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PEACE AND WAR:
ARMED CONFLICTS
AND
INTERNATIONAL
ORDER 1648–1989

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1 ON THE STUDY OF WAR

The analysis of war is too important to be left to the intuitionists.
Quincy Wright

[We] turn to history and only to history if what we are seeking are the
actual causes, sources, and conditions of overt changes in patterns
and structures of society. Conventional wisdom to the contrary, we
shall not find the explanations of change in those studies which are
abstracted from history.
Robert Nisbet

Analytical studies of war can be traced back at least to the great work of
the historian Thucydides, but systematic exploration of war as a
unique but generic form of behavior between political communities
was undertaken initially by political philosophers. Machiavelli, Rousseau,
Kant, Hobbes, Hegel, and others had significant things to say
about the etiology and consequences of war, but their insights were
suggestive and prescriptive rather than empirical. They could enumerate
the reasons wars are likely, but their causal statements were mostly
hypothetical. Few had systematic evidence to support them.

The search for patterns and generalizations based on accumulated
evidence is of more recent vintage. Today there is a large literature that
has a common focus on the "causes of war." It is not my purpose to
examine in detail this important corpus of work, but it may be appro-
priate to reflect on some of its achievements and shortfalls because yet
another book on war must be justified either as filling a gap or extend-
ing in significant ways existing bodies of knowledge.

Descriptive studies of the incidence, location, and costs of war have
advanced significantly over the past few decades. Today, comprehen-
sive lists of wars, rebellions, civil wars, and other categories of violence
are available (Wright, 1942; Perré, 1962; Bouthoul and Carrière, 1976;
Small and Singer, 1982; Levy, 1983; Luard, 1986). Although there are
methodological debates about contenders for inclusion and exclusion
(Duvall, 1976; Luard, 1986), researchers can take satisfaction in the
knowledge that only minor tinkering or marginal additions would be
necessary to satisfy the requirements of comprehensiveness in time and location. While most data admittedly come from Western sources, dealing with armed contests between the nation states of the modern era, there are no compelling reasons to postpone research until, let us say, we have a full catalogue of data on inter-tribal wars in Africa during the thirteenth century. Today we know what we are talking about – the phenomenon to be explained – which was not the case until fairly recently.

In the realm of explanation, however, the record is more sketchy. The causes of war, which are the subject of speculation in international relations over the last four centuries, remain obscure, but less obscure than previously. Modern research has still left a trail of uncertainty, partial clues, contradiction, and continued mystery. This is not unexpected, since the scientific enterprise never moves along a straight path. All avenues and possibilities have to be explored, and we would expect many of them to lead to intellectual dead ends or to findings of only weak significance. That there is no answer to the ancient question “why war?” is not the fault of the scientific method per se. But how questions are posed, which questions are raised, which are neglected, what assumptions are made about causation, and how we select levels of analysis and individual explanatory variables vitally affect the quality of results. Inconsistent results are another problem. For example, studies assert that arms races lead to war or that they do not lead to war. Some argue that balances of power are critical foundations for peace. Others argue, marshaling equally impressive evidence, that preponderances are a necessary condition for peace. Alliances have been linked both to war and to peace. This state of affairs prompted J. David Singer (1979:14) to write that the systematic study of war has failed to “achieve any significant theoretical breakthrough.” There is, he suggested, no “compelling explanation” for war. His solution to the problem was to shift from the concept of causality to that of explanation: the latter implies a plurality of possible explanations rather than the identification of a single cause. This, of course, is an important insight. Yet, Singer did not raise other fundamental concerns about the nature of causality or explanation in contemporary war and peace research. He did not, for example, examine the dominant sociological mode of analysis that emphasizes the explanatory potential of broad systemic factors and national attributes, what I will call ecological variables. The assumption is that somehow these background conditions are translated into disputes and wars through actions and interactions. If there is causality, then it lies through a complex chain of conditions and events, but the ecological variables, which are often operationalized in dichotomous terms, stand out as the sources of explanation in most studies.

**EXPLANATORY CONFIGURATIONS**

Investigators of conflict, crises, and war reached a consensus years ago that moncausal explanations are theoretically and empirically deficient. Kenneth Waltz’ (1957) classic typology of war explanations convincingly demonstrated various problems arising from diagnoses that locate war causation exclusively at the individual, state attribute, or systemic levels. He also illustrated how prescriptions based on faulty diagnoses offer no solution to the problem. Even Rousseau’s powerful exploration of the consequences of anarchy, updated by Waltz (1979), remains full of insights, but it only specifies why wars recur (there is nothing to prevent them) and offers few clues that help to predict when, where, and over what issues. Blainey (1973), in another telling attack on moncausal theories, continues where Waltz left off. He offers, on the basis of rich historical illustrations, both logical and anecdotal rebuttals of facile explanations of war that dot academic and philosophical thought on the subject. But rebuttals of the obvious are not sufficient. We presently have myriads of theories of war, emphasizing all sorts of factors that can help explain its etiology. As Carroll and Fink (1975) note, there are if anything too many theories, and even too many typologies of theories. Quoting Timasheff approvingly, they point out that anything might lead to war, but nothing will certainly lead to war.

Table 1.1 sets out the location of explanatory variables in some of the theoretical and empirical literature. More elaborate classification schemes are available (e.g., Deutsch and Senghaas, 1971; Carroll and Fink, 1975), but our purpose is not to add yet another typology or to produce so many cells that virtually every study has a niche of its own. The studies are categorized according to the well-known “levels of analysis” scheme, but include only those that emphasize ecological/attribute variables; according to a static–dynamic dichotomy (or more properly, a dimension); and according to an attribute or relational configuration of the independent variables.

Several conclusions emerge from this illustrative rendering of the field. First, a significant proportion of the studies continue to employ single independent variables. While most reason in terms of associations and correlations, they are intended to be causal: variations in a cause changes in b, usually defined as variations in the incidence of war. Second, the location of possible sources of war is infinitely expan-
Table 1.1 Ecological, attribute, and relational correlates of war: selected studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>Static</th>
<th>Dynamic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SYSTEM-LEVEL</td>
<td>Power concentration and war</td>
<td>+ Singer et al. (1972), - Levy and Morgan (1986)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Static &amp; Dynamic</td>
<td>Alliance and war</td>
<td>+ Siverson &amp; Starr (1990), - Levy (1981)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Static &amp; Dynamic</td>
<td>War contagion</td>
<td>+ Davis, Duncan &amp; Siverson (1974)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Note: + = positive association, - = no association.

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...dable (we may wish to add an extraterrestrial analytical level to include one study—whose author I prefer not to reveal—that correlated sunspot activity with the incidence of war). The range of explanatory variables runs from the genetic (not considered here) to the cosmic. Some ordering of the comparative significance of these types of variables is long overdue. Third, most studies employ variables from only one level of analysis. This leads to a number of problems, among which is the perennial issue of determinism and free will. Explanatory systems that emphasize structural and ecological variables such as the degree of power concentration in the international system are largely deterministic, as are genetic explanations of war. Studies that emphasize decision-making, values, and perceptions of policy-makers come closer to the free will end of the spectrum. How can the two be reconciled?

The prevalence of contradictory findings is the final problem. There are some important areas of consensus—what Singer has termed “reliable knowledge”—that have emerged from replication and modification of research designs and data. Great powers are more war-prone than other kinds of states. Studies have confirmed Woodrow Wilson’s hypothesis (Shaw, 1924; 379) that democracies do not go to war against each other. The hypothesis of systemic war contagion processes has been disconfirmed in numerous studies (Geller, 1988:366). At least two studies have demonstrated persuasively (though not without challenge, based on other data and methodologies) that, not surprisingly, borders play a role in conflict. Both alliance membership and contiguity increase the probabilities that any given state will become involved in a war should its neighbour and/or alliance partner be at war (Siverson and Starr, 1990). Some theories of relative power cycles among the great powers show rather impressively how, at certain “inflection points” in the relative rise and decline of great powers, serious wars are more likely to occur than at other times. The problems of adjusting foreign policies to new roles consistent with new power positions in some ways lead to a higher probability of war participation (Doran, 1983). Beyond these and a few other areas of general agreement, explanations of variation in war remain contested either because there have been no findings meeting various tests of significance or because findings have been contradictory. In a significant proportion of the systemic studies of war, there is no verdict.

Is there the prospect that if we heed the perennial cry for more research we will uncover exciting new possibilities? Will the addition of new independent variables increase the storehouse of reliable knowledge? How should researchers deal with the problems of...
chronic incompatibility of findings? Are the solutions to these difficulties to be found primarily within the context of quantitative analysis? There is a common assumption that with adjustments here, a little methodological tinkering there, and the compilation of ever more studies, researchers will eventually uncover the numerous mysteries that remain. But perhaps more fundamental questions need to be raised. Two in particular come to mind. First, is the emphasis on single ecological variables appropriate to the problem to be investigated? Second, what areas of investigation have been overlooked in the research agenda? This study examines three areas of pronounced neglect: (1) what are the issues that initially generate international conflict? what do men fight about? (2) what is the “meaning” of war to those who resort to it? and (3) in what ways do the arrangements of peace serve as a source of future international conflict? We will examine each of these questions and the relationships between them below, but first we should explore in more detail the issue of ecological variables as explanations of war.

THE PROMISES AND PITFALLS OF ECOLOGICAL VARIABLES

Sociological analyses of war generally link broad background variables of the international system or of its member states to the incidence of international violence. Typical variables include the degree of power concentration in an international system, numbers and types of alliances, balances and imbalances of power, relative rates of power change among key states, the presence or absence of arms races, degrees of status inconsistency, and the like. Other studies have concentrated on the link between national attributes (size, location, type of political system, and the like) and conflict/war. A derivative avenue of inquiry has examined the nature of relationships between attributes of nations. Most continue to employ single independent variables, even though at the theoretical level, monocausal theories of war have been proven inadequate for a long time. The usual answer to this problem is that correlational findings are not causal. They only indicate that the probabilities of war involvement or war initiation increase or decrease under certain specified systemic conditions or attribute profiles. Such results are not only interesting but potentially of theoretical significance. The combination of certain specified systemic and attribute conditions could certainly indicate which sorts of configurations increase or decrease international stability and the overall incidence of war in a particular era. But it does not tell us much about the sources of individual wars. Not many wars begin because there is a parity or preponderance of power, or because two parties share a frontier, or because they have differential growth rates (consider the unlimited and unknown numbers of wars that did not begin under such conditions). Knowledge of change in probabilities is important, but is it sufficient? Let us use a domestic analogy to make the point that statistical associations between relatively static variables such as system structure or national attributes, and war incidence, while they may reveal certain patterns, do not in most cases offer a satisfactory form of explanation.

I do not have a quarrel with my neighbor because he or she is older, is more wealthy, or has a larger house. All of these attributes are in most cases irrelevant to the neighborly relationship, whereas behavior is critical. If my neighbor throws his garbage on my porch, a quarrel is likely to ensue. We have an issue that generates conflict. The fact of contiguity and our attribute differences offer less satisfactory possibilities. The probabilities of a quarrel with a neighbor are no doubt greater than they would be with an unknown person living on the other side of town. But a probability difference is not a very satisfactory explanation, much less a cause. Some of the studies that link attributes to war incidence face this same problem. It is interesting to know, for example, that great powers are more war-prone than other kinds of states, but this fact can be explained also on a simple probability basis: great powers have more relationships and more interests to advance and protect, and hence we should expect them to resort to armed force more frequently than smaller states. An individual with a broad network of relationships is more likely to be involved in conflicts than is a hermit.

