CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

Asking who won a given war, someone has said, is like asking who won the San Francisco earthquake. That in wars there is no victory but only varying degrees of defeat is a proposition that has gained increasing acceptance in the twentieth century. But are wars also akin to earthquakes in being natural occurrences whose control or elimination is beyond the wit of man? Few would admit that they are, yet attempts to eliminate war, however nobly inspired and assiduously pursued, have brought little more than fleeting moments of peace among states. There is an apparent disproportion between effort and product, between desire and result. The peace wish, we are told, runs strong and deep among the Russian people; and we are convinced that the same can be said of Americans. From these statements there is some comfort to be derived, but in the light of history and of current events as well it is difficult to believe that the wish will father the condition desired.

Social scientists, realizing from their studies how firmly the present is tied to the past and how intimately the parts of a system depend upon each other, are inclined to be conservative in estimating the possibilities of achieving a radically better world. If one asks whether we can now have peace where in the past there has been war, the answers are most often pessimistic. Perhaps this is the wrong question. And indeed the answers will be somewhat less discouraging if instead the following questions are put: Are there ways of decreasing the incidence of war, of increasing the chances of peace? Can we have peace more often in the future than in the past?
Peace is one among a number of ends simultaneously entertained. The means by which peace can be sought are many. The end is pursued and the means are applied under varying conditions. Even though one may find it hard to believe that there are ways to peace not yet tried by statesmen or advocated by publicists, the very complexity of the problem suggests the possibility of combining activities in different ways in the hope that some combination will lead us closer to the goal. Is one then led to conclude that the wisdom of the statesman lies in trying first one policy and then another, in doing what the moment seems to require? An affirmative reply would suggest that the hope for improvement lies in policy divorced from analysis, in action removed from thought. Yet each attempt to alleviate a condition implies some idea of its causes: to explain how peace can be more readily achieved requires an understanding of the causes of war. It is such an understanding that we shall seek in the following pages. To borrow the title of a book by Mortimer Adler, our subject is "How to Think about War and Peace." The chapters that follow are, in a sense, essays in political theory. This description is justified partly by the mode of inquiry—we proceed by examining assumptions and asking repeatedly what differences they make—and partly by the fact that we consider a number of political philosophers directly, sometimes in circumscribed fashion, as with St. Augustine, Machiavelli, Spinoza, and Kant, and sometimes at length, as with Rousseau. In other places we shall concentrate on a type of thought, as in the chapters on behavioral scientists, liberals, and socialists. But what is the relevance of the thoughts of others, many of them living far in the past, to the pressing and awful problems of the present? The rest of the book is an answer to this question, but it is well at the outset to indicate the lines along which we shall proceed.
Why does God, if he is all-knowing and all-powerful, permit the existence of evil? So asks the simple Huron in Voltaire's tale, and thereby confounds the learned men of the church. The theodicy problem in its secular version—man's explanation to himself of the existence of evil—is as intriguing and as perplexing. Disease and pestilence, bigotry and rape, theft and murder, pillage and war, appear as constants in world history. Why is this so? Can one explain war and malevolence in the same way? Is war simply mass malevolence, and thus an explanation of malevolence an explanation of the evils to which men in society are prey? Many have thought so.

For though it were granted us by divine indulgence to be exempt from all that can be harmful to us from without [writes John Milton], yet the perverseness of our folly is so bent, that we should never cease hammering out of our own hearts, as it were out of a flint, the seeds and sparkles of new misery to ourselves, till all were in a blaze again.¹

Our miseries are ineluctably the product of our natures. The root of all evil is man, and thus he is himself the root of the specific evil, war. This estimate of cause, widespread and firmly held by many as an article of faith, has been immensely influential. It is the conviction of St. Augustine and Luther, of Malthus and Jonathan Swift, of Dean Inge and Reinhold Niebuhr. In secular terms, with men defined as beings of intermixed reason and passion in whom passion repeatedly triumphs, the belief has informed the philosophy, including the political philosophy, of Spinoza. One might argue that it was as influential in the activities of Bismarck, with his low opinion of his fellow man, as it was in the rigorous and austere writings of Spinoza. If one's beliefs condition his expectations and his expectations condition his acts, acceptance or rejection of Milton's statement becomes important in

the affairs of men. And, of course, Milton might be right even if no one believed him. If so, attempts to explain the recurrence of war in terms of, let us say, economic factors, might still be interesting games, but they would be games of little consequence. If it is true, as Dean Swift once said, that “the very same principle that influences a bully to break the windows of a whore who has jilted him, naturally stirs up a great prince to raise mighty armies, and dream of nothing but sieges, battles, and victories,” \(^2\) then the reasons given by princes for the wars they have waged are mere rationalizations covering a motivation they may not themselves have perceived and could not afford to state openly if they had. It would follow as well that the schemes of the statesman Sully, if seriously intended to produce a greater peace in the world, were as idle as the dreams of the French monk Crucé— idle, that is, unless one can strike at the roots, the pride and petulance that have produced the wars as they have the other ills that plague mankind.

There are many who have agreed with Milton that men must look to man in order to understand social and political events, but who differ on what man’s nature is, or can become. There are many others who, in effect, quarrel with the major premise. Does man make society in his image or does his society make him? It was to be expected, in a time when philosophy was little more than a branch of theology, that the theologian-philosophers would attribute to human agency what many philosophers before and since have described as the effects of the polity itself. Rousseau, among many who could be mentioned, makes a clean break with the view that, man being a social animal, one can explain his behavior in society by pointing to his animal passion and/or his human reason. Man is born and in his natural condition remains neither good nor

\(^2\) Swift, *A Tale of a Tub.*
bad. It is society that is the degrading force in men's lives, but it is the moralizing agency as well. And this latter effect Rousseau was unwilling to surrender even had he thought it possible for men to retreat to the state of nature. This is his position, consistently reflected in his various works, though the myth persists that he believed the savage noble and lamented the advent of society.\(^8\) Man's behavior, his very nature, which some have taken as cause, is, according to Rousseau, in great part a product of the society in which he lives. And society, he avers, is inseparable from political organization. In the absence of an organized power, which as a minimum must serve as the adjudicating authority, it is impossible for men to live together with even a modicum of peace. The study of society cannot be separated from the study of government, or the study of man from either. Rousseau, like Plato, believes that a bad polity makes men bad, and a good polity makes them good. This is not to say that the state is the potter and man a lump of clay posing no resistance to the shape the artist would impart. There are, as Rousseau recognized, similarities among men wherever they may live. There are also differences, and the search for causes is an attempt to explain these differences. The explanation of consequence—whether one is worried about the recurrence of theft or of war—is to be found in studying the varying social relations of men, and this in turn requires the study of politics.

Can man in society best be understood by studying man or by studying society? The most satisfactory reply would seem to be given by striking the word "or" and answering "both." But where one begins his explanation of events makes a difference. The Reverend Thomas Malthus once wrote that, "though human institutions appear to be the obvious and obtrusive causes of much mischief

\(^8\) For further discussion of Rousseau, see ch. vi, below.
to mankind; yet, in reality, they are light and superficial, they are mere feathers that float on the surface, in comparison with those deeper seated causes of impurity that corrupt the springs, and render turbid the whole stream of human life.” 4 Rousseau looked at the same world, the same range of events, but found the locus of major causes in a different ambit.

Following Rousseau’s lead in turn raises questions. As men live in states, so states exist in a world of states. If we now confine our attention to the question of why wars occur, shall we emphasize the role of the state, with its social and economic content as well as its political form, or shall we concentrate primarily on what is sometimes called the society of states? Again one may say strike the word “or” and worry about both, but many have emphasized either the first or the second, which helps to explain the discrepant conclusions reached. Those who emphasize the first in a sense run parallel to Milton. He explains the ills of the world by the evil in man; they explain the great ill of war by the evil qualities of some or of all states. The statement is then often reversed: If bad states make wars, good states would live at peace with one another. With varying degrees of justification this view can be attributed to Plato and Kant, to nineteenth-century liberals and revisionist socialists. They agree on the principle involved, though they differ in their descriptions of good states as well as on the problem of bringing about their existence.

