reagan Doctrine" sought indirect means of intervention, especially proxy wars against new Soviet client states in the Third World. \(^{253}\) When Congress placed limits even on indirect intervention in Nicaragua, the Reagan administration resorted to private and clandestine funding for the insurgent forces.

The Bush administration's war to eject Iraq from Kuwait does not necessarily signal a waning of democratic constraints on imperial overextension. Indeed, there was no overexpansion, no disproportion between strategic costs and benefits. Preventing Saddam Hussein from dominating half of the world's oil reserves was a vital national interest, and the economic cost of fighting was shared among several wealthy countries. The strategy of a prolonged air campaign before the start of the ground offensive took into account the public's desire to minimize casualties.

True, the sales pitch for the war included most of the myths of empire. Kuwait was portrayed as a crucial domino: if Iraq were allowed to retain it, Saddam would soon hold sway over the entire Arab world, which would join the Iraqi bandwagon in a holy war against Israel. Saddam was a paper tiger: easy to defeat now, but certain to grow stronger in the future. Benefits would be of El Dorado proportions because defeating Saddam would safeguard the "new world order." The costs of not fighting would be enormous, it was claimed, since other aggressors would be emboldened. \(^{254}\)

But experts and political figures critically evaluated these assertions in widely publicized debates. Congress and the public had a much fuller airing of diverse views and pertinent evidence before the Gulf War than they had before Congress voted on the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, for example. The use of the myths of empire to justify the Gulf War shows that democratic scrutiny of strategic assertions is still needed. The fact that after such scrutiny Congress voted for war does not necessarily mean that democratic oversight was a failure.

\(^{253}\) Stephen Van Evera, "The Case against Intervention," *Atlantic* 266 (July 1990): 72-80, shows that the costs of these proxy wars were very high for Third World societies, even though they were low for the United States.


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### Overexpansion:

**Origins and Antidotes**

All the nations examined in this book exhibited a tendency toward overexpansion, in the sense of provoking self-encirclement by their belligerent behavior, blundering into quagmires on the periphery, or both. These cases include all the industrialized great powers except France, covering the periods of their greatest relative power and imperial activism. \(^1\) The tendency toward overexpansion varies greatly, however, both across cases and over time.

#### The Pattern of Outcomes

Germany and Japan were most inclined toward disastrous overexpansion; Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States were less so. When Germany and Japan encountered resistance, they usually took this as a signal to redouble their efforts to achieve security through expansion. When the other states met resistance they typically reined, attempting to defuse mounting opposition by offering concessions to their opponents.

Even the worst of the overexpansionist states went through periods where this impulse was kept under control however. Germany was least inclined toward overexpansion under Bismarck and during the Weimar period. Japan was least inclined toward overexpansion under the Meiji *genro* in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and during the Taisho period of the 1920s. Conversely, even the states that were less self-destructive occasionally flirted with overexpansion. For Britain, in the periods I examined, this included certain interludes in

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1. See chapter 2 for a discussion of case selection criteria.
Myths of Empire

The Palmerstonian period and the scramble for Africa in the 1890s. For the Soviet Union it included the militant period between 1947 and 1950, the period of Khruschev's missile diplomacy from 1958 to 1962, and Brezhnev's overextension in the Third World. For the United States, incidents of overexpansion occurred during the period of the Cold War consensus, from the Korean War through the Vietnam War.

Strategic Concepts

All the states justified their policies through a recurring set of arguments for security through expansion. These included the domino theory, its Thermopylae corollary, paper tiger images of the adversary, bandwagon and big stick theories of alliance formation, belief in defensive advantages, perception of windows of opportunity for preventive action, and El Dorado arguments about the benefits of conquest. The prevalence of such ideas correlated closely with the inclination toward overexpansion. Such ideas were most common, most extreme, and least tempered by openeness to contradictory evidence in Germany and Japan, and during periods of greatest overextension in the other countries.

The very structure of these ideas suggests they were ex post facto justifications for policy and elements of a strategic ideology rather than mere beliefs or perceptions. In many cases the concepts underlying the policy of security through expansion came close to self-contradiction. Opponents were seen as unappeasably aggressive, yet somehow inert in resisting aggressive measures to contain their expansion. In other cases decision makers used analytical double standards to support their conclusions or argued from opposite premises to support the same conclusion. Frequently they failed to search systematically for relevant information, and they punished people who discovered disconfirming evidence. These pathologies of logic and information processing were worst in the cases and periods of greatest overexpansion.