But these are relatively technical problems. More significant is the determinism implied in many of the studies, the presumed relevance and priority of ecological variables. Researchers assume that somehow, through decision-making and other processes, these systemic and other-nation conditions are translated into foreign policy outputs and decisions to employ force. But how? And how are we to estimate their significance compared to more immediate stimuli (behaviors)? Of what relevance was the degree of systemic power polarization to the Argentine generals who decided to invade the Falkland Islands; or to President Nasser, who decided to have another go at Israel? Or to the Iraqi president who launched a war against Iran in 1979? There is an element of the ecological fallacy in these questions (explaining an individual event in terms of general system properties), and yet they should be asked.
Many of the studies cited here assume a high degree of constraint imposed by system characteristics, national attributes, and relational variables. They are reminiscent of the early voting behavior studies that linked socio-economic variables such as class, education, religion, and income to voting choices. But those early studies failed to ask voters why they voted in a particular way. The view of man in these studies is that of an automaton forced to behave in certain ways because of environmental characteristics or individual attributes. There is no acknowledgment that people have purposes, ideas, preferences, and dislikes; that they have concerns for personal welfare and sometimes even a calculated concern with the welfare of the broader society and its political system. What are the limits of choice? Peter the Great, Louis XIV, Charles XII, Bismarck, Wilson, and Hitler, just to mention a few, did as much to create system characteristics as they were constrained by them.

Why is it that some countries that share numerous attributes nevertheless have substantially different foreign policies? And why do some countries that share few attributes nevertheless have many foreign policy features in common? Libya and Tunisia share many characteristics and inhabit a common global system and regional subsystem. But for years their foreign policies have been fundamentally different except that they both sympathize with the plight of the Palestinians. Burma and Albania have virtually nothing in common, but in the 1960s and 1970s their foreign policy orientation of extreme isolation was almost identical. The list of examples could be elaborated at length, certainly enough to raise questions about the presumed critical importance of ecological variables (or as is often the case, dichotomies) in explaining variations in the incidence of war.

Of the many people who have authored studies of the genre, J. David Singer is among the few who have directly addressed some of the questions raised above. He has argued that the contexts in which nations behave must be examined initially and their explanatory power discovered, because it will not be possible to gauge otherwise how much freedom of choice decision-makers enjoy. Singer’s strategy of focusing on ecological and structural background variables appears initially to be a matter of preference rather than one of the probable weight of explanation. Yet, Singer also argues that ecological variables are fundamental and institutional, while decision-making and other approaches concentrate on more immediate concerns. His distinction follows Thucydides’ separation of the underlying and proximate causes of war. The underlying causes in Singer’s view are clearly more important.

So that there is no misunderstanding of Singer’s position on the critical importance of ecological variables, it is best to let him speak for himself. In 1970 he wrote (Singer, 1970:536; cf. Singer, 1981:4-5):

While fully concurring that an “ecological” theory of war would be incomplete at best, I would urge that serious attention to these attributes and relational variables is absolutely essential. To look at behavioral events alone, or as parts of interaction sequences, is to court disaster unless they are examined along with—and in the context of—the physical, structural, and cultural setting within which they occur. . . . Government decisions and behavior represent the intervening variables between a set of ecological incentives and constraints (domestic and global) on the one hand, and war or no war as the outcome of conflict, on the other; they can only be understood in that sort of context . . . . Until we can get at the discrepancies (if any) between the objective incentives and constraints and the way in which they are perceived, we will be far from understanding the behavior which leads toward or away from war . . . . Until certain of the key ecological variables are identified and their own explanatory power ascertained, we will never know exactly how much control remained in the hands of the decision-makers and how much of the variance is accounted for by their behavior.

Singer’s general strategy is laudable, and there are numerous grounds for exploring the explanatory power of ecological variables. But until recently, few have followed all of Singer’s admonitions. Only within the last several years have researchers begun to assess the comparative explanatory power of ecological and decision-making variables. This concern has already produced findings in explaining probabilistically the process of war diffusion (Siverson and Starr, 1990), with alliance membership (representing choice) having a greater impact on war participation than contiguity (representing an ecological variable). The results of another recent study suggest that ecological variables as explanations of war incidence fare rather poorly compared to approaches that employ Thucydides’ notion of “proximate” causes (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1988). Students of war are finally beginning to abandon single-variable and single-level types of analyses—twenty years after Singer pinpointed the problem. The pioneering work is as yet a mere trickle, but it is moving in an appropriate direction. However, the cultural context of war, noted by Singer as a critical research area, remains largely ignored (Singer, 1981).

**THE MEANINGS OF WAR**

One of the problems of quantitative studies of war is that in
order to obtain statistically sufficient universes of the dependent variable, they must remain fairly insensitive to different kinds of war. This is not the problem of legal definitions, or cut-off points in the number of casualties required to be included in the data set, or duration of hostilities. These are relatively technical issues, and since there have been so many wars since 1492, 1648, 1740, or 1816 (the usual starting dates for various data sets), the addition of several wars that had, let us say, 750 casualties instead of the usual 1,000 would probably not alter most findings.

The real difficulty is that through history the use of force in statescraft has had different meanings, and if this is so, the sources, causes, or correlates of war in one period cannot be easily transferred to another. Russia was at war against Turkey in 1713. Pakistan was at war against India in 1971. Both wars satisfy the usual criteria for inclusion in a data set. Similarly, two patients are “ill” when they both have fevers significantly above normal body temperatures. But one has a severe rash and acute lung congestion while the other has severe stomach pains. Both share one symptom – fever – which places them both in the “ill” category. But the other symptoms suggest entirely different causes. The “meaning” of the first illness is likely death; for the second, it is several more hours of discomfort until a medicine produces a cure. In 1713, the war arose because Russia was not fulfilling the terms of peace to which it had committed itself in a war the previous year. Turkey began the war in order to compel Russia to meet those terms. The stakes in the war were not very significant, however, and neither side believed that it was risking much in undertaking a contest of arms. In 1971, Pakistan fought for its survival (defined as East and West Pakistan). The meaning of the war for it was fundamentally different than it had been for either the Ottoman Empire or for Russia in 1713.

Statistical studies have generally avoided classifications of types of war in terms of their cultural and historical meaning. They have distinguished wars by the nature of participants, the track record of war participation by individual states, by geographical location, and the like. These have produced interesting and significant descriptive findings. But does it not seem possible that war is significantly rooted in its social and cultural context? Would it not make a difference in terms of war incidence whether decision-making elites view it as a duel, an avenue for fame, glory, and honor, an act of self-defense, the execution of a judgment, a crime, a technique of persuasion, or as an act of mutual suicide (Wright, 1942:II, 877)? Should it not make a difference in terms of war causes and frequency that Louis XIV in his youth regarded war as an alternative to the joys of the hunting season and that Frederick the Great saw it as an instrument for gaining personal reputation and glory, while Neville Chamberlain regarded it as a diplomatic and moral catastrophe? The commitment to search for regularities through statistical techniques over long periods of time, and the constraints imposed by the necessity of formal quantification render these and other significant differences of little scientific interest. Discriminating between wars on the basis of their “meaning” would no doubt require all sorts of arbitrary and “soft” judgments, but this is not a sufficient ground for excluding the exercise.

Richard Mansbach and John Vasquez (Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981; Vasquez, 1987) have suggested a rather different form of explanation. They point out that there are identifiable processes that lead to war. They present an explanation for the rise of contentious issues, identify variables that can explain under what circumstances they get placed on the global agenda, and how they are eventually resolved authoritatively including through the use of force. The “paths of war” include many of the symptoms located in the traditional and quantitative literatures, including arms races, mismeasurement, the “Peloponnesian Syndrome” of preventive war, and negative affect of the parties toward each other. These combine in various ways to produce an increased likelihood of war. As such, the processes are not “causes” in the ordinary a→b model. Rather, the variables may link in complex ways. No single factor, whether structural, attribute, or relationship, can be isolated and identified as the cause. Any model of explanation that emphasizes dynamics and the interplay of variables across levels of analysis and over time is a distinct step forward.

Yet, one is still troubled by the lack of contextual factors and the assumptions that all wars are equal. There may be many paths to war, diverse patterns of behavior that eventuate in contests of arms. And contexts do matter. Consider the Franco-Dutch War of 1672–79. The war certainly became a process, but its origins do not fit well with the “paths to war” model. Louis XIV had been planning the war for almost four years prior to his aggression against the United Provinces. The war was not preceded by an arms race; there was no bargaining in a crisis situation; there were rough calculations of military capabilities, but no evidence of mismeasurement. Although Louis and Colbert had their reasons for disliking the Dutch, none of them was sufficient to explain the outbreak of a major war. The “roi soleil” disliked many regimes with which he did not go to war. The “paths to war” in 1672–79 and in many cases subsequent to then – were fundamentally different than those of 1914 or of the American intervention in Vietnam. These examples suggest the need for care in historical research, for studies
employing the “focussed comparison” method (George and Smoke, 1974), and for the development of more discriminating independent and dependent variables.

WHAT MEN FIGHT ABOUT: ISSUES AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

Notice that in most of the studies of the genre reviewed here there is a gap—namely human behavior—between the independent and dependent variables. Preponderances favor peace; arms races lead to war, as do resource shortages, the uneven development of capabilities among the great powers, status inconsistency, and many other things. Nowhere do we find the issues that excite men’s passions and fears, those stakes that predispose them to take up arms to pursue or defend their causes and purposes. True, older studies of war classified the sources of war as political, religious, economic, and the like, but with the significant exception of Luard’s study (1986) and the recent work of Mansbach and Vasquez, no one has taken up the challenge of exploring this difficult terrain. Why? Perhaps it is because issues are difficult to define and even more difficult to measure. However, to leave out issues is to leave out the stuff of politics. Adding issues to the research agenda may not tell us why some conflicts end in wars, while others do not—an important area of contemporary research—but it tells us what men are likely to fight about and how issues change over time. It is hard to see how this critical question, even if posed only in descriptive terms, can be ignored any longer.

One of the reasons that it has been ignored, in my opinion, is the general social perspective toward war during much of the twentieth century, certainly since 1918. Academic researchers, peace movements, and many politicians for quite understandable reasons have depicted war variously as a disease, as a catastrophe, as a crime, in brief, as a form of deviant behavior. This perspective on war has arisen from the horrible experiences of twentieth-century war, the anticipated consequences of nuclear war, and the liberal nineteenth- and twentieth-century belief in human and humane progress. To many, war is an irrational activity, representing a rejection of politics for an entirely different domain of behavior. It must be, therefore, structures and processes that lead to war, and not the deliberate calculations of policy-makers who might be bent on conquest. Our generally liberal views toward the purposes of states and regimes underestimates the extent to which there may be, as Leon Bourgeois argued during the debates on the League of Nations Covenant during the Paris peace conference in 1919, états de mauvaise foi, states committed to the use of force to achieve various purposes that are inconsistent with the safety and vital interests of other states.