Where Marxists throw the liberals’ picture of the world into partial eclipse, others blot it out entirely. Rousseau himself finds the major causes of war neither in men nor in states but in the state system itself. Of men in a state of nature, he had pointed out that one man cannot begin

to behave decently unless he has some assurance that others will not be able to ruin him. This thought Rousseau develops and applies to states existing in a condition of anarchy in his fragmentary essay on "The State of War" and in his commentaries on the works of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre. Though a state may want to remain at peace, it may have to consider undertaking a preventive war; for if it does not strike when the moment is favorable it may be struck later when the advantage has shifted to the other side. This view forms the analytic basis for many balance-of-power approaches to international relations and for the world-federalist program as well. Implicit in Thucydides and Alexander Hamilton, made explicit by Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau, it is at once a generalized explanation of states' behavior and a critical point d'appui against those who look to the internal structure of states to explain their external behavior. While some believe that peace will follow from the improvement of states, others assert that what the state will be like depends on its relation to others. The latter thesis Leopold Ranke derived from, or applied to, the history of the states of modern Europe. It has been used to explain the internal ordering of other states as well.\(^5\)

Statesmen, as well as philosophers and historians, have attempted to account for the behavior of states in peace and in war. Woodrow Wilson, in the draft of a note written in November of 1916, remarked that the causes of the war then being fought were obscure, that neutral nations did not know why it had begun and, if drawn in, would not know for what ends they would be fighting.\(^6\) But often to act we must convince ourselves that we do know

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\(^6\) Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, p. 257n.
the answers to such questions. Wilson, to his own satisfaction, soon did. He appears in history as one of the many who, drawing a sharp distinction between peaceful and aggressive states, have assigned to democracies all the attributes of the first, to authoritarian states all the attributes of the second. To an extent that varies with the author considered, the incidence of war is then thought to depend upon the type of national government. Thus Cobden in a speech at Leeds in December of 1849:

Where do we look for the black gathering cloud of war? Where do we see it rising? Why, from the despotism of the north, where one man wields the destinies of 40,000,000 of serfs. If we want to know where is the second danger of war and disturbance, it is in that province of Russia—that miserable and degraded country, Austria—next in the stage of despotism and barbarism, and there you see again the greatest danger of war; but in proportion as you find the population governing themselves—as in England, in France, or in America—there you will find that war is not the disposition of the people, and that if Government desire it, the people would put a check upon it.7

The constant interest of the people is in peace; no government controlled by the people will fight unless set upon. But only a few years later, England, though not set upon, did fight against Russia; and Cobden lost his seat in 1857 as a result of his opposition to the war. The experience is shattering, but not fatal to the belief; for it relives in the words of Wilson, for example, and again in those of the late Senator Robert Taft. In the manner of Cobden but in the year 1951, Taft writes: "History shows that when the people have the opportunity to speak they as a rule decide for peace if possible. It shows that arbitrary rulers are more inclined to favor war than are the people at any time."8 Is it true, one wonders, that there is a uniquely peaceful form of the state? If it were true,

7 Cobden, Speeches, ed. Bright and Rogers, I, 432–33.
8 Robert A. Taft, A Foreign Policy for Americans, p. 23.
how much would it matter? Would it enable some states to know which other states they could trust? Should the states that are already good seek ways of making other states better, and thus make it possible for all men to enjoy the pleasures of peace? Wilson believed it morally imperative to aid in the political regeneration of others; Cobden thought it not even justifiable. Agreeing on where the causes are to be found, they differ in their policy conclusions.

But what of those who incline to a different estimate of major causes? "Now people," President Dwight Eisenhower has said, "don't want conflict—people in general. It is only, I think, mistaken leaders that grow too belligerent and believe that people really want to fight." ⁹

Though apparently not all people want peace badly enough, for, on a different occasion, he had this to say: "If the mothers in every land could teach their children to understand the homes and hopes of children in every other land—in America, in Europe, in the Near East, in Asia—the cause of peace in the world would indeed be nobly served." ¹⁰

Here the President seems to agree with Milton on where cause is to be found, but without Milton's pessimism—or realism, depending on one's preconceptions. Aggressive tendencies may be inherent, but is their misdirection inevitable? War begins in the minds and emotions of men, as all acts do; but can minds and emotions be changed? And, if one agrees that they can be, how much and how fast can whose minds and feelings be changed? And, if other factors are relevant as well, how much difference would the changes make? The answers to these questions and to those of the preceding paragraph


are not obvious, but they are important. How can they best be sought?

Some would suggest taking possible answers as hypotheses to be investigated and tested empirically. This is difficult. Most English liberals at the time of the First World War argued, as did Wilson, that the militarist and authoritarian character of the German state prompted Germany to seek the war that soon spread to most of the world. At the same time some liberals, most notably G. Lowes Dickinson, argued that no single state could be held guilty. Only by understanding the international system, or lack of system, by which the leaders of states were often forced to act with slight regard for conventional morality, could one understand and justly assess the processes by which the war was produced.11 Dickinson was blasted by liberals and socialists alike for reversing the dominant inside-out explanation. Acceptance or rejection of explanatory theses in matters such as this most often depends on the skill of the pleaders and the mood of the audience. These are obviously not fit criteria, yet it would be foolish to argue that simply by taking a more intensive look at the data a compelling case could be built for one or the other explanatory theory. Staring at the same set of data, the parties to the debate came to sharply different conclusions, for the images they entertained led them to select and interpret the data in different ways. In order to make sense of the liberals' hypothesis we need somehow to acquire an idea of the interrelation of many possibly relevant factors, and these interrelations are not given in the data we study. We establish or, rather, assert them ourselves. To say "establish" would be dangerous; for, whether or not we label them as such, we cannot escape from philosophic assumptions. The idea we entertain becomes a filter through which we pass our data. If the

11 Dickinson, The European Anarchy, passim.
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data are selected carefully, they will pass like milk through cheesecloth. The recalcitrance of the data may cause us to change one filter for another, to modify or scrap the theory we hold—or it may produce ever more ingenious selection and interpretation of data, as has happened with many Marxists trying to salvage the thesis that with the development of capitalism the masses become increasingly impoverished.

If empirical investigations vary in incidence and in result with the ideas the empiricists entertain, it is worth asking ourselves if the ideas themselves can be subjected to scrutiny. Obviously they can be. The study of politics is distinguished from other social studies by concentration upon the institutions and processes of government. This focuses the political scientists' concern without constituting a self-denying ordinance against the use of materials and techniques of other social scientists.12 On the latter point there is no difficulty for the student of international relations; there is considerable difficulty on the former, for international relations are characterized by the absence of truly governmental institutions, which in turn gives a radically different twist to the relevant processes. Yet there is a large and important sense in which traditional political philosophy, concentrating as it does upon domestic politics, is relevant for the student of international relations. Peace, it is often said, is the problem of the twentieth century. It is also one of the continuing concerns of political philosophers. In times of relative quiescence the question men put is likely to be: What good is life without justice and freedom? Better to die than live a slave. In times of domestic troubles, of hunger and civil war, of pressing insecurity, however, many will

ask: Of what use is freedom without a power sufficient to establish and maintain conditions of security? That life takes priority over justice and freedom is taken to be a self-evident truth by St. Augustine and Luther, by Machiavelli, Bodin, and Hobbes. If the alternative to tyranny is chaos and if chaos means a war of all against all, then the willingness to endure tyranny becomes understandable. In the absence of order there can be no enjoyment of liberty. The problem of identifying and achieving the conditions of peace, a problem that plagues man and bedevils the student of international relations, has, especially in periods of crisis, bedeviled political philosophers as well.

R. G. Collingwood once suggested that the best way to understand the writings of philosophers is to seek out the questions they were attempting to answer. It is here suggested that the best way to examine the problems of international political theory is to pose a central question and identify the answers that can be given to it. One may seek in political philosophy answers to the question: Where are the major causes of war to be found? The answers are bewildering in their variety and in their contradictory qualities. To make this variety manageable, the answers can be ordered under the following three headings: within man, within the structure of the separate states, within the state system. The basis of this ordering, as well as its relevance in the world of affairs, is suggested in the preceding pages. These three estimates of cause will subsequently be referred to as images of international relations, numbered in the order given, with each image defined according to where one locates the nexus of important causes.

Previous comments indicate that the views comprised by any one image may in some senses be as contradictory as are the different images inter se. The argument that war is inevitable because men are irrevocably bad, and the ar-
gument that wars can be ended because men can be changed, are contradictory; but since in each of them individual are taken to be the locus of cause, both are included in the first image. Similarly, acceptance of a third-image analysis may lead to the false optimism of the world federalists or to the often falsely defined pessimism of a Realpolitik position. Since in all respects but one there may be variety of opinion within images and since prescription is related to goal as well as to analysis, there is no one prescription for each image. There are, however, in relation to each image-goal pairing, logical and illogical prescriptions.

One can say that a prescription is wrong if he can show that following it does not bring about the predicted result. But can one ever show that a prescription was actually followed? One often hears statements like this: "The League of Nations didn't fail; it was never tried." And such statements are irrefutable. But even if empirical disproof were possible, the problem of proving a prescription valid would remain to be solved. A patient who in one period of illness tries ten different medications may wonder just which pill produced the cure. The apportioning of credit is often more difficult than the assigning of blame. If a historical study were to show that in country A increases in national prosperity always followed increases in tariffs, to some observers this might seem to prove that high tariffs are a cause of prosperity; to others, that both of these factors are dependent on a third; and to still others, nothing at all. The empirical approach, though necessary, is not sufficient. The correlation of events means nothing, or at least should not be taken to mean anything, apart from the analysis that accompanies it.