Position in the International System

The tendency toward overexpansion correlated at least roughly with each state's position in the international system. Of the five powers, Germany and Japan were the least buffered by size, geographical location, or resource endowments from the dangers of international anarchy. Consequently they had the most to gain by attempting to expand to a position of economic and military self-sufficiency.
Myths of Empire

Cognitive Explanations

Cognitive theory might offer a variety of explanations for the belief in security through expansion. In the case studies I have carried out a fairly systematic test of one cognitive explanation—that strategic ideas are rooted in intellectually formative lessons. I found remarkably little support for this explanation. Typically, lessons of the past were invoked as rationalizations to advocate policies preferred on other grounds. People drew different lessons from similar experiences if their interests were different. They switched their preferred historical analogies when their policy preferences changed.

I do not claim that in all cases these findings decisively refute cognitive theory as an explanation for strategic beliefs. Sometimes ingrained lessons from formative experiences are unquestionably important. For example, the lessons of the trench stalemate in the First World War had a powerful impact on European military doctrine in the interwar period, countering emerging offensive technological possibilities and the usual offensive proclivities of military organizations. Moreover, I have not attempted systematic tests of a host of other cognitive hypotheses about strategic perceptions. Nor have I eliminated the possibility that certain cognitive biases—attrition errors, for example—create a weak but widespread predisposition to overexpand, which interacts with geopolitical or domestic political variables in triggering specific instances of overexpansion. Nonetheless, my cases suggest that cognitive explanations for the belief in security through expansion should be approached critically.

Domestic Coalition Politics

For the most part, the coalition politics theory passed both cross sectional and time series tests. Cartelized political systems like Germany and Japan were the most recklessly overexpansionist; democratic systems and systems ruled by unitary oligarchies were less so. Each of the countries was most expansionist when it was most cartelized; it was less so when it was more unitary or democratic. One period deviates from this pattern; two others are questionable.

The obvious deviant is Hitler's Germany, a comparatively unitary political system that was extreme in its expansionism. Nonetheless, this case does not falsify the coalition politics theory for two reasons. First, as I argued in chapter 2, unitary systems ruled by a single individual lack the political checks that are characteristic of systems ruled by unitary oligarchies. The coalition politics theory does not necessarily predict that individual dictators will always overexpend, but it is not falsified if they do.

Second, in accord with most recent historians, I argue that Hitler internalized the geopolitical concepts that had become common currency in German strategic discourse as a result of the mythmaking of the cartelized Wilhelmine period. In this way the coalition theory, in amended form, can explain the Hitler period. It would obviously be even better for the coalition theory if one could argue that strategic myths helped Hitler come to power or stay in power. Some historians have tried this argument, but most do not find it fully convincing.

Another possibly deviant case is Stalin's aggressively militant policy between 1947 and 1950, a period of rule by an individual dictator. Thus, a unitary period produced the same overexpansionist outcome as did the later cartelized periods under Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Conversely, this unitary period produced a different outcome from the unitary but generally nonexpansionist interwar period. Though this pattern of outcomes is awkward for the coalition politics theory, it does not clearly refute that theory, for two reasons.

First, as in Hitler's case, the theory makes no hard predictions about individual dictatorships, so such cases are not decisive for the theory. Second, a number of scholars have argued that internal political needs strongly shaped Stalin's foreign and domestic policy in this period. He needed a tense, two-camp international environment to help consolidate Soviet power in Eastern Europe and reconsolidate the Soviet Union itself after the political relaxation of the war years. Part of Stalin's aim, in this view, was to divide and stymie institutionally based social groups, which became logrolling cartels after his death. Thus a variant of the cartelization argument might help explain Soviet overexpansion in the late 1940s.

Finally, the American case embodies a weaker variant of the domestic coalitions theory. Unlike the other cartelized cases, I do not claim that American politics as a whole became more cartelized during periods of global overexpansion, but only that policy-making on some foreign policy issues was affected by logrolling among cartels. This qualification notwithstanding, the case fits the coalition politics theory well:
Myths of Empire

America was inclined toward overexpansion while the logrolled Cold War elite consensus lasted; it was anti-interventionist in the more democratic period that followed the breakup of that consensus.