A Clausewitzian approach does not regard war as a form of deviant behavior. War, rather, is characterized in instrumental terms as a rational, if not desirable, means of achieving or defending known purposes. It is “an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will... war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means” (Clausewitz, 1864:75, 87). Issues become immediately relevant in this view of war. “The political object – the original motive/issue for the war – will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires” (ibid., 81). This perspective on war approaches the free will end of an ecological/determinist – free will continuum. Politics and war are in the realm of constrained voluntion rather than in the realm of ecological determination. Policy-makers, whether princes, kings, Polibureaus, cabinets, or presidents, generally seek to defend, extend, or achieve certain objectives. When these purposes and the means to implement them are incompatible with the values and interests of other actors, the probability of the use of force increases. Governments must then consider whether or not the stakes are worth all the risks entailed in war.

Stakes are not exactly the same as issues (cf. Rummel, 1976:275). The United States intervened in Vietnam in order to achieve a stated set of purposes. The issue was defined in Washington as the continued independence of a political entity called the Republic of Vietnam. The issue for North Vietnam was the unification of a historic state and the construction of socialism in it. At stake for the United States, however, was its credibility, its prestige, and its sense of commitment to its allies. The issues generated the conflict, but the probability of the use of force by the United States increased dramatically only after North Vietnam and the Viet Cong had decided to achieve the unification of the country through military means. A number of choices were made along the way; there was nothing inevitable about American intervention. However, it is difficult to see exactly how ecological or attribute variables were compelling. The issues were necessary conditions for the intervention, and the issues combined with the stakes and the behav-

1 Clausewitz also discussed the development of war into an “absolute war,” in which “there is not a trace of an overlap with the process of bargaining, or persuasion, or of non-military pressure of any kind” (Callie, 1978:32).
ors of North Vietnam and the Viet Cong were, taken together, sufficient conditions.

If we grant the validity of this perspective, then we may reverse the usual structure of explanation. Rather than looking at antecedent conditions, whether ecological, structural or attributional, we search for purposes and objectives. The explanation then becomes teleological: wars occur not "because of" but "in order to." Others have mentioned this form of analysis but have seldom explored its implications in the study of war (Howard, 1983:12-16; Wright, 1942:11, 1236, 1291; Eagleton, 1972:16-17; Rummel, 1976:245). While we recognize that we may be speaking of two sides of the same coin, the emphasis on purpose steers us at least part of the way around the hurdle of the assumed explanatory power of ecological, genetic, and relational variables or dichotomies. Purposive behavior between two or more parties may lead to contention over certain values, or as most people use the term, over issues. The underlying problem for investigation is not "why do nations fight?", which is the usual way the question is put, but "what are they fighting about or over?". To borrow from Mansbach and Vasquez (1981), we are less concerned with the issue of power than with the power of issues.

Such a formulation entails some difficulties. Here, let us raise the question posed by authors such as Geoffrey Blainey and Michael Howard, who argue that all issues can be boiled down to one mega-issue: whatever the window dressing, propaganda lines, and self-serving justifications for the use of force, the basic issue is always a power contest between two or more protagonists in which, according to Raymond Aron, the stakes are the "existence, the creation, or the elimination of states" (quoted in Howard, 1983:16). While the historical record shows numerous examples of the "Peloponnesian syndrome," where states go to war preventively because they face an impending hegemony or preponderance of power by their main rival, there are many more instances when no such stakes were involved. Governments choose to employ force because they value interests and make claims against others that cannot be adjusted or compromised through diplomacy or other non-violent means. Preventive war does occur (Levy, 1987), but in many instances state survival is not at stake. Other sorts of issues, implying considerably more limited values, are the source of most wars.

It is difficult to see, as just two illustrations of this conclusion, how the Somalia–Ethiopia War of 1978 or the Falklands War of 1982 can be explained satisfactorily as power contests. They were contests of power in the trivial sense that any trial of arms includes the application of military power. But state survival was neither the issue nor the stake that generated the war. If we "explain" war by reducing the phenomenon's origins to contests of power, then we simply avoid the critical questions, since clearly not all power contests end in war. Howard and Blainey, like so many others, have identified a necessary condition for war, but not a sufficient one.

I have left out of the analysis consideration of the many studies that focus on psychological, perceptual, and organizational variables. The vast literature has significantly increased our knowledge of the problems of decision-making processes in crisis situations, and the ways that information, organizational mores, misperceptions, and a variety of personality characteristics can increase the probability of making suboptimal decisions. But even this literature contains some difficulties. There are at least three issues of note. First, most of the literature defines or assumes that decisions to employ force or to go to war are suboptimal. There is more than a hint of the Western twentieth-century view of war as deviant, irrational behavior. At a minimum, this literature depicts the use of force as an exceptional form of statecraft. Second, like the ecological and attribute studies, the policy-making studies of war focus on processes and ignore issues. They concentrate on information flows, the role of stereotypes and other psychological phenomena, bureaucratic in-fighting, and the like, but do not discuss the stakes involved in the contentious issues. And third, the literature has been strongly influenced by two notable crises, the events of August 9-14 and Cuba in October 1962. A more recent source of data has been the numerous decisions that led ultimately to the American armed intervention in Vietnam. These cases have often been portrayed as paradigmatic examples of decisions to use force (or in Cuba, to avoid it). Yet, these examples are taken from an immense domain of possibilities. There is no evidence that they are typical or representative of the universe of cases. Most notable by their absence are decisions to employ force by national liberation movements and other groups that seek to establish states. Comparative studies across historical eras and geographical locations are needed.

There has been some significant work to correct the distorting effects of an extremely narrow sample of cases. Jervis (1976) has used an extensive catalogue of historical evidence to examine the problems of crisis decision-making, while Lebow (1981) has been one of the few to compare explicitly across a number of cases taken from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The state-centric bias remains, however.
A MAP OF A MAP

I have raised questions, not provided answers. The purpose of this book is to complement previous work by demonstrating the importance of three problems that have been largely neglected in the study of war:

1. The role and types of issues that generate international conflict.
2. The change in socio-historical-intellectual milieu in which war is undertaken and which can sometimes help explain probabilistically why decisions to go to war are made. This is the “meaning” of war, identified through attitudes toward the use of force among those who guide state policy.
3. The link between peace settlements and war. Peace settlements deal primarily with issues; how they deal with them may have a profound impact on the character and incidence of war in the postwar period. We are concerned here with the problem of building international orders—how they were designed, on what sorts of diagnoses of the etiology of international conflict they were based, and how they operated.

The model of international politics that underlies the study of these neglected areas of war is as follows. All governments face certain sets of problems that they must solve, learn to live with, or adapt to. These include state-formation and nation-building; provision for the general welfare, broadly conceived; defense of the realm; maintenance of independence and autonomy; and perpetuation of the regime (K. J. Holsti, 1990). Some governments have other purposes, which may include regional or global imperialism, ideological proselytization and conversion, search for prestige and status, and many others. In most cases purposes can be identified.

Decisions and actions are taken within certain socio-economic and diplomatic contexts. These offer both constraints and opportunities, but they are seldom deterministic of individual attributes. Decisions offer fewer fruitful avenues of investigation. If they were significantly determining or highly constraining, we would expect states sharing them to behave in roughly similar fashion. Yet, as we look around the world, we can see many instances where states sharing both contexts (e.g., system polarity) and attributes (e.g., size, culture, economy, regime, and the like) have different foreign policies and profiles of war activity.

A model which assumes a fairly rational ordering of means to ends, which places purpose at the centre of analysis, does not preclude folly (Tuchman, 1984), misjudgment, wishful thinking, poor prediction, unanticipated consequences, and other foibles and shortcomings of governments and their caretakers. Apart from the problem that one’s short-run folly can always be a blessing in the long run, and vice versa, these shortcomings do not vitiate the view that politics is an essentially purposeful activity.

The reader will see the ghost of Clausewitz in these comments. If foreign policy is a purposeful activity, then, in most cases so is war (I will reserve the problem of nuclear war for the concluding chapters). It is one of many ways of wielding influence, of compressing change into a relatively short period of time, of resolving issues that were not amenable to other techniques of settlement. Purposive behavior between two or more parties usually leads to contention over certain values, or as most people use the term, over issues.

Issues are not sufficient conditions for war. There are contentious issues facing governments daily, yet only a small proportion are contested or resolved through armed force. The critical problem of why some conflicts eventuate in war while others do not is a recent and critical avenue of inquiry, but is beyond the scope of this study. Each case rests on a complex calculus of costs, advantages, degrees of threat, risk, and the like. However, policy-makers’ attitudes toward the use of force and how they “define” war will critically affect those calculations.

DEFINING ISSUES

The investigation proceeds inductively. The typology of issues developed as the result of studying 177 wars and major armed interventions. This seemed a preferable strategy over deductively defining abstract categories of issues, such as those of Rosenau (1966) and Mansbach and Vasquez (1981). There are two reasons for this choice. First, the purpose of this part of the study is descriptive rather than explanatory. The categories of issues are those used by historians who report the activities of policy-makers. Abstract categories remove the researcher even one step further from the perspectives of those who make decisions to go to war. Second, some of the typologies of issues really define procedures such as log-rolling, or outcome properties such as distributional results, rather than the values or stakes in contention. There is not always a very good fit between the typologies of academics and the issues as they were defined by the actors involved in conflict.

Working inductively does not necessarily simplify the matter, however. Many conflicts involve multiple issues; issues change over time, particularly as a war progresses; disputants do not place the same value, or even identify the same values, as being in contention or
jeopardy; some issues are so intermixed that attempts to separate them become arbitrary if not impossible; and weighing the relative importance of different issues injects the investigator's judgment as a substitute for the operating frames of reference of the decision-makers. Evidence can often lead to several interpretations.

I am aware of these problems and some others of lesser import as well. Were our concern chiefly to offer a precise issues synopsis of every single war in the European and global states system since 1648, more modesty would be displayed. Since the purpose is to draw a rough map of issue change over time, however, some differences of interpretation, some omissions, and some arbitrary judgments may be less lethal. A portrait or characterization is more important than detail.

Mansbach and Vasquez (1981) distinguish between objectives under contention, values to be satisfied by their allocation, proposals (statements of, or claims for, potential outcomes), and stakes and positions. Issues include all of these. They may involve several stakes and values, including status, prestige, security, honor, and the like. For our purposes, an issue can be defined as the stakes over which two or more parties contend. It includes values, but it is often difficult to identify or measure those. Mansbach and Vasquez also identify stakes as the core of the concept. Issues are the “contention among actors over proposals for the disposition of stakes among them.” They include “the characteristics of the stakes involved” (1981.59).