If there is no empirical solution to the problem of prescription verification, what solution is there? Prescrip-
tion is logically impossible apart from analysis. Every prescription for greater peace in the world is then related to one of our three images of international relations, or to some combination of them. An understanding of the analytical terms of each of the images will open up two additional possibilities for accepting or rejecting prescriptions. (1) A prescription based on a faulty analysis would be unlikely to produce the desired consequences. The assumption that to improve men in a prescribed way will serve to promote peace rests on the further assumption that in some form the first image of international relations is valid. The latter assumption should be examined before the former is made. (2) A prescription would be unacceptable if it were not logically related to its analysis. One who suffers from infected tonsils profits little from a skillfully performed appendectomy. If violence among states is caused by the evilness of man, to aim at the internal reform of states will not do much good. And if violence among states is the product of international anarchy, to aim at the conversion of individuals can accomplish little. One man’s prognosis confounds the other man’s prescription. If the validity of the images themselves can be ascertained, the critical relating of prescription to image becomes a check on the validity of prescriptions. There is, however, an additional complicating factor. Some combination of our three images, rather than any one of them, may be required for an accurate understanding of international relations. We may not be in a situation where one can consider just the patient’s tonsils or his appendix. Both may be infected but removing either may kill the patient. In other words, understanding the likely consequences of any one cause may depend on understanding its relation to other causes. The possible interrelation of causes makes the problem of estimating the merit of various prescriptions more difficult still.
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What are the criteria of merit? Suppose we consider again the person who argues that "bad" states produce war, that "good" states would live peacefully together, that therefore we must bring states into accord with a prescribed pattern. To estimate the merit of such a series of propositions requires asking the following questions: (1) Can the final proposition be implemented, and if so, how? (2) Is there a logical relation between prescription and image? In other words, does the prescription attack the assigned causes? (3) Is the image adequate, or has the analyst simply seized upon the most spectacular cause or the one he thinks most susceptible to manipulation and ignored other causes of equal or greater importance? (4) How will attempts to fill the prescription affect other goals? This last question is necessary since peace is not the only goal of even the most peacefully inclined men or states. One may, for example, believe that world government and perpetual peace are synonymous, but one may also be convinced that a world state would be a world tyranny and therefore prefer a system of nation-states with a perpetual danger of war to a world state with a promise of perpetual peace.

We shall try to facilitate the answering of the questions just raised, first by a critical consideration of each image and then by a consideration of the interrelation of images. Of what follows, Chapters II, IV, and VI give a basic explication of the first, second, and third images, respectively, largely in terms of traditional political philosophy. Chapters III, V, and VII further illustrate and exemplify each of the images in turn. Chapter VIII serves both as a brief essay on the interrelation of images and as a conclusion.
CHAPTER II. THE FIRST IMAGE

*International Conflict and Human Behavior*

There is deceit and cunning and from these wars arise.  

CONFUCIUS

According to the first image of international relations, the locus of the important causes of war is found in the nature and behavior of man. Wars result from selfishness, from misdirected aggressive impulses, from stupidity. Other causes are secondary and have to be interpreted in the light of these factors. If these are the primary causes of war, then the elimination of war must come through uplifting and enlightening men or securing their psychic-social readjustment. This estimate of causes and cures has been dominant in the writings of many serious students of human affairs from Confucius to present-day pacifists. It is the leitmotif of many modern behavioral scientists as well.¹

Prescriptions associated with first-image analyses need not be identical in content, as a few examples will indicate. Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, moved to poetic expression by a visit to the arsenal at Springfield, set down the following thoughts:

Were half the power that fills the world with terror,
Were half the wealth bestowed on camps and courts,
Given to redeem the human mind from error,
There were no need of arsenals or forts.

¹ They are discussed at length in ch. iii, below.
Implicit in these lines is the idea that the people will insist that the right policies be adopted if only they know what the right policies are. Their instincts are good, though their present gullibility may prompt them to follow false leaders. By attributing present difficulties to a defect in knowledge, education becomes the remedy for war. The idea is widespread. Beverly Nichols, a pacifist writing in the 1930s, thought that if Norman Angell "could be made educational dictator of the world, war would vanish like the morning mist, in a single generation." In 1920, a conference of Friends, unwilling to rely upon intellectual development alone, called upon the people of the world to replace self-seeking with the spirit of sacrifice, cooperation, and trust. Bertrand Russell, at about the same time and in much the same vein, saw a decline in the possessive instincts as a prerequisite to peace. By others, increasing the chances of peace has been said to require not so much a change in "instincts" as a channeling of energies that are presently expended in the destructive folly of war. If there were something that men would rather do than fight, they would cease to fight altogether. Aristophanes saw the point. If the women of Athens would deny themselves to husbands and lovers, their men would have to choose between the pleasures of the couch and the exhilarating experiences of the battlefield. Aristophanes thought he knew the men, and women, of Athens well enough to make the outcome a foregone conclusion. William James was in the same tradition. War, in his view, is rooted in man's bellicose nature, which is the product of centuries-old tradition.

2 Nichols, Cry Havoc! p. 164.
4 Russell, Political Ideals, p. 42. In one way or another the thought recurs in Lord Russell's many writings on international relations.
His nature cannot be changed or his drives suppressed, but they can be diverted. As alternatives to military service, James suggests drafting the youth of the world to mine coal and man ships, to build skyscrapers and roads, to wash dishes and clothes. While his estimate of what diversions would be sufficient is at once less realistic and more seriously intended than that of Aristophanes, his remedy is clearly the same in type.\(^5\)

The prescriptions vary, but common to them all is the thought that in order to achieve a more peaceful world men must be changed, whether in their moral-intellectual outlook or in their psychic-social behavior. One may, however, agree with the first-image analysis of causes without admitting the possibility of practicable prescriptions for their removal. Among those who accept a first-image explanation of war there are both optimists and pessimists, those who think the possibilities of progress so great that wars will end before the next generation is dead and those who think that wars will continue to occur though by them we may all die. "Optimist" and "pessimist" are tricky words, yet it is difficult to find better ones. If they are defined simply according to expectations, which accords with popular usage, it is difficult if not impossible to place a given person in one or the other category. There are degrees of optimism and pessimism, and the same person may be optimistic about some things, pessimistic about others. The philosophic meanings of the terms are clearer and more useful. Pessimism in philosophy is the belief that reality is flawed, a thought expressed by Milton and Malthus in the statements cited in the previous chapter. Momentarily, more or less adequate restraints upon the forces of evil may be contrived, but the expectation of

\(^5\) James, "The Moral Equivalent of War," in *Memories and Studies*, pp. 262-72, 290.
a generally and permanently good result is prevented by constant awareness of the vitiating effects of an essential defect. The optimist, on the other hand, believes that reality is good, society basically harmonious. The difficulties that have plagued man are superficial and momentary. The difficulties continue, for history is a succession of moments; but the quality of history can be changed, and the most optimistic believe that this can be done once and for all and rather easily. One comes back to expectations, but the expectations are rooted in different conceptions of the world. It needs to be pointed out that pessimism about the chances of ultimate success, in eliminating war for example, is not identical with a statement that nothing can be done about our present plight. The pessimist may be more hopeful than the optimist about postponing the war that threatens tomorrow; the optimist may believe that nothing is worth doing that falls short of applying the remedy that will supposedly bring final and complete success. The pessimist deserves the epithet because he believes final success impossible, but the epithet need not then be taken as one of opprobrium.

Within each image there are optimists and pessimists agreeing on definitions of causes and differing on what, if anything, can be done about them. Critical consideration of a given image may, moreover, be an insufficient basis for forming a general set of expectations, for the image itself may be faulty. This will become apparent as we seek to understand successive images. In the present chapter, we consider primarily those who assent to the proposition that to understand the recurrence of war one must look first to the nature and behavior of man and who, doing so, find ineradicable defects by which the evils of the world, including war, can be explained. In the next

chapter, we shall consider some of the many who, looking to the same causes, are confident that they can be manipulated or controlled in order to produce if not a final condition of peace at least a notable decrease in the incidence of war.

When Jonathan Dymond, an early nineteenth-century pacifist, wrote that "whatever can be said in favour of a balance of power, can be said only because we are wicked," he penned a statement to which both optimists and pessimists subscribe.\(^7\) The optimists see a possibility of turning the wicked into the good and ending the wars that result from present balance-of-power politics. The pessimists, while accepting the derivation of the balance of power and war from human nature, see little if any possibility of man righting himself. Instead the balance of power is accorded an honorable position by them, for, to use Dymond's figure, it may truly prevent "tigers" from tearing each other apart. And if occasionally it does not, still faulty prophylaxis is better than none at all.

Optimists and pessimists agree in their analysis of cause but, differing on the possibility of altering that cause, become each other's bitterest critics. Reinhold Niebuhr, a theologian who in the last twenty-five years has written as many words of wisdom on problems of international politics as have any of the academic specialists in that subject, has criticized utopians, Liberal and Marxist alike, with frequency and telling effect. Political realism, he argues, is impossible without a true insight into man's nature.\(^8\) Everyone, of course, thinks his own theories realistic. The optimists do, and they too think that they

\(^{7}\) Dymond, *The Accordancy of War with the Principles of Christianity*, p. 20.

have based them on a correct view of man. Niebuhr's dissent is based on the thought that they have overlooked the potentiality of evil in all human acts. They have assumed that progress moves in a straight line, ever upward, whereas in fact each advance in knowledge, each innovation in technique, contains within itself the potentiality of evil as well as of good. Man widens his control over nature, but the very instruments that promise security from cold and hunger, a lessening of labor and an increase of leisure, enable some men to enslave or destroy others. Man, a self-conscious being, senses his limits. They are inherent. Equally inherent is his desire to overcome them. Man is a finite being with infinite aspirations, a pigmy who thinks himself a giant. Out of his self-interest, he develops economic and political theories and attempts to pass them off as universal systems; he is born and reared in insecurity and seeks to make himself absolutely secure; he is a man but thinks himself a god. The seat of evil is the self, and the quality of evil can be defined in terms of pride.\textsuperscript{9}

This view is, of course, much older than Niebuhr. Within the Christian tradition, it is stated in classic terms by St. Augustine. Outside that tradition, it is elaborated in the philosophy of Spinoza. In the political writing of the twentieth century, it is reflected most clearly and consistently in the works of Hans Morgenthau. These four writers, despite their numerous differences, unite in basing their political conclusions upon an assumed nature of

\textsuperscript{9} Niebuhr and Eddy, \textit{Doom and Dawn}, p. 16: "It is the human effort to make our partial values absolute which is always the final sin in human life; and it always results in the most bloody of human conflicts." (I have used, here and elsewhere, only the part of the book that is written by Niebuhr.) Cf. Niebuhr, \textit{The Nature and Destiny of Man}, I, 137, 150, 177, 181; and "Is Social Conflict Inevitable?" \textit{Scribner's Magazine}, XCVIII (1955), 167.
man. St. Augustine and Spinoza can be used to illustrate the process of reasoning by which this is done.