In the case studies and in these conclusions, I have often labeled each country or period as simply cartelized, unitary, or democratic. It would be obvious, however, that most political systems are hybrids, embodying different mixes of these three types. For example, Gladstonian Britain combined strong unitary elements (an oligarchy with diffuse interests) and strong democratic elements. In contrast, Brezhnevite Russia combined strong unitary elements (the Politburo oligarchy) and strong cartels. Gorbachev from 1987 to 1990 tried to create a more Gladstonian constellation of power, using pressure by unitary forces from above and democratic forces from below to reform the recalcitrant cartels. In Taisho Japan, unitary (genro), cartel, and democratic elements were all present to a significant degree.

For these various hybrids, different patterns of overexpansion are predicted. When cartels are weak but unitary and democratic forces are both strong, overexpansion should be minimal. When strong cartels are combined with strong unitary forces, overexpansion may occur, but should be tempered by the restraining effect of the unitary elements, which can broker and control the ill effects of cartel logrolling. When strong cartels combine with strong democratic pressures but there is no significant unitary element, the result is less clear. On one hand, democratic forces might be expected to restrain the worst excesses of cartel logrolling. On the other hand, cartel mythmakers might find fertile ground among the masses, making things even worse. As the Wilhelmine case shows, elite interest groups may even compete among themselves in using strategic ideologies to recruit mass allies.

My hypothesis is that the outcome depends on the balance of power between the cartelized and democratic forces. If the forces of cartelization force a well-institutionalized electoral democracy with open public debate and multiple sources of strategic information, then democracy will not as a check on the cartels' inclination toward overexpansion. This is the American pattern. If strong cartels face a situation of weakly institutionalized democracy and truncated debate, however, then increasing mass participation will exacerbate the cartels' tendency toward overexpansion, because selling strategic ideology to the masses will probably produce blowback effects that constrain the elite mythmakers themselves. This is the Wilhelmine pattern. It is also a current danger that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, where mass participation in politics is increasing rapidly and democratic institutions are not fully formed.


Overexpansion: Origins and Antidotes

In contrast, if democratization occurs under a relatively unitary system in which the leadership favors imperial restraint, then increasing political participation should do no harm. Strategic myths will be neither excessively manufactured nor excessively consumed. This is the Gladstonian case. It is also the likely outcome if Gorbachev succeeds in institutionalizing his democratic reform program.

Table 3 summarizes the tests of the domestic structure hypothesis and their results. The "overall" characterization is based on a comparison with other states. The characterization of different periods is based on a comparison with other periods in the development of the same country. For example, when I say that Taisho Japan is "more democratic," I mean compared with Meiji Japan or the Japan of the 1930s, not compared with other countries in the 1920s.

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In chapter 2 several variants of the domestic argument were advanced, stemming from the logical deduction that narrow interest groups normally lack the power to hijack state policy to their parochial, expansionist ends. Conversely, encompassing groups like the state and the ruling class would have the power but normally lack the motive. Thus the variants differ in the mechanism whereby parochial interests hijack state policy. One variant stresses the role of strategic ideologies propagated by individual groups. Another stresses logrolling. The most inclusive variant posits a role for the ideologies of separate groups, for logrolling processes, and for the ideologies propagated by political entrepreneurs managing logrolled coalitions.

Though the simpler, less inclusive variants can explain some aspects of the cases, the most inclusive variant is needed to explain most of the outcomes. In several cases the overexpansion extended far beyond what any single group would have individually preferred. Ideology and logrolling explain these unintended consequences. The cases strongly support the logical deduction that individual groups, without exploiting ideology, will lack either the power or the motive to hijack state policy for self-interested overexpansion. The only partial exception was the Kwantung army’s fait accompli in Manchuria. In this instance a narrow, parochial group simply acted on its own authority and dared its superiors to renounce the action. But to sustain the policy of imperial expansion, the Japanese army propagated an ideology of security and prosperity through expansion and entered into a logrolling arrangement with the navy.