Stakes are usually fairly concrete— a piece of territory, the protection of an ethnic minority, the creation of a new state, the end of apartheid, and so forth. Values are more difficult to pinpoint, and their analysis always includes the formidable problem of ends and means. They are, moreover, usually a by-product of conflict rather than the stake that gives rise to the conflict in the first place. The stakes in Louis XIV’s attack on the United Provinces in 1672 involved territorial gains. At issue were specific pieces of territory Louis wanted to add to his domains. An important value at play in this conflict was the king’s gloire. It was an important consideration in the court at Versailles and among all of Europe’s ruling monarchs and princes. La gloire increased or diminished with the fortunes of war, but it was not the stake involved in the planning for the war. Similarly, Lyndon Johnson defined the American stakes in Vietnam as the freedom of South Vietnam and the security of the United States via the maintenance of a non-communist southeast Asia. American prestige, status, and reputation for meeting commitments to allies were no doubt important considerations or values, but they were perceived more as the consequences of particular policies than as the issues which led to American

intervention and the bombing of North Vietnam. We can assume that all conflicts involve calculations of status, prestige, and reputation, but they might be more relevant in helping to explain why wars continue rather than why they start. I will include such values only where they are designated as a bone of contention between the parties.

In the chapters that follow, statements by the parties involved, as reported in standard historical accounts, identify the issues. If they are unavailable, historians’ judgments will serve as the basis for the data. In every case, at least two historical accounts have been used. In some instances the position of a government or other policy-making body is not possible to identify given the usual research constraints. Why, exactly, the Tatars joined Turkey in its war against Poland from 1671 to 1676 is not listed in standard English- and French-language diplomatic histories. Many cases of small partners joining a warring state, when no alliance commitment is involved, suggest simple opportunism. They go to war, or join an ongoing contest of arms, in order to get in on the spoils. Some of the histories are deficient in specifying all war participants’ stakes. The operating rule guiding research is therefore to identify only the issues that generated the conflict between the original combatants. States that entered wars later are omitted from the analysis.

The distinctions between issues are usually clear, but in some instances rough judgments are required. There is also the problem of instrumentality and the lack of concordance between parties’ perceptions of stakes. How, for example, would we classify the following situation as described by Boccalini in discussing the foreign policy of Venice in the fifteenth century?

The Venetians have as the ultimate purpose of their existence peace … For the Venetians it is enough to have territorial possessions large enough to assure Venice its freedom. They want to have power not out of ambition, to command others, but out of their striving not to become the subject of others (quoted in Ranum, 1975:28).

A Veronese claim to Venetian lands would raise a territorial issue for Verona. Yet the ultimate stake for Venice, as the quotation implies, would be to prevent itself from becoming the subject of others. Territory is instrumental; the Venetian stake is autonomy, not just a piece of land. In this case, we would classify the issue as one of autonomy for Venice and territory for both Venice and Verona.

If we enter the labyrinth of instrumental stakes, attempting to classify some as means, and others as ends, we might never emerge to make any conclusions. Others have mentioned the difficulties in-
volved (Wright, 1942:II, 722–23, 857, 1290; Blainey, 1973:146–51, 248–49), and seem to have been scared off by the task. Bouthoul and Carrère (1976) use a simple classification scheme, but its categories are too coarse. In my view, the best way to proceed is to define the issues as the policy-makers defined them, allowing for the limits of historical evidence.

DATA SOURCES: GEOGRAPHICAL AND TEMPORAL DOMAINS

The cases used as the basis for this study come from the European and global states systems from 1648 through 1989. There is a consensus among scholars of international relations that a single states system, or society of states, has existed since the treaties of Westphalia. It is defined by the security interdependence of its members, meaning generally that the foreign policy activities of one actor had some impact on others in the system. What the United Provinces’ agents said and did in 1655 was noted and responded to by Venice, Brandenburg, Sweden, and many others in continental Europe and Britain. The Burmese–Thai Wars of the 1760s, on the other hand, had no impact on the European states system. The states system became global only in 1945 in the sense that conflicts on any continent were noted by and responded to by international institutions and by many individual states throughout the world.

In all, there are 177 cases, which form a reasonable sample compared to the 118 interstate and extra-systemic wars chronicled by Smel and Singer (1982) for the shorter period 1816–1980, and the 154 interstate wars, 1740–1975, listed by Bouthoul and Carrère. It is also a reasonable proportion of Luard’s comprehensive list of violence that includes a massive total of 470 cases from 1648. These include numerous rebellions, civil wars, and wars where little or no documentation in a major European language is available in the standard histories. Until the post-1918 period, all wars involved 1,000 or more casualties; some major interventions were less costly in lives, but involved the physical occupation by one country’s armed forces in a foreign jurisdiction for a minimum of two weeks. Further discussion of the choices for the post-1918 period is contained in chapters 11 and 12.

The selection of 1648 as the starting point is less contentious than the selection of cases. That date is commonly recognized as the official birthday of the modern states system. The principles of sovereignty and legal equality were enunciated in the Treaties of Osnabrück and Münster. The principles became major legal and philosophical pillars in the struggles to create modern states, and provided the basic norms for the conduct of their mutual relations.

ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR

The “meaning” of war refers to the policy-makers’ conceptualizations of war – what type of activity and ethical connotations it involves, for example – and their attitudes toward the use of force. Most of the literature on this subject examines popular, philosophical, or academic opinions about war (e.g., Gooch, n.d.). Public moods may indeed act as a constraint on or support of policy-makers: witness the strong sentiments of pacifism in Great Britain during the 1930s. But since public participation in matters of war and peace is a phenomenon of only the last two centuries, and only in a few states, it is not a sufficient guide to officials’ attitudes. Nor is it safe to assume that public and governmental attitudes always coincide.

Attitudes do not always lead directly to actions. However, they offer rationales and justifications for the use of force. They also influence the calculus of costs, risks, and benefits when it comes time to decide whether or not to unsheathe the sword. The attitudes toward the use of force by Japanese leaders in the 1930s offer a stark contrast, for example, to those of their British colleagues in the same era. I will not try to explain the origins of those attitudes. Description at this stage will have to suffice.

ISSUES, WAR, AND PEACE: CREATING INTERNATIONAL ORDERS

Most wars end with formal negotiations leading to peace treaties. These treaties perform several functions. They establish, in most cases definitively, the losses and gains suffered or achieved in the contest of arms. They specify the outcome of war, or as Mansbach and Vasquez (1981, ch. 8) put it, they represent “decisions” that authoritatively allocate values. Many of the issues that generated the preceding war are resolved. The agreements also legitimize war outcomes in the sense that the parties are expected to meet the commitments undertaken in the negotiated or imposed documents. Subsequent efforts to evade commitments then justify reprisals, sanctions, and possibly further war. Finally, peace treaties often reaffirm international norms and conventions, including prior peace treaties (cf. Randle, 1973).

But some peace treaties represent more than the settlement of the issues that generated a previous war. They are expressions of the fact...
that, despite the rather dismal record of war occurrence, wars are great learning experiences. The costs, strains, and often the negative outcomes for all parties encourage governments to think about methods of preventing resort to arms in the postwar world. Peace treaties may thus include new sets of principles, procedures, or territorial distributions upon which to organize the postwar relations between states. These efforts reflect both the nature of the issues that gave rise to previous wars, and significant changes in the attitudes of diplomatic elites toward the use of force in subsequent international relationships. Expressions such as "permanent amity," "the permanent repose of Europe," and "a just and lasting peace" are sprinkled throughout major peace treaties. They are not only ritual statements, but acknowledgments that there should be better ways than through armed combat to resolve international conflicts. They are also statements of hopes and expectations that the character of international relations will change fundamentally as a result of the lessons learned through costly wars. The great multilateral peace conferences were, in brief, attempts to build new international orders. The main elements of these orders include the definition of norms regarding the use of force; systems of governance for the society of states; conflict-resolving mechanisms and procedures; the resolution of war-producing issues; specific terms of settlement that will preclude wars of revenge by the losers (assimilation); and some consideration of the types of issues that may generate conflict in the future. I will evaluate each peace in terms of these criteria, leaving a more developed discussion for the last chapter.

Chapters on the great attempts to erect more pacific international relationships are interspersed with the chapters on conflict-generating issues. My purpose is not to present yet another historical account of peace conferences, but to assess the designs, plans, and assumptions about war and international order that were in play at them. Theories of peace at the conferences and the resulting treaties were usually based on policy-makers' explicit or implicit theories of war, or at least on their evaluation of the causes of the most recent war. These conferences represented the learned diplomatic wisdom of the day about war and peace. It was not the writings of academics and philosophers, which were notoriously ignored in most peacemaking efforts, but the ideas of the policy-makers themselves that mattered. They were the ones who not only settled the terms of the preceding war, but who also tried to hammer out - never ignoring their own state's vital interests - some sort of system or set of procedures that would either prevent future armed conflict or that could help manage or limit it. In brief, we will explore the theories of international relations of the peacemakers.

Exercises in international order building have seldom been typical of bilateral peace conferences, or even in diplomatic gatherings following multilateral wars that were limited in time, location, and/or costs. Moreover, those peace treaties that were basically armistices seldom contained provisions for ameliorating or accommodating the issues that generated a war. Some peace treaties, after all, were designed not to allocate values authoritatively, but to provide a pause until the next round of war could be undertaken to try to finish the job. They were stratagems and phases in continuing conflicts over unresolvable issues. Many of the peace treaties between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for example, were of this kind, as were the treaties that slowly brought to an end the Swedish Empire of the seventeenth century.

The great peace conferences that attempted to come to grips with the fundamentals of war and peace include Osnabrück and Münster, 1644–48, the more limited conferences that resulted in the treaties collectively known as the Peace of Utrecht (1713–15), the two Treaties of Paris and the Congress of Vienna that succeeded the Napoleonic Wars, the conference of Paris in 1919, and the 1945 San Francisco conference, including its antecedents, during the Second World War. These constitute the focus of the inquiry.

The analytical framework for the study can be characterized as a

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**Figure 1.1 The peace and war cycle**

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peace-war loop. Issues generate conflict, when two or more governments seek to achieve incompatible objectives (e.g., a piece of territory) or stake out mutually exclusive positions on a particular problem (e.g., rights of neutral shipping and trade in wartime). In any era, some types of issues will predominate as conflict-producers.

Whether or not the contests over the issues eventuate in war is in part a function of policy-makers' attitudes and conceptualizations of war. The hypothesis is that the more favorable the attitudes toward war, the greater its incidence. But the kinds of issues also affect incidence. Contests over strategic territory, for example, are more likely than disagreements over trade policy to generate contests of arms. Security is a more important value in most eras than is welfare. The succeeding chapters identify the issues in each era that were most prominent as sources of war.

Wars end in peace. Peace treaties and agreements usually resolve the issues that gave rise to the previous war. Some also try to create new international orders, and they develop new norms, reflecting changes in attitudes, regarding the future use of force. An even smaller number try to anticipate issues of the future and develop means for dealing with them. How these conferences deal with past issues and with the defeated combatants may also be critical in influencing the nature of postwar international relationships. In some instances the great peace settlements set the stage for future eras of conflict and war. In these cases, peace becomes the father of war. Our task is to assess each conference in terms of its contribution both to the order-building enterprise and to the subsequent pattern of warfare in the system. The periodization is thus based on intervals between the peace conferences. We begin with the lengthy conferences at Münster and Osnabrück that terminated one of Europe’s longest and deadliest wars.

2 MÜNSTER AND OSNABRÜCK, 1648: PEACE BY PIECES

[The Peace of Westphalia] is null, void, invalid, unjust, damnable, reprobate, inane, empty of meaning and effect for all time.