St. Augustine had observed the importance of self-preservation in the hierarchy of human motivations. When we see that even the most wretched "fear to die, and will rather live in such misfortune than end it by death, is it not obvious enough," he asks, "how nature shrinks from annihilation?" 10 The desire for self-preservation is, with Augustine, an observed fact. It is not a principle sufficient to explain the whole of man's behavior. For Spinoza, however, the end of every act is the self-preservation of the actor. The laws of nature are simply statements of what this single end requires; natural right, a statement of what it logically permits.11 The man who lives according to reason will demonstrate both courage and high-mindedness. That is, he will strive to preserve himself in accordance with the dictates of reason, and he will strive to aid other men and unite them to him in friendship. This is not a description of actual behavior; it is a description of behavior that is ideally rational. It is not because they are duties that the man who follows the dictates of reason behaves with courage and high-mindedness. Instead these characteristics are the necessary result of following reason. His endeavor to aid others is not selfish behavior. Exactly the opposite: regard for others and the desire to cooperate with them result from the realization that

11 Spinoza, Ethics, Part IV, prop. xxxvii, note ii: "By sovereign natural right every man judges what is good and what is bad, takes care of his own advantage according to his own disposition, avenges the wrongs done to him, and endeavours to preserve that which he loves and to destroy that which he hates." References are to The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, tr. Elwes, which contains A Theologico-Political Treatise, A Political Treatise, and The Ethics. Volume and page references will be given in parentheses only where a standard system of reference alone does not make easy location of a passage possible.
mutual assistance, the division of labor, is necessary to his own sustenance and preservation.\textsuperscript{12} Logically, as with first-image optimists, this leads to anarchism: "that all should so in all points agree, that the minds and bodies of all should form, as it were, one single mind and one single body, and that all should, with one consent, as far as they are able, endeavour to preserve their being, and all with one consent seek what is useful to them all."\textsuperscript{13} Reason accurately interpreting the true interest of each would lead all people to live harmoniously in society with no need for a political authority to control and direct them.\textsuperscript{14}

Rather than being the end of Spinoza's political thought, this is only its beginning. Each man does seek his own interest, but, unfortunately, not according to the dictates of reason. This St. Augustine had explained by original sin, the act that accounts for the fact that human reason and will are both defective.\textsuperscript{15} In Spinoza's philosophy this religious explanation becomes a proposition in logic and psychology. He constructs a model of rational behavior: Those acts are rational that lead spontaneously to harmony in cooperative endeavors to perpetuate life. This is not the condition in which we find the world. That men are defective then becomes an empirical datum requiring no explanation from outside; indeed there can be no explanation from outside, for God has become

\textsuperscript{12} Although according to Spinoza every self acts for its own preservation, self-preservation and self-realization tend to coincide in proportion as man's life is suffused with reason. Cf. Ethics, Part IV, prop. viii and appps. iv–v; Part V, props. xxxviii–xlii.

\textsuperscript{13} Ethics, Part IV, prop. xviii, note. For the preceding analysis see especially Part III, prop. lix, note; Part IV, props. xxix–xli; and Theologico-Political Treatise, chs. v, xvi (I, 73, 202–203).

\textsuperscript{14} Cf. Augustine, City of God, tr. Dods, Book XV, ch. v: "But with the good, good men, or at least perfectly good men, cannot war."

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., Book XI, ch. vii; Book XII, ch. i.
Men are led not by the precepts of pure reason but by their passions. Men, led by passion, are drawn into conflict. Instead of being mutually helpful, they behave in a manner that is mutually destructive. Each seeks to be first among men and takes more pride in the harm he has done others than in the good he has done himself. Reason can moderate the passions, but this is so difficult that those who think that men "can ever be induced to live according to the bare dictate of reason, must be dreaming of the poetic golden age, or of a stage-play."  

Spinoza's explanation of political and social ills is based on the conflict he detects between reason and passion. St. Augustine, Niebuhr, and Morgenthau reject the dualism explicit in Spinoza's thought: the whole man, his mind and his body, are, according to them, defective. Despite this difference, the substratum of agreement remains; for each of them deduces political ills from human defects. Niebuhr, for example, rejects Marx's assertion that exploitation of man by man is caused by the division of society into classes, with the comment that both class divisions and exploitation result from a "tendency in the human heart."  

And Morgenthau sees "the ubiquity of evil in human action" arising from man's ineradicable lust for power and transforming "churches into political organizations . . . revolutions into dictatorships . . . love for country into imperialism."  

As the statement by Morgenthau suggests, the explana-

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16 *Ethics*, Part I, props. xxvi, xxix: Individuals, their minds and bodies, are nothing but modes of God; and God is nothing but the totality of nature.

17 *Political Treatise*, ch. i, sec. 5.


tion that suffices for domestic ills serves as well to explain frictions and wars among states. Augustine attributes to man’s “love of so many vain and hurtful things” a long list of human tribulations, ranging from quarrels and robberies to murders and wars. Spinoza, though he proclaims peace as the end of the state, finds that states are natural enemies and as such must constantly be on guard, one against the other: not because states are never honorable and peaceful, but because they may at any moment become dishonorable and belligerent; not because cooperation is against their best interests, but because passion often obscures the true interests of states as of men. And Niebuhr writes simply that war has its origin in “dark, unconscious sources in the human psyche.”

Further reflecting the resemblance between them, pessimists, like optimists, often appear to believe that war could be eliminated if only men could be changed. The thought is indirectly expressed by St. Augustine when out of his world-weary wisdom he writes: “For though there have never been wanting . . . hostile nations beyond the empire, against whom wars have been and are waged, yet, supposing there were no such nations, the very extent of the empire itself has produced wars of a more obnoxious description.” The idea that political form is but a secondary causal factor is put more directly by Niebuhr. “The ideal possibility of any historic community,” he writes, “is a brotherly relation of life with life, individually within the community and collectively between it and others.” But even the “internal peace of a community is always partly coercive [and] . . . the external peace between communities is marred by competitive strife.”

21 Niebuhr, *Beyond Tragedy*, p. 158.
ternally an oligarchy is needed to overcome the perils of anarchy; externally power is required to ward off the foreign foe. Both necessities arise from sin and remain as necessities "because men are not good enough to do what should be done for the commonweal on a purely voluntary basis." 23 Where Spinoza juxtaposes reason and the human passions that becloud it, Niebuhr poses love against the sin that overwhelms it. Sin is cause, and love, if it could overcome sin, would be cure. "Only a forgiving love, grounded in repentance, is adequate to heal the animosities between nations." 24

CRITICAL EVALUATION

First-image pessimists accept the relevance of the optimists' ideal while rejecting the possibility of achieving it. Thus Spinoza contemplates the pleasures of the state of peaceful anarchy that would be possible were men truly rational, and Niebuhr accepts the Christian myth of the Garden of Eden or the Stoic myth of the Golden Age as portraying standards of action that remain at once an impossibility in history and a source of inspiration to mortal men. 25 But what is the relevance of an impossible ideal? Clearly if men could agree upon their goals and were perfectly rational in seeking them, they would always figure out and follow the best practicable solution for any given problem. If they were truly loving, they would always be willing to "turn the other cheek" but would in fact find no occasion for doing so. Neither of these con-

23 Niebuhr, Faith and History, pp. 219–20; cf. Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. 93: "The man in the street, with his lust for power and prestige thwarted by his own limitations and the necessities of social life, projects his ego upon his nation and indulges his anarchic lusts vicariously."