All the cases included instances when individual groups used strategic ideology to sell parochial programs. Often this hinged on monopolies of information or expertise, but advantages in organizing and lobbying for publicity were also factors. Examples include the overselling of the Russian threat by British Near East specialists and Tirpitz’s selling of the battle fleet through the Navy League.

In none of the cases was this the whole story, however. When a single interest group’s overcommitted policies started to get the country into trouble, its strategic ideology inevitably came under intense scrutiny from other groups in society. The outcome of that scrutiny seems to have hinged more on broad political constellations than on the individual group’s power or persuasiveness. Democracies and military systems tended to pull misbehaving cartels into line, whereas logrolled systems tended to make excuses (coalition ideologies) to cover up the real causes of disastrous policies.

In the British case, for example, the interventionists’ strategic ideolo-

gy helped get Britain into an Afghan war at the end of the 1830s, but the obvious failure of their strategic program led to its termination after an open parliamentary debate. Conversely, in the German case Bülow was fired for recognizing that the Tirpitz battle fleet was provoking Britain and that the Junkers had to be taxed to pay for the arms race on land and sea. In his stead, Bethmann propounded the comforting idea of “risk diplomacy,” through which Germany could expand and neutralize its enemies without actually fighting.

In short, cartelize political systems build a Rube Goldberg contraption of strategic justifications to keep the logroll alive. Noncartelize systems seek out and destroy the strategic myths propagated by individual interest groups once they have independent means for evaluating those myths.

Further evidence supporting the key role of coalition dynamics is that coalition managers were often among the most expansionist figures in their countries. This applies most clearly to Palmerston, Khrushchev, and “the best and the brightest” who managed America’s Cold War consensus. Separate groups wanted expansion only on a particular front, but the coalition managers were placed in a position where they had to accept it on every front. Indeed, they gained their positions by devising schemes that purported to reconcile all the conflicting imperial programs.

Coalition managers have crafted their political alliances in one of two ways. The first is the straight logroll. In this process, each major group in the ruling coalition gets what it wants on the issue it cares about most. The clearest examples are the Wilhelmine iron-rye-army-navy coalition, Brezhnev’s ideologue-army-détente coalition, and the Japanese army-navy logroll.

A second approach is the creative straddle. In this process, the political entrepreneur comes upon a stalemated political system in which no stable coalition seems possible owing to the sharp differences among all the groups. Even a straight logroll seems impossible because things that one group wants strongly are strongly opposed by other groups. To square this circle, political entrepreneurs engage in one form or another of prestidigitation. They may, for example, use ideological appeals to change the preferences of individual groups, making them available for more feasible logrolls. Thus Palmerston convinced middle-class Britons that imperialism was a “liberal” activity and so was able to logroll their support for imperialism with Tory support for the domestic status quo. Alternatively, political entrepreneurs may

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me up with a creative synthesis that purports to solve everyone's problems simultaneously, in a way no single group had conceived. The best example would be Khrushchev's attempt to use the ICBM and other policy innovations to satisfy or rebut everyone's concerns. Some historians also describe Hitler's role in this fashion. In such cases, alliance leaders may wind up pursuing foreign adventures that literally no member of their coalition would have initially preferred, in order to validate their strategic vision. Some scholars argue that Khrushchev's Berlin crisis of 1958 emerged in this way.

The American Cold War consensus falls somewhere between the right logroll and the creative straddle. On one hand, Europe-first Asia-first figures reconciled their differences through a backscratching dance, as in logrolling. On the other hand, the element of prestige was much stronger in this case than the element of straightfor-ward group interest. Many Republican Asia-firsters merely pretended care about Chiang for tactical political purposes. Internationalist coalition managers appeased this pretended interest in order to neutralize this tactical advantage. Eisenhower's strategy of governing through pseudoliberal globalist alliance on foreign policy and a Republican-Liberal Democrat alliance on domestic policy is strongly reminiscent of Palmerston's method.

This raises a final point: simple logrolling does not explain most of these cases without resort to ideology. In some cases ideology was so integral to the political process that it played a central role in determining what the individual "interest groups" wanted. This happened, for example, with mid-Victorian middle-class imperialists and with post-1945 publican Asia-firsters. Economic or other tangible interests were less relevant to these groups' preferences than were ideological interests in liberal imperialism in the former case and anticommunism in the latter.