Pope Innocent X

The Pope’s reaction to the Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück is understandable. The Thirty Years War had raged across Bohemia, Germany, Italy, France, and the United Provinces, pitting nascent states against empires, rebellious princes against the Holy Roman Emperor, free cities against imperial cities, and Catholics against Protestants. The Pope condemned the outcome of four years of negotiations that led to the Peace of Westphalia because it confirmed the religious schism begun by Luther and significantly reduced the political authority of the Holy Roman Emperor and the other great symbol of Christian unity, the papacy. The Peace of Westphalia organized Europe on the principle of particularism. It represented a new diplomatic arrangement—an order created by states, for states—and replaced most of the legal vestiges of hierarchy, at the pinnacle of which were the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor.1

The Congresses of Münster and Osnabrück, which produced the Treaties of Westphalia, were the first of their kind. Europe had not previously witnessed a multilateral diplomatic gathering that was designed both to terminate a pan-European war and to build some sort of order out of the chaos into which Europe had increasingly fallen since the late fifteenth century. The congresses brought together the main heterogeneous political units of Europe at that time. There were 145 delegates representing 55 jurisdictions, including the Holy Roman Empire and all the major kingdoms except Great Britain, as well as significant duchies, margraves, landgraves, bishoprics, free cities, and imperial cities (Combes, 1854:235). Here was an opportunity to do more than barter over territory or extract spoils. This was a veritable

1 The Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück contained clauses renouncing curial protest; these clauses "finally and officially did away with Rome's possibility to decisively alter the course of secular politics in Europe" (Kielberger, 1980:57).
12 WAR: ISSUES, ATTITUDES, AND EXPLANATIONS

You have no idea how much it contributes to the general politeness and pleasantness of diplomacy when you have a little quiet force in the background.  
George Kennan, 1946

A profile of issues that have generated international conflict chronicles the values, stakes, and purposes for which people have been willing to use force in the states system. Those who made war decisions implicitly or explicitly calculated that the potential costs of men, matériel, property, and the possibility of humiliating defeats and terms of surrender did not outweigh the values and purposes that they sought or that were being challenged or threatened by opponents. A map of the issues that rose, declined, or persisted in the years that separate the Treaties of Westphalia from today also tells us something about the sociology of international relations. Many of the issues reflect critical processes of political, economic, and ideological transformation going on within states and societies. This mapping exercise will remain primarily descriptive, but there are some tantalizing opportunities for causal analyses that would seek to account for the rise and decline of various kinds of issues over time. Finally, the profiles offer some explanations for the successes and failures of the great historical peace-making efforts. Those efforts have had mixed success. All sought to create some sort of international order and to settle authoritatively those issues that had generated the preceding war or wars. A key requirement, however, was not just to dispose of them, but also to anticipate the issues of the future and to establish means by which they could be handled short of war.

Tables 12.1 and 12.2 report the frequency of individual issues, identified as a percentage of all issues that appeared in a time period, and the frequency, represented as a percentage, that a particular issue contributed to the origin of wars in the period. The first measures the relative significance of an issue compared to all conflict-generating issues; the latter identifies the salience of a particular issue as a source of war. We must remember that most wars arose over multiple issues. The tables summarize the figures that appeared in the previous chapters. They include only issues that appeared in a minimum of two historical periods (the post-1945 period is the exception so that we can identify possible issues of the future) and that had a minimum frequency of 1 percent of all issues in those periods. The tables demonstrate the comparative importance and rise and decline of the various issues, but for purpose of analysis it will be helpful to transform the figures into graphic form and to combine some of the issues into a single issue cluster.

**TERRITORY**

Figure 12.1 shows the profile of contests over territory, including boundary wars, since 1648. Quarrels involving control, access to, and/or ownership of physical space figured in about one-half of all wars between Westphalia and the outbreak of the First World War, but since Napoleon’s defeat there has been a gradual decline in the prominence of this issue, both as a percentage of all conflict-producing issues and as a source of war. As a source of war the decline has been
particularly notable since 1945. In this period it has attained a level (31 percent) less than one-half of what it had been in the eighteenth century and about 30 percent lower than it had been between Waterloo and the outbreak of the Second World War. As a percentage of all issues its decline (from 14 to 10 percent compared to the previous period) has been less pronounced. Nevertheless both measures are presently at historic lows.

This does not necessarily mean that policy-makers value territory less than they did in previous eras. Territory still evokes sentiments of national pride and prestige, and often symbolizes the spatial foundations of the national society. The passions engendered by the Rann of Kutch, uninhabited Himalayan plateaus, and small islands in the South Atlantic sustained wars involving thousands of casualties. There are some contested boundaries and territorial claims currently on the international agenda, although most of them are dormant (Day, 1987). But there is less willingness to use force to solve these problems than there was previously. A possible explanation, aside from cost-benefit analysis, is that international constraints against resolving issues of this type by force have gathered strength. The Charter of the Organization of African Unity, for example, sanctifies colonial boundaries and discourages attempts to revise them. One
bureaucratic structure. Unless territory is endowed with notable strategic or economic value, today it is less likely to become a source of war than in former times.

Figure 12.2 provides evidence to support this line of explanation. Control or ownership of strategic territory has been a significant issue underlying wars in all the historical periods since 1648. The figures for incidence show no strong trends. As a source of war there are significant differences between periods, but no general decline as there was for territory in general. We are reminded almost daily about the importance of the Golan Heights, the Bekaa Valley, the Northern Territories off Japan, the Strait of Hormuz, and the like. The geo-strategic outlook continues to influence policy-making, and most governments propose to "solve" their security problems by guaranteeing access to or seeking exclusive control over major routes of commerce or avenues of military threat.

NATION-STATE CREATION AND WAR

When we aggregate three issues – national liberation/state creation, national unification-consolidation, and secession – we deal with similar values and stakes if not behaviors. They all identify efforts to create states and symbolize that long historical process that began in Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and that has extended into the non-European parts of the world in the twentieth century. The locale and the modalities of state creation have changed significantly over time, but the ends have not altered. Modern man has chosen to underline human political fragmentation and to base community political organization on other than imperial (hierarchical) or world communitarian principles. Statehood today is usually identified as the sole legitimate political manifestation of an ethnic/language/religious group's exclusiveness. It is the prime political expression of group identity in a pluralistic and fragmented world. The ideological underpinning of political exclusiveness is the doctrine of national self-determination. Not infrequently it is accorded greater priority than other political beliefs, including democracy, civil liberties, welfare, and socialism.

The search for statehood has commanded the international agenda since the late eighteenth century, and in two of the periods (1815–1914 and since 1945) it has been more often associated with war and armed intervention than any other issue. And while the importance of territory has been declining from its high levels of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the search for statehood has been increasing, if not steadily. Figure 12.3 records the explosion of national independence movements of the nineteenth century, followed by the hiatus of the interwar period when the seeds of independence and self-government were being planted in what is today termed the Third World, and their germination in the post-1945 period. More than one-half (52 percent) of the wars of the post-1945 period were manifestations of the state-creation enterprise. In terms of the relative frequency of issues it ranks highest by a considerable margin.

IDEOLOGY AND WAR

Men have frequently gone to war over ideas – an important fact neglected in most realist versions of international relations that
depict international politics as a permanent search for power and security, where ideas serve only as fig leaves for the cruder concerns of power. But politics cannot be reduced to such simplicities. Political principles and ideological aspirations play a prominent role in shaping relations between nations. Empirical research has established that democracies do not war against each other, and the number of governments that have been overturned by the great powers primarily for reasons of ideological incompatibility is substantial. But the extent to which ideological international conflict has varied throughout the history of interstate relations since 1648.

Westphalia put an end to Europe’s most destructive and longest armed conflict (if measured in terms of direct and indirect casualties as a proportion of population, the Thirty Years War was the most destructive). While power and dynastic factors were involved, contests over religious and derivative civil principles drove the war from the beginning. They were sufficient conditions for bloodshed. The Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück effectively settled these issues, and the succeeding century and one-half was marked by conflicts over more concrete issues. The political principles and practices of dynasticism went largely unchallenged. Courts frequently dabbled in each others’ intrigues and generously funded various factions abroad, but for the most part the alignments had little to do with political or constitutional principles. Uniformity of political beliefs, forms, and practices stretched from Lisbon to Moscow and Stockholm to Naples well into the late 1700s.

Only in the late eighteenth century did the consensus and uniformity begin to break down. Republicanism became infectious, spawning radical challenges to dynastic principles in the American colonies, Sweden, Holland, and Poland. These all occasioned wars and interventions before France’s revolutionary regime formally took up the task of “liberating” Europe in the name of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Figure 12.4 chronicles the rise and accelerating importance of ideological and government composition issues throughout the period of this study.

They were and have remained a prominent source of international conflict since the settlements of 1814–15. The importance of these kinds of issues has been particularly notable in the post-1945 period where, combined, they have been involved in 42 percent of the wars. This constitutes the second-highest-ranking issue cluster after state creation. International politics has been increasingly revolving around ideas and the people who represent them in government rather than around concrete issues such as territory and commerce. The purpose of many of the great powers and some of the lesser ones as well have concentrated on controlling or influencing the government personnel of near and distant states, rather than occupying their territories. Conversely, they have also sought to undermine the authority of foreign regimes whose policies and political principles they found unpalatable. The ideological issue involves, for the most part, attempts to influence and control political change abroad. Force was frequently used where other methods failed (cf. Luard, 1988:2–3).
ECONOMICS AND WAR

There is archaeological evidence that man's earliest collective armed combat was used to establish monopolies over trade routes, access to water, and exclusive use of grazing lands (Morley and Marriott, 1975; Roper, 1975). Greek history is littered with wars the purpose of which was to establish trade monopolies and to control commercial waterways. After 1648, colonial activity, which hitherto had been sponsored, organized, and largely funded by private concerns, became increasingly state supported and protected. Competition for monopolies over trade and for exclusive and preferential access to

Figure 12.4 Ideology and war

markets was frequently a source of diplomatic problems and frequent wars. Such activities were buttressed and justified by mercantilist theories that held that a state's power could be increased by ruining the foreign trade of its rivals. In the seventeenth century there were also few rules of navigation that commanded widespread observance. The limits of territorial jurisdiction and the rights of neutral shipping during war time caused serious conflicts and were the issues around which several wars were fought.

One century later economic theorists and policy-makers increasingly recognized that commerce was not necessarily a zero-sum activity, and that war and trade did not mix well: the damage to commerce through armed combat was often greater than the expected spoils of military victory. Commerce and navigation became increasingly regulated by international legal norms and, as we have seen, disputes arising over these problems began to decline. Some thorny problems, such as rights of transit through the Turkish Straits, continued to play an important role in generating conflicts well into the twentieth century, but none was sufficient to lead to war. Colonial competition among the European governments and the United States over Africa, the Middle East, Persia, and China caused a number of dangerous crises (Fashoda, Algeciras), generally strained diplomatic relations between the powers, and served as sources of the Spanish-American and Russo-Japanese Wars. There were as well the numerous campaigns and skirmishes by the Europeans against indigenous populations, none of which, however, had an impact on security interdependence between the states of the central system.