25 For example, Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 148; Faith and History, pp. 143–44.
ditional statements describes the actual behavior of men—they are neither perfectly rational nor truly loving, nor, the pessimist adds, will they ever become so. Thus Morgenthau rejects the assumption of “the essential goodness and infinite malleability of human nature,” and explains political behavior by the sometimes merely blind, sometimes too cleverly egotistic behavior of men, a behavior that is the undeniable and inevitable product of a human nature that “has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover” the laws of politics.\(^{28}\)

The attribution of political ills to a fixed nature of man, defined in terms of an inherent potentiality for evil as well as for good, is a theme that constantly recurs in the thought of Augustine, Spinoza, Niebuhr, and Morgenthau. There is an important sense in which the attribution is justified. To say that man acts in ways contrary to his nature is prima facie absurd. The events of world history cannot be divorced from the men who made them. But the importance of human nature as a factor in causal analysis of social events is reduced by the fact that the same nature, however defined, has to explain an infinite variety of social events. Anyone can “prove” that man is bad simply by pointing to evidence of his viciousness and stupidity. To relate unwanted events, such as crime and war, to this viciousness and stupidity is then a simple task. Although this is insufficient to establish the validity of the first image, it is nevertheless difficult, if not impossible, to counter such a particular interpretation of an image by trying to check it against events. To try to do so is to bog down in a welter of facts and value judgments. Do such evidences of man’s behavior as rapes, murders, and thefts prove that he is bad? What about the counterevidence

provided by acts of charity, love, and self-sacrifice? Is the amount of crime in a given society proof that the men in it are bad? Or is it amazing that under the circumstances there is not more crime? Maybe we have so little crime and so few wars because men, being good, adjust so amazingly well to circumstances that are inherently difficult! To say, then, that certain things happen because men are stupid or bad is a hypothesis that is accepted or rejected according to the mood of the writer. It is a statement that evidence cannot prove or disprove, for what we make of the evidence depends on the theory we hold. As Emile Durkheim has pointed out, "the psychological factor is too general to predetermine the course of social phenomena. Since it does not call for one social form rather than another, it cannot explain any of them." 27 To attempt to explain social forms on the basis of psychological data is to commit the error of psychologism: the analysis of individual behavior used uncritically to explain group phenomena.

Without an understanding of man's nature, one is often told, there can be no theory of politics. Applying the dictum, Niebuhr writes that "political strategies," invariably involving "the balancing of power with power," are made necessary by "the sinful character of man." 28 Leaving aside the problem of whether or not one agrees with this statement, we may ask what difference agreement or disagreement would make. Human nature may in some sense have been the cause of war in 1914, but by the same token it was the cause of peace in 1910. In the intervening years many things changed, but human nature did not. Human nature is a cause then only in the sense that if men were somehow entirely different, they would not

28 Niebuhr, Christianity and Power Politics, p. 4.
need political control at all. This calls to mind the runner who, when asked why he lost the race, replied: "I ran too slowly." The answer, though correct, is not very helpful. A more helpful answer may or may not be possible. One might ask the runner how he trained, what kind of shoes he wore, how well he slept the night before, and whether or not he paced himself properly. Answers to such questions, while not affecting the innate capabilities of the athlete, may provide clues to more impressive performances in the future. It would be foolish to prescribe a regimen for the athlete without considering his physical characteristics, but dwelling obsessively upon the invariant factors that affect his performance may divert attention from the factors that can be manipulated. Similarly one may label human nature the basic or primary cause of war, but it is, according to those whom we here consider, a cause that human contrivance cannot affect.

Spinoza claimed to explain human behavior by reference to psychological factors. But the search for causes is an attempt to account for differences. If men were always at war, or always at peace, the question of why there is war, or why there is peace, would never arise. What does account for the alternation of periods of war and peace? While human nature no doubt plays a role in bringing about war, it cannot by itself explain both war and peace, except by the simple statement that man's nature is such that sometimes he fights and sometimes he does not. And this statement leads inescapably to the attempt to explain why he fights sometimes and not others. If human nature is the cause of war and if, as in the sys-

29 "I would have it known," he writes, "that all this demonstration of mine proceeds from the necessity of human nature . . . -I mean, from the universal effort of all men after self-preservation." His effort in politics has been "to deduce from the very condition of human nature . . . such things as agree best with practice." Political Treatise, ch. iii, sec. 18; ch. i, sec. 4.
tems of the first-image pessimists, human nature is fixed, then we can never hope for peace. If human nature is but one of the causes of war, then, even on the assumption that human nature is fixed, we can properly carry on a search for the conditions of peace.

How damaging are these criticisms to the systems erected by first-image pessimists? Very damaging indeed where the pessimists have in fact attempted to derive specific political conclusions directly from an assumed nature of man. This cannot be done, but with their method other and very important things can be. Where Durkheim points out that the psychological factor, since it does not call for specific social forms, cannot explain any of them, one can well imagine Augustine or Niebuhr replying that, on the contrary, the psychological factor explains all of them. "Caesars and saints," Niebuhr has written, "are made possible by the same structure of human character." Or again, "Human nature is so complex that it justifies almost every assumption and prejudice with which either a scientific investigation or an ordinary human contact is initiated." 30 This admits one part, while denying another part, of Durkheim's critical intention. Human nature may not explain why in one state man is enslaved and in another comparatively free, why in one year there is war, in another comparative peace. It can, however, explain the necessary imperfections of all social and political forms. Thus Niebuhr admires Marx for exposing the contradic-

31 Niebuhr, Christianity and Power Politics, ch. 11.
convey the thought that though political solutions will be imperfect they are nevertheless necessary. The basic assumptions of Augustine and Niebuhr, Spinoza and Morgenthau, are useful in descrying the limits of possible political accomplishment.

What is valid in Durkheim's criticism is, however, indicated by a set of tendencies displayed by the pessimists: on the one side, to develop a politics and economics without content; on the other, to introduce realms of causation that go beyond the psychology of man in order to get content. The first is illustrated by Niebuhr's criticism of Augustine. While Augustine argues that the consequences of original sin make government necessary, he fails to distinguish relative orders of merit among social and political institutions. His keen perception of the consequences of anarchy makes him willing to abide tyranny. On this point, Niebuhr's criticism is forthright and convincing. Augustinians, he writes, "saw the dangers of anarchy in the egotism of the citizens but failed to perceive the dangers of tyranny in the selfishness of the ruler. Therefore they obscured the consequent necessity of placing checks upon the ruler's self-will." 32 But Niebuhr himself sometimes betrays a similar habit. For example, his comments on freedom and control in economics and on the relation between economics and politics derive more from his theological position than from a close analysis of economic and political problems and forms. While his general comments are often sound, his specific statements are as often arbitrary—whether one agrees or disagrees, it is difficult to see the basis for them. Niebuhr's concentration on the finitude of man has led to some brilliant insights, as close and constant attention to a single factor often does, but it has also led to judgments that could as

easily be reversed. And this could be done on the basis of a similar definition of human nature, quite in the way that Niebuhr disagrees politically with St. Augustine while accepting his view of man.

For understanding the significance of first-image analysis in international relations, the second tendency of the pessimists is more important. Though Spinoza thinks he has been able to explain political phenomena by reference to qualities inherent in man, he also clearly makes the point that under different conditions men behave differently. When not united, men must constantly be on guard one against the other; when they live within a commonwealth they often enjoy at least a modicum of peace and security. Without the restraints of government, Augustine points out, men would slaughter each other until man is extinct. Orderly government may make all the difference between death and the possibility of living to an old age with relative safety and happiness. Augustine and Spinoza recognize the point implicitly, without making explicit admissions. Niebuhr and Morgenthau tackle more directly the problem of relating causes to each other. Niebuhr explicitly distinguishes primary from secondary causes. "All purely political or economic solutions of the problem of justice and peace deal with the specific and secondary causes of conflict and injustice," he declares. "All purely religious solutions deal with the ultimate and primary causes." Although proponents of one kind of

solution often exclude the other, both kinds are necessary. Niebuhr makes clear, for example in his criticism of Augustine, that a realistic understanding of Christian tenets requires that men concern themselves with degrees of merit in social and political institutions. None can be perfect, but the imperfections of democracy are infinitely preferable to the imperfections of totalitarianism. Perfect justice being impossible, men become concerned with weighing possible palliatives, with striving for those that promise a little more justice or freedom, security or welfare, and seeking to avoid those that may lead to a little less. For Niebuhr, the impossibility of earthly perfection does not justify the Augustinian unconcern, found in Luther, Hobbes, and Karl Barth, with the comparative qualities of alternate forms and policies.

This intense and practical concern with questions of a little more or a little less has the interesting effect of moving the “secondary” causes to the center of the stage. One might say that from his basic cause Niebuhr derives one maxim: do not expect too much. From his identification of secondary causes he derives his other conclusions: just what to expect under different conditions, which conditions must be changed to minimize unwanted effects and achieve others, and, generally, what the rules of conduct must be for the conscientious citizen or politician.

Too much concern with the “primary” cause of conflict leads one away from a realistic analysis of world politics. The basic cause is the least manipulable of all causes. The causes that in fact explain differences in behavior must be sought somewhere other than in human nature itself. Niebuhr recognizes this when he writes that “the particu-

34 Niebuhr and Eddy, Doom and Dawn, p. 6; cf. Leaves from the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic, pp. 88-91.
lar plight of modern civilization is in a sense not caused by the sinfulness of human nature or by human greed. The greed of collective man must be taken for granted in the political order." 36 But power can be organized under government and the pretensions of one group or state can be checked by the assertions of another. 37 From a correct understanding of secondary causes comes the real chance for peace. The same overbalancing of primary by secondary causes is evident in Morgenthau—war from man's lust for power, he says, peace from world government. 38 And, with world government presently impossible, Morgenthau, like Niebuhr, argues convincingly the inescapable necessity of balance-of-power politics. 39

Perhaps some circumscribed comments on the persistent debate between the "realists" and their critics will make the practical meaning of the comments on first-image pessimists clearer. Since Morgenthau has been slighted somewhat in the previous discussion and since it is around him that the battle rages, we shall concentrate on him and his critics in the succeeding pages.