Sometimes ideological dynamics merely exaggerated the outcome of interest group logrolling and made it harder to reverse. But in other instances ideological blowback outlived the political circumstances that we rise to the strategic ideologies. In this case, without reference to ideology there is no explanation at all. Hitler's Germany is the clearest instance of this: America in Vietnam is a partial example.

**Determinants of the Degree of Cartelization**

The industrialization process was the major factor affecting the degree of cartelization of politics in four of my five cases. Comparing across the countries, late industrializing Germany and Japan were more cartelized than early industrializing Britain or late, late industrializing Russia. Comparing within each country over time, cartelization was greatest in Britain and Germany during the most rapid stage of industrialization. Arguably this was because rapid industrialization brought about the historical concurrence of too many different social classes with deeply opposed interests. But this did not happen in the Soviet case, since social revolution had swept away the old classes before the stage of rapid industrialization. Nor did such a pileup occur during rapid industrialization in Japan, where the Meiji restoration had swept away some of the old classes.

The character of the industrialization process was thus the single most important factor determining the degree of cartelization in four of the five cases. In part my case selection affected this finding. For example, I chose not to examine America's period of rapid industrialization in the late nineteenth century but to focus on the Cold War period. Bias in case selection cannot be much of a problem, however, since I looked at a long historical sweep for most of the great powers of the industrial era. Though the industrialization process was important, it was not the only factor causing or exacerbating cartelization. I offer no theory to organize these other causes; I will simply report what some of them were.

International depression and protectionism helped promote cartelization in Germany and Japan. It did so directly, by spurring industrial sectors to organize behind protectionist barriers and more generally to pursue a strategy of organized markets. It also did so indirectly, by undercutting labor-export democratic coalitions and by playing into the hands of military-bureaucracies' programs for expansion to achieve autarky. Theoretical literature has already examined the links among depression, protectionism, and cartelization.4

In the Soviet case, cartelization was due to the completion of the transformational phase and the self-interested ossification of the institutions originally designed to carry out the transformation. This generally fits Mancur Olson's argument that the mere passage of time is associated with increasing cartelization, though in Soviet Russia the highly centralized character of its institutions also aided their organization as self-interested cartels. Similarly in Britain, ossified atavistic institutions promoted cartelization and expansionism. In particular, declining Midlands industries seeking protection within an expanded empire provided a key base of support for Joseph Chamberlain's Africa policies.

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The breakup of cartelization was most often associated with dramatic failures of the cartels' policies: for example, Vietnam led to the demise of the elite Cold War consensus; the consequences of Brezhnevite stagnation spurred Gorbachev's reforms. When cartels were exceptionally strong, as in Wilhelmine Germany and imperial Japan, defeat in a major war was required to break their hold.

In short, not only the industrialization process, but also international influences and lesser kinds of domestic social change can affect the degree of cartelization. So can policy failure. To predict patterns of cartelization in the future, a theory might focus on social changes associated with advanced industrial or postindustrial society, as well as on other international or domestic influences.

**Implications for Theory**

What kind of theory of international politics would be consistent with these findings? It would have to accept most of the basic insights of Realist balance of power theory, since balancing against aggressors is a dominant feature of all my cases. But it would also have to reject contemporary Realism's assertion that, in anarchy, international competitive pressures necessarily override pressures from domestic interests and coalitions in the formulation of national strategy. It would also have to allow a major role for ideology. I will not attempt here to offer a fully developed theory of international politics based on the findings of this book. Rather, I will give a rough sketch of the kind of theory my findings imply should be developed.

Such a theory would start with the assumption that any individual belongs to a number of conflict groups, that is, groups of people who combine to use their resources in pursuit of common interests in competition against other groups. These conflict groups include classes, ethnic groups, industrial sectors, firms, bureaucracies, political parties, and national states. Some groups are stronger than others owing to the intensity of their members' interests, their size, their wealth, monopolies of information and expertise that they enjoy, or other characteristics.