The spread of economic imperialism as well as more benign forms of trade and commerce in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries created a set of interests that required protection from the home government. Governments frequently relied upon coercive means, including military interventions, to protect the lives, property, and investments of their citizens residing in non-European lands. In some cases, such as the Anglo-Chinese Opium Wars of the mid nineteenth century, force was used to promote what by any standards was illicit trade. Gunboat diplomacy was the term applied to "protection." Armed force was also employed in the nineteenth century to control piracy and to abolish the practice of slavery. While there is a relatively well-articulated legal regime that defines the rights and obligations of both host governments and citizens doing business abroad, some areas remain contested, and in conditions of turmoil, civil war, and rebellion the host government may not be able to provide protection. Foreign intervention is a frequent result. I have labeled the issue "protect nationals/commercial interests abroad."
during the 1930s thanks to Japanese and Italian imperialism, only to decline again after the Second World War. Contests over resources continue to appear and may become significant issues of the future. But on the whole, most problems of a commercial/navigational character have been regularized or controlled through well-articulated legal regimes. The few that remain (e.g., incompatible Canadian and American positions on the status of the Northwest Passage) are not likely to lead to military hostilities.

Access to resources and critical waterways during times of diplomatic tension may be more problematic, however. Local wars or domestic turmoil may disrupt critical traffic lanes, thus posing a threat to resource consumers. During the 1970s the United States issued several warnings that it would use force if necessary to maintain the vital oil shipping routes open in the Persian Gulf, and during the 1980s a NATO attack on Saudi Arabia's oil fields would have disrupted Gulf traffic even more. In the contemporary international environment it is difficult to envisage that conflicts surrounding economic and transportation issues would be sufficient to spark large-scale wars. But interventions may occur when the economic interests of the great powers in particular are threatened by turmoil, civil wars, and international wars in the Third World. An environment of serious depression or severe resource shortage, moreover, this type of issue could emerge as a significant source of potentially lethal international conflict.

HUMAN SYMPATHY: ETHNICITY, RELIGION, AND WAR

Men fight not only over ideas, territory, power, and welfare values. They also sympathize with those whom they consider their ethnic, religious, and ideological kin. When these kin are threatened, persecuted, or physically harmed, their benefactors abroad may come to their assistance—sometimes with armed force. This sympathy factor in international relations may also take the form of seeking to incorporate the kin into one's own nation through annexation or in response to an irredentist movement in a neighboring jurisdiction. All periods in this study have featured conflicts in which the sympathy factor played a prominent role.

Figure 12.6 represents the evidence of the continued importance of the use of force as a means of protecting kin abroad. It aggregates the separate issues of “protect religious confères,” “protect ethnic confères,” and “heathenism/religious unification/irredenta.” The high frequency of wars in the nineteenth century in which these sorts of issues played a role is partly accounted for by the persecution of Orthodox

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Christians and fellow Slavs in the Ottoman Empire and the frequent championing of their cause by Russia. There has been a decline of sympathy issues since the First World War, but they have been one source of conflict in more than one-fifth of the post-1945 wars. The Kashmir, Cyprus, and Palestinian problems have involved these types of issues; it is significant that each has remained intractable since inception many years ago. Sympathy may be harder to appease than concerns over power or territory.

**Predation and Survival**

The term “total war” has been used conventionally to describe

- Issue as % of all issues in the period
- Issue as source of war % in the period

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**Remaining Issues**

levels of destruction, casualties, and the explosive power of modern weapons. But in many of our periods war has been total in another sense: one or more of the participants sought to eliminate another state or regime as an officially independent political entity. At its worst extreme there was the Nazi attempt to liquidate Poland as a state and to exterminate its population through executions, massacres, starvation, and slave labor. A somewhat more problematical example has been Israel. Each of its wars has been perceived as a contest for national survival, though it is not known exactly what would have happened to Israel as a state, to its government, and to its population had the Arabs achieved military victory in 1947–48, 1956, 1967, or 1973. We do know, however, what happened to the regimes of countries that were “liberated” by communist armies.

Figure 12.7 is a barometer of the amount of predation in the international system, where predation is defined as the attempt to destroy a regime or dismember, partition, or liquidate a sovereign state. The profile adds more support to the view of nineteenth-century Europe as relatively moderate in its international politics. Only 6 percent of the wars included regime/state survival as a stake or issue, while in the era of the HITLER, Italian, and Japanese onslaughts more than one-third (37 percent) of the wars had as one of their purposes the elimination of a government or the liquidation of a state. Since 1945 the figure has declined, but it still remains slightly above the historical average of 21 percent of all wars and substantially above the averages for the nineteenth century.

The remaining issues do not have high frequencies and/or have disappeared from the international agenda. Referring back to tables 12.1 and 12.2 we see that dynastic/succession issues went the way of the theory of divine right, and that empire-building enterprises, which revived briefly under the Germans, Italians, and Japanese in the 1930s, have become obsolete, in part because of the mystique of the self-determination doctrine and also because formal territorial control is no longer necessary to gain access to markets and sources of supply or to dominate lesser economies. The support of allies—the obligation to fulfill alliance commitments—is an issue throughout the post-Westphalian period, but as a proportion of all issues it has remained low since 1648. Few governments are willing to go to war solely to protect an ally. Usually other issues are involved simultaneously (e.g., Great Britain’s decision to declare war on Germany in 1939). Nevertheless, governments have gone to war reasonably frequently to enforce
other kinds of treaty obligations. In the interwar period, 9 percent of all issues involved attempts to enforce previous legal obligations; this meant that 30 percent of the wars and armed interventions had a treaty obligation at issue.

Maintenance of imperial or state integrity (usually offsetting a challenge of the “national liberation” variety) remains prominent across all periods, but was especially high in the nineteenth century when the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires were constantly beleaguered by the actions of disaffected ethnic and religious minorities.

The post-1945 period has seen the demise of overseas empires, sometimes dismantled voluntarily according to set schedules but at

Attempts to maintain regional dominance—America’s activities in Central America are a contemporary example—cut across all periods, but there are no trends in this stake or issue. Perhaps most surprising is the low incidence of issues defined in balance of power terms. Policy-makers in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries were fully familiar with the concept and often employed it as a guide to diplomatic and military actions. But it would appear that it operated more in the genesis of alliances and in the decisions to join wars after conflicts had already arisen than as a conflict-producing issue itself. Concern for the balance of power was more a manifestation of conflict than a source of it. Statesmen launched wars for specific purposes, but those wars would escalate to greater participation by the powers if they made the calculation that a victory by the initiator would threaten the balance. The Crimean War and several others fit this pattern.

To summarize, we have chronicled the profiles of various issues and stakes that have figured in the etiology of armed conflict since 1648. One pattern that emerges from the figures is that relatively abstract issues—self-determination, principles of political philosophy and ideology, and sympathy for kin—have become increasingly important as sources of war while concrete issues such as territory and wealth have declined. One explanation for this pattern might lie in the ability of governments to create legal and other conflict-avoiding regimes for concrete-type issues, while for abstract issues regulation is difficult to develop. There can be compromises over territory, access to waterways, rules of navigation, and the location of boundaries, for example, and many of these issues can be handled in such a fashion that both parties to a conflict can gain through compromise or regime construction. In contrast, statehood has been viewed typically in zero-sum terms. Federal and other schemes that provide degrees of cultural, economic, and political autonomy may offer partial solutions, but the mystique of national self-determination defined in terms of independence and sovereignty remains vigorous; the aim of the group is not autonomy but sovereignty. Similarly, it has been difficult to compromise the great ideological issues of an era. Totalitarian ideologies by definition require total obedience at home and conformity abroad. At the foreign policy level the purpose of the revolutionary totalitarian state is to recreate the world or one of its regions in its own image. Ideological conformity is, however, incompatible with the social.
political, religious, and value fragmentation of mankind. It is therefore
difficult to fashion compromises between fundamentally incompatible
belief systems. Conflict and war historically have been seemingly
inevitable results of the clash of two or more Weltanschauungen. Only
through slow learning and increasing pragmatism, and after shoulder-
ing the heavy burdens of ideological purity above all other values, does
reconciliation start to become a possibility. But ideological accommo-
dation has been a slow process, often accompanied by considerable
violence both domestically and internationally. It took great wars to
resolve the religious issues of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
to replace the dynastic principles with republican principles in the late
eighteenth and entire nineteenth centuries, and to defeat the most
pernicious of all political doctrines, Nazism. The conflict between
communism and liberalism has seen much bloodshed, but it has been
muted under the threat of civilization-destroying war. The increasing
pragmatism of contemporary communist leaders, notable particularly
in their recent acknowledgments of the existence of an international
society and the necessity of their states to live at peace within it, may
mean that we will be spared the ordeal of another general war and that
at least some of the issues emanating from communist ideology may be
handled by means other than the use of force.

The search for nation-statehood has been a predominant goal of
ethnic, social, language, and religious groups for more than two cen-
turies. But it goes back much further. An extended debate among
anthropologists, philosophers, and legal scholars in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries revolved around the proposition
that historically the process of state creation and war correlate with
each other (R. Holst, 1913; Windsor, 1987: 175-91). Aside from ide-
ological issues, the history of international relations since the late eight-
teenth century has been largely constituted of the state-creating and
state consolidation urges. A significantly high proportion of
the world’s existing states came into being through war and violence. The
United States was born through rebellion and achieved its present
territorial dimensions largely through armed conquests at the expense
of the Mexicans, Hawaiians, and Spanish. Germany, Italy, the Balkan
countries, Israel, Algeria, Indonesia, and dozens of other states
became members of the society of states only after prolonged armed
conflicts. There is also evidence that states which come into being
through revolution and violence are more likely to be involved in
subsequent international conflict (Maoz, 1989). The birth of nations
often starts with war, culminates with war, and helps produce post-
independence armed conflicts.

A substantial amount of war since 1815 and even earlier has been
associated with the transformation of the main principles of human
political organization, the change from the loose, tribute-based multi-
ethnic/religious empire to the nation-state. We must not forget that the
“powers” of the nineteenth century were structurally more dissimilar
than similar. The Ottoman, Austrian, and Russian Empires were
indeed “powers,” but their constitutional formats represented an older
type of political organization that was inconsistent with the exclusiv-
ist and communitarian sentiments implied in the doctrine of national
self-determination. And the dissolution of those empires, culminating
through and immediately after the First World War, could not take
place for the most part through peaceful means. The retreat of overseas
empire after the Second World War was somewhat more orderly, but
wars of “national liberation” were necessary to prove conclusively that
the days of formal empire had finally come to an end.

Despite all the rhetoric about global interdependence, the shrinking
world, and the presumably unifying impact of technological innova-
tions on social and economic life, a more primordial sentiment seeks
to assert autonomy, separateness, uniqueness, cultural survival, and,
ultimately, sovereignty (K. J. Holsti, 1985b:675-96). Since most of the
states of the world are composed of multiple ethnic/language/religious
groups, we could expect the future international agenda to be crowded
with cases of civil wars, wars of secession, and the breakdown of
multi-community states – all with the possibility of foreign inter-
vention. That agenda is already well populated and growing annually:
it includes the case of Sri Lanka, the Karens and Shans of Burma,
pro-independence movements in Kashmir and the Punjab, armed
secessionist/autonomy struggles in Nagaland and the Sind, and in
Africa, the Eritreans and southerners of the Sudan. Even industrial
states are not immune from these urges, as the actions of the I.R.A.,
the Basques, some Corsicans and Quebecois, and most recently, the
Baltic peoples, attest.