Morgenthau recognizes that given competition for scarce goods with no one to serve as arbiter a struggle for power will ensue among the competitors, and that consequently the struggle for power can be explained without reference to the evil born in men. The struggle for power arises simply because men want things, not because there is some evil in their desires. This he labels one of the two roots of conflict, but even while discussing it he seems to pull unconsciously toward the "other root of conflict and concomitant evil"—"the animus dominandi, the desire for

power.” This is illustrated by a statement such as the following: “The test of political success is the degree to which one is able to maintain, to increase, or to demonstrate one’s power over others.” 40 Power appears as an end-in-itself, whereas a greater emphasis on the first root of political discord would credit power as an instrument necessary for success in competitive struggles. Morgenthau, however, often considers the drive for power that inheres in men as a datum more basic than the chance conditions under which struggles for power occur. This is indicated by his statement that “in a world where power counts, no nation pursuing a rational policy has a choice between renouncing and wanting power; and, if it could, the lust for power for the individual’s sake would still confront us with its less spectacular yet no less pressing moral defects.” 41

We have here two ideas: first, that struggles for preference arise in competitive situations and force is introduced in the absence of an authority that can limit the means used by the competitors; second, that struggles for power arise because men are born seekers of power. What are the implications for international politics of this dual explanation? One who accepts the second idea will define national interest in terms of power, because men naturally seek power. One who accepts the first idea will also define national interest in terms of power, but this time because under certain conditions power is the means necessary to secure the ends of states. In the one instance, power is an end; in the other, an instrument. The lines of analysis are obscured, for if it turns out that power is a necessary means, then power inevitably takes on some of the qualities of an end. Whether one adopts the first or the second explanation, or mixes the two, may then make little differ-

ence in the policy conclusions reached. It may, however, confuse the analyst and flummox his critics.

Realists have tended to accept the idea of a neat dichotomy between two schools of thought. This is implicit in Niebuhr's statement, previously cited, that the basis of all political realism is a sophisticated view of man, and in Kennan's definition of the conduct of government as a "sorry chore . . . devolving upon civilized society, most unfortunately, as a result of man's irrational nature, his selfishness, his obstinacy, his tendency to violence." 42

It is explicit in Morgenthau's assertion that modern political thought divides into two schools—the utopians with their optimistic philosophies of man and politics and the realists who see that the world "is the result of forces which are inherent in human nature." It is evident as well in the distinction of Gerald Stourzh between those who think that the progress of reason and science makes government increasingly unnecessary and "those who hold that there is an ineradicable element of selfishness, pride, and corruption in human nature" and who therefore "refuse to concede to reason and to 'scientific principles' such a paramount role in political things." 43

Governments, political manipulations, and balances of power may be necessary in part because of man's passion and irrationality, but they are necessary for other reasons as well. The division of political approaches into two categories is misleading because it is based on an incomplete statement of the causes of conflict and the consequent necessities of politics. The dichotomy is often accepted by the critics of the realists as well. In a review of John Herz's Political Realism and Political Idealism, Quincy

42 Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Policy, p. 48.

Wright comments on the self-styled realists as follows: "Thus when it is said that states pursue power as their supreme value, the philosophical question is at once raised: Ought power to be the supreme value of states? The 'realist' answers affirmatively, asserting that states should pursue their national interests and the supreme national interest is the augmentation of the state's power position. They are, however, then asserting not a self-evident axiom but an ethical norm, and an ethical norm which is by no means uncontroversial." 44 As a criticism of Morgenthau this can be accepted, but not as a criticism of Herz; and even as a criticism of Morgenthau it commits the error of acquiescing in the confusions he has himself introduced. If one becomes intrigued with statements such as those previously cited in which a power drive rooted in man is asserted to be the primary cause of worldly ills, then it may be fair to say that Morgenthau has made a normative statement that one may accept or reject according to his inclination. According to Herz's analysis, however, states look to their comparative power positions because of the "security dilemma," born of a condition of anarchy, that confronts them. 45 Power appears as a possibly useful instrument rather than as a supreme value that men by their very natures are led to seek. Whether or not power should be "the supreme value of states" is then not the question. Rather one must ask when, if ever, it will be a supreme value and when merely a means.

The attempt to derive a philosophy of politics from an assumed nature of man leads one to a concern with the role of ethics in statecraft without providing criteria for distinguishing ethical from unethical behavior. This diffi-

44 Wright, "Realism and Idealism in International Politics," *World Politics*, V (1952), 122.
45 Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism*, ch. ii, sec. ii.
difficulty is reflected in the comments of a critic who is worried by the problem of giving content to Morgenthau’s proposed guide for foreign policy, “the national interest.” Grayson Kirk suggests that “one source of this difficulty [with content] lies in an unwillingness to admit that many of our policy-makers, during this so-called Utopian period [in the history of American foreign policy], have undertaken to express the national interests of the United States in terms of moral principles, not because they were confused theorists, but because they honestly believed that our best national interests lay in the widest possible acceptance of certain moral and legal principles as guides of international conduct.” 46 Whether or not certain statesmen “honestly believed” that they were expressing our national interests when they sought “the widest possible acceptance of certain moral and legal principles as guides of international conduct” is a matter of personal concern only. It is more important to ask whether or not the conditions of international politics permit statesmen to think and act in terms of the moral and legal principles that may be both serviceable and acceptable in domestic politics. Everyone is for “the national interest.” No policy is advanced with the plea that, although this will hurt my country, it will help others. The problems are the evaluative one of deciding which interests are legitimate and the pragmatic one of deciding what policies will best serve them. To solve these problems one needs as much an understanding of politics as an understanding of man—and the one cannot be derived from the other.

On numerous occasions Morgenthau has displayed admirable sophistication and discernment in his political commentary. He has analyzed skillfully the implications of international anarchy and distinguished action possible

internally from action possible externally, but it is not all the fault of his critics that they have had difficulty in conceiving the relation intended by him between his views of man and his theories of politics.

CONCLUSION

The evilness of men, or their improper behavior, leads to war; individual goodness, if it could be universalized, would mean peace: this is a summary statement of the first image. For the pessimists peace is at once a goal and a utopian dream, but others have taken seriously the presumption that a reform of individuals sufficient to bring lasting peace to the world is possible. Men are good; therefore no social or political problems—is this a true statement? Would the reform of individuals, if realized, cure social and political ills? The difficulty obviously lies in the word “good.” How is “good” to be defined? “Those people are good who spontaneously act in perfect harmony with one another.” This is a tautological definition, but nevertheless a revealing one. What first-image analysts, optimists and pessimists alike, have done is: (1) to notice conflict, (2) to ask themselves why conflict occurs, and (3) to pin the blame on one or a small number of behavior traits.

First-image optimists betray a naïveté in politics that vitiates their efforts to construct a new and better world. Their lack of success is directly related to a view of man that is simple and pleasing, but wrong. First-image pessimists have expertly dismantled the air castles of the optimists but have had less success in their endeavors to build the serviceable but necessarily uninspiring dwellings that must take their place. They have countered a theory of politics built on an optimistic definition of man’s capabilities by pointing out that men are not what most pacifists and many liberals think them. Niebuhr and
Morgenthau say to the optimists: You have misunderstood politics because you have misestimated human nature. This is, according to them, the real error of the liberals. Instead it should be called an error of many liberals. A more important error, into which some but by no means all liberals have fallen, is to exaggerate the causal importance of human nature; for, as Niebuhr himself points out in a statement cited earlier, human nature is so complex that it can justify every hypothesis we may entertain. At a minimum, nevertheless, first-image pessimists provide a valuable warning, all too frequently ignored in modern history, against expecting too much from the application of reason to social and political problems. And this is an example of a possibly useful result of first-image analysis.

