1. The nuclear revolution
   a) Massive Retaliation
   b) moral opprobrium (nuclear v. non-nuclear)
   c) credibility problem (nuclear v. nuclear)
   d) Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)
   e) what to do if threat is “too big”?

2. Crisis bargaining
   a) Game of Chicken
   b) risk and commitment
   c) severing communications
   d) preemption and disaster

3. How to make big threats credible?
   a) strategic irrationality
      • Nixon’s Madman Theory
      • George W. Bush v. Kim Jong Il
      • provocability and vindictiveness
   b) threat that leaves something to chance (brinkmanship)
      • modified chess game analogy
      • shared risk of disaster
      • autonomous generation of risk
      • blurring the brink
   c) limited retaliation
      • splitting threat in small steps
      • bargaining through gradual escalation
      • McNamara’s “No Cities” Doctrine

4. An example: Six Day War of 1967