We are witnessing the creation of a genuinely global international
system whose essential and primary units are states constructed upon
distinct social communities. This system is still in the birth process and
it is coming into existence. It has in the past, largely through violent
means. In the industrial world the process is largely completed, and it
may not be accidental that the mutual relations of the states comprising
it have become predictably peaceful. Borders are settled and legit-
mated, the societies are reasonably well integrated – though strong
regional sentiments and secession movements still exist in some of
them – and their political systems enjoy general legitimacy and the
rules for changing parties and personnel are no longer contested. Constitutionalism has prevailed over other means of achieving power.

Little of this can be said of most of the newer nations. Their state apparatuses are in many cases weak, divided, and ineffective in meeting a host of grass-roots expectations and providing adequate services. The societies over which they have jurisdiction in varying degrees are fractured into more meaningful and effective political communities based on tribal, ethnic, religious, and other bases. State and nation do not coincide, thus inviting movements to make them consistent. Although colonial boundaries enjoy substantial legitimacy as the permanent demarcation lines of the new states, few would venture to predict that they are and will remain as stable as, for example, the boundaries separating Switzerland from France and Italy, or the United States from Canada.

The challenges of the future will thus arise in large part from the continuing process of state formation and consolidation. As in the past fifty years, most of the wars will revolve around these issues and will occur in the Third World. There will be many arms races, wars of national liberation, attempted secessions, and possible foreign interventions. Another possibility is that the destructiveness of modern conventional war will render the costs of achieving independence greater than the advantages.

Historically states could be created through contests of arms without unduly endangering the society that was to be integrated into a single and separate political order. The military technology and levels of force employed to unite Italy and Germany, for example, presented only low-level threats to most Germans and Italians. Under contemporary conditions of warfare, in contrast, the attempt to create a state through armed force may involve such high levels of destruction to the community that the resulting state will face potentially insurmountable problems of social, economic, and political reconstruction and survival. Vietnam has never fully recovered from its war of national liberation and unification; Mozambique barely exists as anything akin to a state; and Lebanon is mostly a legal fiction. As Philip Windsor (1987:186) has noted, under contemporary conditions of war the greatest threat to the state is war. This is the paradox: if wars create states, in today’s conditions they may also destroy them.

ISSUES OF THE FUTURE

We may encounter new types of issues that will generate serious international conflicts, even among the industrial countries.

Trade issues have become “high politics” among many governments and in an environment of serious economic recession or depression it is possible to imagine some governments resorting to coercive measures to protect various welfare values. These might involve demonstrations of force that could escalate to the point of large casualties. Environmental aggression causing substantial harm to adjacent countries offers possible scenarios, although the responses so far to disasters such as Chernobyl and major oil spills at sea that fouled foreign coast lines have been surprisingly muted and non-hostile.

In the list of wars and major interventions since 1945, we have already seen several cases where overpopulation, resource depletion, and pollution contributed to international conflicts, usually through the mass migrations that those conditions spawned. The situation in Central America may unfortunately be typical of many areas of the Third World. There, it is a combination of explosive birth rates, highly skewed land-ownership patterns, the alienation of prime agricultural land for export-oriented crops and meat production, deforestation by the marginalized in search of land for subsistence agriculture, and pollution. These patterns, along with highly stratified social structures, offer prime conditions for domestic revolutionary activity and ultimate external intervention and/or migration to neighboring countries that have similar problems and thus cannot accommodate large influxes of refugees. Other possibilities include the use of armed force by one government against drug producers in another jurisdiction, and armed operations against terrorist organizations. The point is not to predict exactly what will be the contentious issues of the future but to underline that as some issues decline others may rise to take their place; or the menu may just keep expanding.

ATTITUDES AND WAR

It is not possible to draw accurate configurations of attitudes toward war, their change, and their impact on war-peace decisions. Precise measures do not yet exist. We can only hypothesize that the more decision-making elites regard war as an honorable, profitable, desirable, and/or prestige-generating activity, the more likely it is that when calculating costs, risks, and potential gains during a diplomatic conflict they will tend to minimize the former and maximize the latter. There are many intervening variables between attitudes and decision-making, but there are also likely to be correlations between them. Knowing Hitler’s and Chamberlain’s attitudes toward war—even if that is all we knew—we could predict with reasonable confi-
dence which would decide to take up the sword. Admittedly, these two figures represent extremes. For other policy-makers, the prediction would be more difficult to make.

If we look at the configuration of attitudes toward war historically and impressionistically, there appears to be a slow decline in the appeal of bellicosity. Until the end of the Napoleonic Wars, few policy-makers saw war as an extraordinary problem of the international system, one that demanded severe reforms of international institutions, processes, and norms. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries war served many functions and purposes: as avenues to personal glory, reputation, and prestige; as essential instruments in the state-building endeavor; as indices of national status and prestige; and as means of achieving and defending diplomatic and commercial objectives. Policy-makers certainly did not see war as unusual, as an indicator of national, court, or royal pathology, or as a form of deviant diplomatic behavior. On the contrary, many personal, court, and state interests could be served by the military enterprise. To the extent that the societies of the day valued heroic activity, war was the heroic undertaking par excellence.

The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars brought some subtle changes to attitudes toward war among the decision-making elites. Those wars had been sufficiently destructive to bring home the point that war was indeed a problem of the system and that something should be done about it. Political elites no longer sought personal fame and reputation through military exploits (Napoleon was the last major ruler who fulfilled generalship and civic roles simultaneously), although valor on the battlefield was still sought by the professional military. National reputation and prestige began to be based on foundations other than military exploits and great victories: science, industry, the arts and letters, and education. The diplomatic memorandums of the period 1815 to approximately 1870 indicate that the policy-makers increasingly saw war as an exceptional activity, a sort of last resort after all other avenues of settling conflicts had failed. The norms of the Concert of Europe also suggested that war should not be undertaken without the consent of at least some of the other powers. In these and other ways, the contrasts between 1750 and 1850 are pronounced.

Chapter 7 chronicled the changes in attitudes toward war that took place in the latter decades of the nineteenth century and the fourteen years of the twentieth century prior to the Great War. Once again, war came to be seen by many in a positive light: as a means of social regeneration, as a necessary instrument in the eternal struggle between nations, as an indicator of national superiority in the struggle for the survival of the fittest, and as God’s instrument for weeding out the weak from the strong. These views had little to do with the traditional instrumental view of war, and a lot to do with national jingoism, racial hatreds, and the seamiest sides of nineteenth-century philosophy that equated peace with degeneracy. The portrait of attitudes toward war in this period, particularly in Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy, may not do justice to the variety of views that actually existed, but there were enough high-level policy-makers who shared them that we could predict that war would once again become a regular feature of the international politics of the period.

The First World War de-belicized important segments of European publics and policy-making circles. But the great totalitarian movements of the interwar period once again raised war to a positive social good, a major means of proving the superiority of given races, nationalities, and ideologies. Hitler, Mussolini, and their emulators in many European countries resurrected the mystique of national glory through violence, and they attempted to reestablish the connection between civic and military leadership in the Napoleonic manner. The dictators’ personal glory and prestige could be established and enhanced through the great victories of the nations’ armed forces, the forces which they personally commanded. The relationship between their attitudes toward war and their decisions and actions was close, perhaps determining.

The Second World War and its conclusion with the atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki proved to all but the most committed warriors that general war was no longer an option in the lives of modern states. Henceforth, the purpose of armed forces would be primarily to prevent war through deterrence rather than to fight. Most responsible policy-makers have publicly acknowledged that nuclear war would be an unprecedented disaster for all humanity. Attitudes have shifted dramatically to the point that in conflict situations, risks and costs have come to seem as critically important variables in decision-making. Concerns about escalation, loss of control, ‘events getting out of hand,’ and the like have assumed more prominence than in previous eras. Few states have renounced the potential use of force, but clearly today it is seen among millions as an exceptional, if not pathological, form of behavior. Butressing these attitudes is the growing recognition that the use of force seldom achieves its purposes. For the most part, the great powers have all suffered humiliating losses when undertaking armed interventions against wars of national liberation and other forms of violence in the Third World.

In the Third World, however, apocalyptic visions of war are not
predominant. Those countries were mostly spared the ravages and destruction of this century’s two great European wars, and many of them achieved their independence only through armed struggle. There may be some lessons learned from futile armed contests such as those between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s, but the historical experience of many Third World countries regarding war has been generally more favorable than the industrial countries’ tragic and suicidal wars of this century. Religious fundamentalism may also shift views in favor of violence. Attitudes may of course change, and certainly there are many international norms that lend weight to the more pacific hopes and expectations of populations and policy-makers in the industrialized countries. There are no regimes today that have gone to war with the enthusiasm and frequency of, for example, Louis XIV. But when the security problems facing many of the newer countries are combined with generally less pacific attitudes toward war, we could anticipate that wars will persist in many of these areas of the world. There is still a long way to go before the entire planet becomes “de-belligerized.”

**ISSUES, WAR, AND INTERNATIONAL THEORY**

Recent debates about appropriate formats for studying international politics have underlined different visions of the essential actors, structures, and processes of the world. These visions have been accorded the unfortunate title of “paradigms,” and there is considerable disagreement about the purposes for developing them. For some, they are analytical devices for ordering a field of inquiry and for organizing research programmes. For others, they represent preferred worlds or trends toward which the world is heading. In previous work I have labeled these visions according to the criteria of (1) the nature of the essential actors; (2) the normative problem that animates ethical and scientific concern; and (3) the images of the world/system/society of states (K. J. Holsti, 1985a:7–8). There are three resulting models of international politics: the realist school and its derivative neo-realist model, dependency theory, and world society models. I would modify this trinity for the purposes of this study by deleting the dependency model (because its normative focus is justice and equality, not peace and war) and adding a model developed in some detail at the turn of the century and during the First World War (Pettersson, 1964) but popularized more recently in the work of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1972) under the term “transnational relations.” It can be called a pluralist model because it emphasizes the variety of actors involved in international politics and the mixture of processes that takes place between these actors.

The realist vision places power as a central concept in describing and explaining the behavior of states. Power is a tangible resource founded upon territory, industrial capacity, population, and the like. It is both a means and an end. To Hans Morgenthau (1948), for example, all state interests are defined in power terms, and the processes of international politics are depicted as a constant struggle for power. Morgenthau also discusses three “policies”: imperialism, status quo, and balance of power. This is about as close as he comes to discussing issues.

This version of power politics has its roots not so much in the thought of Hobbes, Machiavelli, or Rousseau as in a group of German, French and Italian political analysts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These analysts strongly reflected Darwinian, Hegelian, and Nietzschean power-through-struggle themes. Like Morgenthau and his successors, they depicted international politics as a struggle for power, a ceaseless search for safety and supremacy, where resources, population, and, above all, territory provide the wherewithal for success (Pettersson, 1964:35–43). In their preference for establishing a world on hierarchical principles (one great power must dominate or be dominated by another) they differed from Morgenthau, who was a champion of balance and moderation. But the central organizing concepts and the vision of both the structures and processes of international politics are notably similar.