While demonstrating the usefulness of the first-image, Augustine and Spinoza, Niebuhr and Morgenthau also help to make clear the limits of its serviceability. To take either the position that men can be made good and then wars will cease to occur or the position that because men are bad wars and similar evils never will end may lead one to a consideration of social and political structure. If changing human nature will solve the problem, then one has to discover how to bring about the change. If man's evil qualities lead to wars, then one has to worry about ways to repress his evilness or to compensate for it. Often with those who expect an improvement in human behavior to bring peace to the world, the influence of social-political institutions is buried under the conviction that individual behavior is determined more by religious-spiritual inspiration than by material circumstance. With those who link war to defects inherent in man, the impetus is more clearly in the opposite direction. To control rapacious men re-

47 Niebuhr, Reflections on the End of an Era, p. 48; Morgenthau, Scientific Man, passim. For extended analysis of liberal thought in domestic and international politics, see below, ch. iv.
requires more force than exhortation. Social-political institutions, especially if the writer in question is this-world oriented, tend to move to the center of the stage. The assumption of a fixed human nature, in terms of which all else must be understood, itself helps to shift attention away from human nature—because human nature, by the terms of the assumption, cannot be changed, whereas social-political institutions can be.
CHAPTER IV. THE SECOND IMAGE

International Conflict and the Internal Structure of States

However conceived in an image of the world, foreign policy is a phase of domestic policy, an inescapable phase.
CHARLES BEARD, A Foreign Policy for America

The first image did not exclude the influence of the state, but the role of the state was introduced as a consideration less important than, and to be explained in terms of, human behavior. According to the first image, to say that the state acts is to speak metonymically. We say that the state acts when we mean that the people in it act, just as we say that the pot boils when we mean that the water in it boils. The preceding chapters concentrated on the contents rather than the container; the present chapter alters the balance of emphasis in favor of the latter. To continue the figure: Water running out of a faucet is chemically the same as water in a container, but once the water is in a container, it can be made to "behave" in different ways. It can be turned into steam and used to power an engine, or, if the water is sealed in and heated to extreme temperatures, it can become the instrument of a destructive explosion. Wars would not exist were human nature not what it is, but neither would Sunday schools and brothels, philanthropic organizations and criminal gangs. Since everything is related to human nature, to explain anything one must consider more than human nature. The events to be explained are so many
and so varied that human nature cannot possibly be the
single determinant.

The attempt to explain everything by psychology meant,
in the end, that psychology succeeded in explaining noth-
ing. And adding sociology to the analysis simply sub-
stitutes the error of sociologism for the error of psychol-
ogism. Where Spinoza, for example, erred by leaving out
of his personal estimate of cause all reference to the causal
role of social structures, sociologists have, in approaching
the problem of war and peace, often erred in omitting
all reference to the political framework within which indi-
dividual and social actions occur. The conclusion is obvi-
ous: To understand war and peace political analysis must
be used to supplement and order the findings of psychol-
ogy and sociology. What kind of political analysis is
needed? For possible explanations of the occurrence or
nonoccurrence of war, one can look to international
politics (since war occurs among states), or one can look to
the states themselves (since it is in the name of the state
that the fighting is actually done). The former approach
is postponed to Chapter VI; according to the second image,
the internal organization of states is the key to understand-
ing war and peace.

One explanation of the second-image type is illustrated
as follows. War most often promotes the internal unity of
each state involved. The state plagued by internal strife
may then, instead of waiting for the accidental attack, seek
the war that will bring internal peace. Bodin saw this
clearly, for he concludes that "the best way of preserving a
state, and guaranteeing it against sedition, rebellion, and
civil war is to keep the subjects in amity one with another,
and to this end, to find an enemy against whom they can
make common cause." And he saw historical evidence
that the principle had been applied, especially by the
Romans, who "could find no better antidote to civil war,
nor one more certain in its effects, than to oppose an enemy to the citizens." 1 Secretary of State William Henry Seward followed this reasoning when, in order to promote unity within the country, he urged upon Lincoln a vigorous foreign policy, which included the possibility of declaring war on Spain and France. 2 Mikhail Skobelev, an influential Russian military officer of the third quarter of the nineteenth century, varied the theme but slightly when he argued that the Russian monarchy was doomed unless it could produce major military successes abroad. 3

The use of internal defects to explain those external acts of the state that bring war can take many forms. Such explanation may be related to a type of government that is thought to be generically bad. For example, it is often thought that the deprivations imposed by despots upon their subjects produce tensions that may find expression in foreign adventure. Or the explanation may be given in terms of defects in a government not itself considered bad. Thus it has been argued that the restrictions placed upon a government in order to protect the prescribed rights of its citizens act as impediments to the making and executing of foreign policy. These restrictions, laudable in original purpose, may have the unfortunate effect of making difficult or impossible the effective action of that government for the maintenance of peace in the world. 4 And, as a final example, explanation may be made in terms

4 Cf. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 67-68, 102, 126, 133-36, 272, and especially 931; and Secretary of State Hay's statement in Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams*, p. 374. Note that in this case the fault is one that is thought to decrease the ability of a country to implement a peaceful policy. In the other examples, the defect is thought to increase the propensity of a country to go to war.
of geographic or economic deprivations or in terms of deprivations too vaguely defined to be labeled at all. Thus a nation may argue that it has not attained its "natural" frontiers, that such frontiers are necessary to its security, that war to extend the state to its deserved compass is justified or even necessary. The possible variations on this theme have been made familiar by the "have-not" arguments so popular in this century. Such arguments have been used both to explain why "deprived" countries undertake war and to urge the satiated to make the compensatory adjustments thought necessary if peace is to be perpetuated.

The examples just given illustrate in abundant variety one part of the second image, the idea that defects in states cause wars among them. It is possible, however, to think that wars can be explained by defects in some or in all states without believing that simply to remove the defects would establish the basis for perpetual peace. In this chapter, the image of international relations under consideration will be examined primarily in its positive form. The proposition to be considered is that through the reform of states wars can be reduced or forever eliminated. But in just what ways should the structure of states be changed? What definition of the "good" state is to serve as a standard? Among those who have taken this approach to international relations there is a great variety of definitions. Karl Marx defines "good" in terms of ownership of the means of production; Immanuel Kant in terms of abstract principles of right; Woodrow Wilson in terms of national self-determination and modern demo-

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5 Cf. Bertrand Russell, who in 1917 wrote: "There can be no good international system until the boundaries of states coincide as nearly as possible with the boundaries of nations." Political Ideals, p. 146.

cratic organization. Though each definition singles out different items as crucial, all are united in asserting that if, and only if, substantially all states reform will world peace result. That is, the reform prescribed is considered the sufficient basis for world peace. This, of course, does not exhaust the subject. Marx, for example, believed that states would disappear shortly after they became socialist. The problem of war, if war is defined as violent conflict among states, would then no longer exist.\textsuperscript{7} Kant believed that republican states would voluntarily agree to be governed in their dealings by a code of law drawn up by the states themselves.\textsuperscript{8} Wilson urged a variety of requisites to peace, such as improved international understanding, collective security and disarmament, a world confederation of states. But history proved to Wilson that one cannot expect the steadfast cooperation of undemocratic states in any such program for peace.\textsuperscript{9}

For each of these men, the reform of states in the ways prescribed is taken to be the \textit{sine qua non} of world peace. The examples given could be multiplied. Classical economists as well as socialists, aristocrats and monarchists as well as democrats, empiricists and realists as well as transcendental idealists—all can furnish examples of men who have believed that peace can be had only if a given pattern of internal organization becomes widespread. The prescriptions for forms of organization that will establish peace are reflections of the original analyses of the roles of some states in bringing about war. The different analyses could be compared in detail. Our purpose, however, is not so much to compare their content as it is to identify and criticize the assumptions that are commonly made, often unconsciously, in turning the analysis of cause into a

\textsuperscript{7} See below, ch. v, pp. 125–28.
\textsuperscript{8} See below, ch. vi, pp. 162–65.
\textsuperscript{9} See below, pp. 117–19.
prescription for cure. For this purpose, we shall examine the political thought of nineteenth-century liberals. Because it is their thesis that internal conditions do determine external behavior, it is necessary first to consider their domestic political views. Doing so will also make it possible to draw some parallels between their strategies of political action internally and externally.

DOMESTIC POLITICS: LIBERAL VIEW

According to Hobbes, self-preservation is man's primary interest; but because enmity and distrust arise from competition, because some men are selfish, full of pride, and eager for revenge, everyone in a state of nature fears for his safety, and each is out to injure the other before he is injured himself. Finding life in a state of nature impossible, men turn to the state to find the security collectively that they are incapable of finding individually. The civil state is the remedy for the appalling condition of the state of nature, and, because for Hobbes there is no society, nothing but recalcitrant individuals on the one side and government on the other, the state must be a powerful one. Liberty Hobbes had defined as the absence of restraint, but men must sacrifice some liberties if they are to enjoy any of them and at the same time satisfy the impulse that looms larger, the impulse to stay alive.

There are three major variables in this analysis: the individual, his society, and the state. The first two variables determine the extent and type of functions the state must undertake. In individualistic theories, the state becomes the dependent variable. Members of the dominant schools of thought in late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England were as individualistic as Hobbes, but they rejected usually Hobbes's view of human nature and always his opinion of the social results of selfishly motivated behavior. Most of them believed, on the one hand,
that man is generally pretty good and, on the other, that even though individual behavior may be selfishly oriented, still there is a natural harmony that leads, not to a war of all against all, but to a stable, orderly, and progressive society with little need for governmental intervention.

The two most important questions that can be asked of any social-economic system are: What makes it run at all? What makes it run smoothly? To these questions, liberal political writers in nineteenth-century England answered almost unanimously that individual initiative is the motor of the system and competition in the free market its regulator. That the emphasis was on individual initiative is a point that scarcely need be labored. It is as evident in Adam Smith, who laid the formal foundations of English liberalism, as it is in John Stuart Mill, who marks its apex. Mill's conclusion that "the only unfailing and permanent source of improvement is liberty, since by it there are as many possible independent centres of improvement as there are individuals," is but an echo of the opinion expressed earlier by Smith when he wrote: "The uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his condition, the principle from which public and national, as well as private, opulence is originally derived is frequently powerful enough to maintain the natural progress of things toward improvement, in spite both of the extravagance of government and of the greatest errors of administration." 10 Not only are individuals the source of progress in society, but they are themselves constantly improving. "The more men live in public," wrote Jeremy

Bentham, "the more amenable they are to the moral sanction." They become "every day more virtuous than on the former day . . . till, if ever, their nature shall have arrived at its perfection." Perfection may not be achieved, but progress toward perfection is as relentless as the downward course of rivers. Restraints on individuals are then more than personally annoying denials of liberty, for they pollute the very springs of social improvement.