Groups seek to advance the interests of their members through a variety of methods that involve conflict and cooperation with other groups. These methods include competing with other groups (e.g., making war on them, bankrupting them, beating them at the polls) as well as entering coalitions with them (e.g., interest group logrolls or international treaties). Under conditions of uncertainty, another important method is using misinformation to steal members from other coalitions and reduce other groups' opposition to one's own policy preferences. As a by-product of this kind of ideological activity, members of one's own group might also be inadvertently misled—the blowback phenomenon.

In the modern era, the national state plays a particularly central role as the focal point for much of this activity. It regulates the behavior of groups within its jurisdiction, while at the same time those groups form coalitions to try to capture state power. The state also organizes competition against states that control other territorial units. Thus the state is a pivot between the domestic and international realms as well as a pivot of competition within the domestic realm.

What is the character of this state, and how does it play its pivotal role? Is it to be considered, in Realist fashion, a hierarchical organization whose strategies are governed by the exigencies of the international competition? Or is it the captive of domestic interests, carrying out their will in disregard of the requirements of rational international strategy?

The answer suggested by the cases examined in this book is, "It depends." At the most general level, it depends on whether international pressures are more threatening, insistent, and immediate than domestic pressures. It is by no means obvious that vulnerability to international pressure is more worrisome than vulnerability to domestic pressure. Faced with extreme threat, statesmen must worry about both international subjugation through war and domestic overthrow through revolution. But, under less extreme threat, they must worry about the collapse of their government, which in principle could be triggered by some weakening of the state's international position, by the alienation of a crucial domestic coalition partner, or by some interaction of the two. Whether international or domestic woes are more pressing, and how they interact, is an empirical question. It cannot be dismissed out of hand by Realist axioms about the Primat der Aussenpolitik.

Some hypotheses about the relative salience of domestic and international pressures might focus on international-level variables. Great powers with big internal markets and large reserve capabilities for fighting long, difficult wars enjoy a substantial buffer from the pressures of international competition. In contrast, small states are more exposed to the vagaries of international security and economic

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5. Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations (Glencoe, Ill., 1955), 11-124, esp. 17.

competition. Whereas great powers adapt their foreign strategies to their domestic circumstances, small powers adapt their domestic circumstances to the strategy that their foreign environment dictates.  

A focus on the structure of domestic politics within the state generates other hypotheses about how the state plays its role as a pivot. States in cartelized systems may be highly responsive to interest group pressures, even if this requires international behavior that makes little sense in terms of the objective constraints and incentives posed by the international environment. Conversely, states dominated by unitary oligarchies with encompassing interests will be more responsive to international pressures, since no powerful domestic groups with parochial interests are pressing the state. States in democratic systems may be highly responsive to their electorate, though median voter preferences should typically drive the state to do what is internationally rational in any event.

Still other hypotheses might focus on the effects of interaction between international and domestic variables. A given international stimulus might have opposite effects, for example, depending on domestic conditions. One might argue that an increase in foreign threat will cause any state to pay more attention to its international environment and less to domestic concerns. Barry Posen hypothesizes, for instance, that in periods of low external threat, military doctrines will be shaped by military organizational biases, whereas in periods of high external threat civilians will intervene in military decision making and force doctrine to conform to the exigencies of the state's international circumstances. Case studies of grand strategy before World War II support this conclusion, but pre-1914 case studies do not. In those instances, increasing threat played into the hands of military officers, who used the situation of impending war as an excuse to elude civilian control and indulge their organizational biases for offensive doctrines.  

The difference between the World War I and World War II cases may have been that by the 1930s civilians had developed much better systems for institutionalizing civilian control of modern, professionalized military specialists. In the changed domestic institutional environment, a similar international impetus had an opposite effect.

In short, the findings of this book suggest the need for a theory of international politics based on competition and alliances among various kinds of conflict groups, in which national states play a pivotal but not an exclusive role. Under uncertainty and asymmetry of information, ideological manipulation should play a major part in such a theory. In general, a research program based on this theory should pay more attention to interactions between international and domestic politics and less to making assertions about the "primacy" of one or the other political arena.

**Implications for Policy in the Present Era**

The arguments advanced here have implications for how we understand the contemporary period of international relations and how we should act in it. The dramatic developments in Europe in 1989 have spurred statesmen and scholars to ask fundamental questions about the nature of international politics with a fresh eye. Some of the most fundamental concern the consequences of the end of the bipolar division of Europe and the boom in mass political participation in its eastern half.