The neo-realist derivative is best exemplified in the structural analysis of Kenneth Waltz (1979). His parsimonious explanatory theory of international politics posits international structures as the main, though not sole, sources of the recurrent behavior of states. Structures, which are defined in terms of the organizing principles of the states system (anarchy), the positions of the main actors, and their relative capabilities, lead to recurring outcomes, of which war, balances of power, concerns for the relative rewards of cooperation, and the reproduction of statehood are the most significant. Structural characteristics also influence how the great powers will manage international affairs. Waltz observes that regardless of the intentions of policy-makers, these forms of behavior recur. Structures condition and determine regardless of the attributes of states, ideologies, the nature of processes between states, individual personalities, and all other phenomena located at the state or process levels. The main theme of structuralist analyses of international relations is that despite great differences between states, system outcomes are similar. Whereas theories of foreign policy emphasize differences between states as explanations of
war, structuralists adhere to the parsimonious simplicity of units and similarity of behaviors.

Waltz has made a major contribution to the development of a parsimonious and rigorous theoretical statement about international politics. Yet, as he himself admits, he has not explained all. And the reader might well ask whether the things to be explained—the recurrent behaviors—are really what we want to know about international politics. Some critical questions are overlooked. Why, for example, do we see such great variations in the location and incidence of war? Why are some balances relatively stable (for most of the nineteenth century) while others change with unusual frequency (mid-eighteenth century)? What are the limits of imitation? To speak of states today as "units," as if they are functionally the same despite their tremendous variations, may overlook some important discontinuities that have significant effects on behavior. For example, the security problematics of many of the newer states are vastly different from those of the more established members of the system. In the Third World, most wars occur because of domestic cleavages, not because of the security dilemma, arms races, or structural characteristics associated with Europe's diplomatic experience. It would be inappropriate to examine the etiology of war in the Third World using concepts and approaches that derive from and are germane only to the progeny of the European states system. If, as I have claimed, we really have two interlocking state systems, it would be misleading to analyze the dynamics of one with the concepts from the other. Waltz and his fellow structuralists' concept of the state is too undifferentiated. The vast differences between pre- and post-1945 states has to be acknowledged in any theory of international relations (K. J. Holsti, 1989).

This book started with the assumption that politics is purposeful activity. But the identification of purpose is an empirical problem and not one of a priori definition. I have demonstrated in the substantive chapters that in the international political arena man has multiple purposes. These purposes change over time and reflect fundamental social and ideological transformation taking place within societies and in international society. Governments are perennially concerned with questions of power and influence—the means of policy—but they are just as preoccupied with purposes. The range of goals is vast, running from the peaceful advancement and protection of welfare values to dreams of universal empire. They are animated by ideals and ideas, values and interests, and sentiments of kinship and sympathy. These are often more potent explanations of behavior than some ubiquitous struggle for power or structural conditions. Most wars, in fact, have been struggles over values, beliefs, and sympathies, and not over power.

If all states are condemned to behave in a similar fashion because of structural factors (anarchy) or because of an eternal struggle for power, we would expect wars and balances to be relatively constant forms of behavior or outcomes between all pairs of states. These behavioral patterns no doubt recur, but the variations in recurrence are so great that they must command inquiry. No living Swede can recall his or her country being involved in a war (the last one was in 1809), while an Israeli of middle age can recall five wars and was probably an armed combatant in at least two of them. Venezuela has been officially (and in that case, only symbolically) at war only once; Russia has engaged in armed combat or armed intervention at least thirty-seven times since the early seventeenth century. Many neighbors have been at peace for a century or more (Canada and the United States, Chile and Bolivia, Spain and Portugal), while others have faced chronic tensions, disputes, and wars (Greece and Turkey, India and Pakistan). Between 1947 and the late 1960s, approximately, there was no balance of power—there was a preponderance of power, as there was in the 1920s and many other eras. Structural and power theories cannot account for these significant variations. The discussion of issues cannot account for them either, but at least it alerts us to the many different things governments quarrel about and how these change over time. A vision of a ubiquitous struggle for power or of a determining systemic structure explains recurrence without accounting for non-recurrence or the great deviations from an "average" pattern of recurrence. To argue that we have war because of systems structures is analogous to an argument that we have automobile accidents because we have highways. Can a comprehensive explanation of war avoid asking what men fight about, how issues rise and decline, and how man's concepts of and attitudes toward the social act of warfare arise and change?

Power is linked to purposes in the sense that it shapes, enhances, or constrains the definition and achievement of values and goals (it would be difficult to envisage the leaders of Vanuatu proclaiming a goal of universal hegemony); but it is seldom an end in itself. Just as the First World War cannot be treated as a typical war—as it often has been in the literature on war and crisis—so the search for power and security in Europe at the turn of the century cannot be taken as the model for all international relationships since 1648. If there is one significant recurrence in the world of diplomacy and war throughout our historical period since 1648, it is the search for statehood (one of Waltz's outcomes), and not a struggle for power or a balance of
This study also underlines the need for a state-centric vision of the world and its agents on questions of war, peace, and order-building. A state-centric vision of the world is appropriate if not complete when examining these problems. Since 1648 it has been governments or those who aspire to become governments (national liberation movements, for example) that ultimately decide the great questions of war and peace, and it is largely governments that define the purposes that must be pursued or defended.

But non-state actors' roles in the etiology of war cannot be overlooked; indeed, their importance may be increasing. Social groups and communities have frequently generated "sympathy" issues that have attracted foreign attention and occasional armed intervention. Early colonial wars were often rooted in the operations of private individuals and the chartered companies, and their movements usually developed at the grassroots level, and, as in the case of the Kwantung army, foreign policy was occasionally driven by the activities of armies in the field. Yet, in our 177 wars and armed interventions, the majority were defined by the policy-makers in terms of state and/or dynastic interests.

To the extent that environmental issues, international drug trafficking, and large population migrations may become increasingly important issues on the international agenda, the transnational relations approach can help organize significant research programmes on future international conflict. In the new states of the world, moreover, transnational links between secessionist groups and external patrons who fund, train, and in other ways support them help to explain the transformation of local rebellions and civil wars into international conflicts and wars.

The evidence provided in the preceding chapters is not congenial to world society models, either as analytical devices or as relevant scenarios for the future. The major cleavages in the international system have between those who sought to fashion the world on hierarchical principles and those who have championed ideological pluralism and the continued political fragmentation of mankind. The predominance of the values of autonomy, independence, and exclusiveness are pronounced throughout the three and one-half centuries covered here. That there are powerful homogenizing tendencies that bring people closer together - physically, culturally, and ideologically - cannot be denied. But there are also forces that drive them to assert their uniqueness and separateness. Whatever the long-run outcomes of these tendencies, the conditions for a relatively egalitarian and symmetrical world society do not exist today. A single world political order, reflecting the emerging global economy, would be one of hegemony and subordination, no matter how benign it might look on the surface. We know upon whose societies a "world community" would be modeled. It would certainly not be Indonesia, India, or Tonga. It would not even be Japan. (Europeans and Americans have no end of difficulties trying to understand the Japanese, particularly in their business practices and their penchant for hard work. The plethora of English-language books that try to explain Japanese society and business practices take the same approach: they basically criticize the Japanese for being different.) Lurking behind many of the models of world society is a hidden ethnocentrism. Everyone wants a world society (if it results in peace) so long as it reflects one's own society, language, economy, and political institutions (cf. Rummel, 1981). World society models may offer analytical possibilities for exploring new sorts of transnational processes, emerging social patterns, the impact of technological innovations, and other social phenomena that arise from scientific and economic trends, but questions of war and peace, which often revolve around issues of statehood (confirming the world's political fragmentation) are better explored through state-centric analytical devices.

The final theoretical question concerns the appropriateness of a Clausewitzian conception of war in a nuclear age. I have argued that we learn more about war when we conceive of it in political-instrumental terms as compared to conceptions based on deviant, pathological, or epidemiological analogies. It has become the conventional wisdom even in the Soviet Union that nuclear war can serve no rational purpose because it would destroy the state and society that weapons have traditionally been designed to protect. In the last chapter we explored the various intellectual means the Americans have developed to try to escape the dilemma - particularly the idea of "limited nuclear war." But society and the state cannot coexist with any nuclear war. The greatest threat to the security of the modern industrial state, then, is not a particular adversary but nuclear war and perhaps even some forms of conventional war. Thus technology has rendered Clausewitz irrelevant and possibly very dangerous.

But most states do not possess instruments of mass destruction, and those that do have renounced the use of force in general. There have been too many wars - many for at least minimally justifiable reasons - in other areas of the world to suggest that the nuclear reality facing Washington, Moscow, London, Paris, and Beijing necessarily extends beyond the great power relationships. The costs of war and armaments may have risen substantially, but they have not yet funda-
mentally altered the decision remains one of several techniques of advancing and protecting values, beliefs, and interests. This is not to say that it will always or even occasionally succeed – Saddam Hussein must have wondered many times why he started the war against Iran – but there is little evidence to suggest that the verbal and emotional commitment to peace so often expressed in the context of potential nuclear war finds strong echoes in thinking on the use of force in general. We have chronicled changing attitudes toward the use of force over the past three centuries. These have been significant in many ways, in some respects even revolutionary. In the industrial countries in particular, there is a strong presumption against the use of force. But that presumption has not yet taken on the character of a universal legal or moral imperative. For the foreseeable future the Clausewitzian model of war remains regrettably valid.

13 THE PEACEMAKERS: ISSUES AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER

We are never completely contemporaneous with our present. History advances in disguise; it appears on stage wearing the mask of the preceding scene, and we tend to lose the meaning of the play. Each time the curtain rises, continuity has to be re-established. The blame is not history’s but lies in our vision, encumbered with memory and images learned in the past. We see the past superimposed on the present, even when the present is a revolution. Regis Debray

Some issues in international politics have been irreconcilable. They involve fundamentally incompatible positions on beliefs, essential values, and political purposes. Among the most important were conflicts over the structure and nature of the international system or society of states. The issues of religious conformity and tolerance, their expression in civil law and education, and conflicts over hierarchical versus pluralistic images of the appropriate political organization of Christendom combined to produce the Thirty Years War. Incompatible positions on hegemony versus pluralism, as maintained by the balance of power, were at the heart of the War of the Spanish Succession. The same issues were raised again during the French Revolution and Napoleon’s reign.

The bilateral conflict between Serbia and Austria-Hungary in 1914 did not touch upon the vital interests of Germany, France, and England. Although Europe was divided by two hostile alliance systems, no party sought hegemony in the way that the Hapsburg family complex, Louis XIV, or Napoleon had pursued it. The states system was not at issue in 1914, only the relative ranking of the powers and Germany’s fear of encirclement. Despite this fear, numerous German statements indicated a commitment to predominance in Europe, if not hegemony.

The Second World War resurrected the old cluster of issues dividing those who sought to organize the European states system on hierarchical and monolithic lines, placing Germany in a position of undisputed