Some optimists argue that these developments will lead to a peaceful democratic utopia in which life under international anarchy will no longer be "nasty, brutish, and short." They contend that the new thinking in Soviet foreign policy reflects an irresistible trend toward liberal democracy and toward the peaceful foreign policies that democracy brings in its wake. In contrast, some Hobbesian pessimists argue that it was the bipolar division of Europe that kept the peace among the great powers since 1945 and that a return to multipolarity will mean a less stable international scene.

My findings about the past sources of aggressive great power overexpansion can help in assessing the probable consequences of these two developments for the stability of the international order and in predicting which of the two will have the greater impact. First, regarding the arguments of the Hobbesian pessimists, my findings suggest that their extreme emphasis on the causal priority of the international structure of power is unwarranted. The Realists may be right that bipolar distributions of power are more stable than multipolar ones. The historical record is at best ambiguous on this point, but the logic of the argument for bipolar stability has considerable power.

12. Snyder, "Averting Anarchy."
shed a little light on how this can be done. Once imperialist coalitions are firmly established, the paper tiger images of opponents that they espouse make it difficult for other states to break the pattern either through threats or through concessions: threats will confirm their view that preventive aggression is necessary, whereas concessions will confirm their view that one can get away with it cheaply. But fortunately the current task is not to discredit Soviet paper tiger images, which Gorbachev has for the most part overthrown. Rather, the task is to reinforce Gorbachev's relatively benign strategic ideology and to prevent its replacement with more dangerous views.

In hospitable international conditions played a major role in undercutting the political base and strategic concepts of the relatively benign Weimar and Taisho regimes. Russia played into the hands of Palmerston's social imperialism through its gratuitously beligerent diplomacy at the Turkish Straits. Stalin's invasion of South Korea helped solidify the American Cold War consensus. The West's unyielding policies repeatedly undercut Soviet doves, liberals, and reformers: Chicherin, Varga, Malenkov, Khrushchev in his later years, and Kosygin. As a rule, conciliatory policies, open international trading environment, and nonoffensive security postures help maintain the credibility of the opponent's doves and benign reformers when they are in power. Deterrent firmness may help the doves when hawks are in power, but this is not yet the case in Gorbachev's Russia.  

Some opportunities to promote favorable institutional changes in the Soviet Union have already been missed. During the summer of 1990, when Gorbachev publicly agonized over the adoption of a "500 days" plan for radical market reform, the United States insisted that a West European proposal for a multibillion dollar financial aid package for Moscow be referred to a committee for "study." If instead the West had offered a concrete proposal for substantial aid, tied to the acceptance of the 500 days plan, the political balance in Moscow might have been tipped in favor of the reformist camp. Similar infusions of capital from the liberal democracies, briefly helped to create favorable conditions for Weimar and Taisho democracy, whereas adverse international economic conditions helped usher in their collapse. At this turning point in the Soviet reform process, the Western allies spent their billions on a military buildup in the Persian Gulf, and Gorbachev retreated towards a command economy. 

In short, the Soviet Union is the only great power that still has not

15. In addition to the cases above, see Snyder, "International Leverage."
fully resolved the social crisis inherent in the transition to industrial society and increasing mass political participation. It may deal with the remnants of this crisis in either of two ways: through a Gladstonian model of benign mass mobilization, or through a more pernicious Wilhelmmine model. The West has a powerful interest in ensuring that international conditions are made as propitious as possible for the success of the liberal model. Zigzags in the Soviet reform process, including the partial reversion to strong-arm methods in economic and nationalities policy, will complicate Western efforts. But as long as Soviet reformers retain any political base, the West should devote substantial resources to strengthening their hand. If the arguments advanced in this book are correct, there is no investment more crucial to the long-run prospects for international peace.

Finally, this book has implications not only for affecting the strategic debates inside other great powers, but also for understanding America’s own debates on grand strategy. It suggests that readers should turn a skeptical eye toward much of America’s strategic discourse, reevaluating many U.S. strategic concepts in light of the social and institutional context that produces them. If the United States and the other democratic great powers can do that, and if reform takes hold in the Soviet Union, the long peace among the great powers should become even more permanent.