"Leave us alone," a motto appearing on the title page of a Benthamite tract, is what the nineteenth-century liberal would have the citizen shout, and keep shouting, at his would-be governors. But men, though they may be treading the path to perfection, have not yet reached its end; and government, though its laws restrain, does not constitute the only restraint exercised by men over men. Do not such considerations require, even in the minds of nineteenth-century liberals and utilitarians, a role for government larger than at first they seem to contemplate?

Liberals were inclined to limit government on principle, the principle following, as with Godwin, from an optimistic assessment of the moral qualities and intellectual capabilities of mankind. The utilitarians were inclined to limit government only by the test of efficiency. In what ways could government contribute most to the happiness of the greatest number? Could a given task be done better by the individual citizen or for him? That the answer given by Bentham and his followers was more often by than for is in large part attributable to the influence of Adam Smith. What is important here is not the old principle of the division of labor but the new argument that the results of labor divided in the production and distribution of goods can be brought together again and dis-

tributed equitably without the supervision of government. In the past, the fact that each manufacturer, each tradesman, each farmer, seeks not the public welfare but his own private good had led to the conclusion that government regulation is necessary to prevent chaos. If the government does not superintend in the general interest, who will? Smith's answer is that, given certain conditions, the impersonal forces of the market will do it. Production will be efficiently managed and goods equitably distributed by the market mechanism alone.

By an exaggerated reliance on the free-market regulator, the liberal definition of the good state as the limited state could be maintained even by those who rejected the assumption frequently associated with liberalism—that man is infinitely perfectible. "So vice is beneficial found, when it's by justice lopp'd and bound": so reads a couplet from the famous Fable of the Bees, given by its author, Bernard Mandeville, the significant subtitle, "Private Vices, Public Benefits." The greed of each man, Mandeville is saying, prompts him to work hard to advance his own fortunes, and this is good for all of society. The very vices of man contribute, indeed are essential, to the progress of society.\(^\text{13}\) This is the very epitome of the principle of harmony, the blind faith that Voltaire satirized in the person of Dr. Pangloss who, through endless adversity, continued to proclaim that all is for the best in this best of all possible worlds.\(^\text{14}\) But if the greed of each man causes him to work hard, for his own good and incidentally for the good of

\(^{13}\) Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, p. 11. Cf. his preface: "I demonstrate that if mankind could be cured of the failings they are naturally guilty of, they would cease to be capable of being raised into such vast potent and polite societies."

\(^{14}\) Mill's statement, in a letter written in 1868, that "since A's happiness is a good, B's a good, C's a good, &c., the sum of all these goods must be a good," is a summary statement of the harmony principle that is found in somewhat different words in all the utilitarian writers. Letters, ed. Elliot, II, 116.
society, it may also cause him to cheat, to lie, and to steal, for his own good only. Thus arises the function of government. As the Abbé Morellet, a contemporary of Adam Smith’s, wrote in a letter to the liberal Lord Shelburne: “Since liberty is a natural state and constraints are on the contrary the unnatural state, by giving back liberty everything again takes its place and all is in peace, provided only that thieves and murderers continue to be hanged.” 15 Criminals must be punished. At a minimum, government exists to provide security to persons and their property. To this proposition not only liberals and utilitarians but almost anyone who has thought seriously of the problems of man in society would agree, though with great differences in the definition of property.

Justice is the first concern of government, but is justice, defined in narrow legal terms, also the last concern? One can point to many statements of liberals and utilitarians to indicate that in their minds it is. Their belief in the strictly limited state can, however, be demonstrated more convincingly by pointing to their own reactions to social facts they find distressing. Adam Smith, for example, was disturbed by a tendency displayed by the employer class to take advantage of its economic position in order to maximize profits, by monopolistic measures, at the expense of the landed and laboring classes. Seldom, observes Smith, do people of the same trade meet together, “even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.” The government’s role? It should do nothing to encourage the members of a trade to come together.16 So convinced was Smith that unnatural inequalities were the product of governmental interference, as no doubt to a

16 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, pp. 375–7 (ch. xi, conclusion); p. 368 (ch. x, part ii).
large extent they were in his day, that he denounced all but the most narrowly defined police functions of government, going so far as to applaud the repeal of laws against regrating, forestalling, and engrossing, though such laws were instrumental in maintaining the free market that lay at the foundation of his ideal system. A similar concern is evident in Ricardo, though the problem is differently defined. Ricardo substituted landowners for Smith's employers as the class whose interests diverge from those of the other two classes. The income of the landowners increases not so much because of their own efforts but because of the increased pressure of population on land. They appear then as parasites feeding on the increased product of labor and capital. The remedy? Repeal the Corn Laws, reduce governmental debt, and reveal to the people the true principles of Malthus. But it is in the works of a publicist, Harriet Martineau, that the foolishness and danger of all governmental activity beyond the catching of criminals is most forcefully argued. In one of her tales, written to reveal the principles of the new economics in ways that all who could read, or listen, could understand, the surgeon, once he understands the facts of political economy, not only discontinues his charitable work in the dispensary and foundling hospital but also persuades a misguided friend to stop the £20 he had been giving to charity each year. These, Miss Martineau demonstrates, are actions nobler, because more rational and more courageous, than acts ordinarily termed philanthropic. And government, were it not in fear of public censure, would follow the example. If the example is difficult to follow, the reasoning is not. Charity does not cure poverty but increases it, not only by rewarding improvidence but also by encouraging the improvident to

increase and multiply. To drive home the lessons of the tale, should anyone have missed them, Miss Martineau summarizes at the end:

The number of consumers must be proportioned to the subsistence-fund. To this end, all encouragements to the increase of population should be withdrawn, and every sanction given to the preventive check; i.e. charity must be directed to the enlightenment of the mind, instead of to the relief of bodily wants.  

This was good Malthus, but not good politics. Yet the Philosophic Radicals of the 1830s attempted to translate such principles into a political program. While the Chartists clamored for reforms that would bring tangible and immediate results—universal suffrage, factory legislation, a more liberal poor law—John Stuart Mill, spokesman for the Radicals, justified an upper- and middle-class suffrage, ridiculed the proposed law for an eight-hour workday, and argued that if wages were low and work unavailable it was not because competition was unregulated but rather because the poorer classes ignored the teachings of Malthus. The Radical program was largely negative—remove taxes on necessaries, forbid flogging in the army, repeal the Corn Laws—with one major positive policy added, the establishment of a system of national education. Both the negative and positive aspects are faithful reflections of the two principles indentified earlier as the basis of utilitarian-liberalism. The effort was to proscribe state action in order to let the natural harmony of interests prevail.

But are the assigned functions of the state sufficient to maintain the conditions that a laissez-faire economy and a liberal society require? The necessary conditions are described frequently: approximately equal units competing

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freely, and individuals morally responsible and mentally alert. So long as the competing units are approximately equal, their success will be decided by comparative efficiency in meeting consumer demand. It soon became apparent that Smith, in arguing that government interventions were the main source of unnatural inequalities, was guilty at least of historical overgeneralization. If, in the absence of governmental intervention, some units come to dwarf others, will not fair, or economic, competition be replaced by unfair, or power, competition? For those who recognized, and some liberals did, that property is potentially power, it follows that economic inequality must give some an advantage in power over others.\textsuperscript{20} In a given field, the manufacturer who survives may then be, not the most efficient, but merely the one with enough resources to harry his competitors into bankruptcy. John Stuart Mill concerned himself with precisely such a circumstance. In fact he subscribed £10 to a Co-operative Plate-Lock Manufactory that, in his words, was struggling against “unfair competition on the part of the masters in the trade.” It appeared that the masters would be financially able to carry on business at a loss for a long enough time to drive out their new competitors. This Mill believed might justly be termed “the tyranny of capital.”\textsuperscript{21} Though Mill continued to prefer private solutions, he recognized that they were not always sufficient. This is especially evident in his treatment of the land problem. In contrast to Ricardo’s negative remedies, Mill urged that unearned increases in land values be taxed away and was even willing to contemplate the state as universal landlord.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{20} For example, Godwin, Political Justice, I, 19; II, 465; J. S. Mill, Letters, ed. Elliot, II, 21.


In the person of John Stuart Mill, utilitarian-liberalism moved from proscribing state action to prescribing what kind of state action is desirable. And the desirability of state action increased once it was determined that an un-fettered society does not automatically realize and maintain the conditions described as prerequisite to the effective functioning of the free-market regulator. Mill gave evidence of understanding this in his comments on the two matters of policy just cited. And he gave evidence of understanding that such specific problems point to an underlying theoretical problem when he wrote to Carlyle that the negative principle of laissez faire, once it has accomplished its necessary works of destruction, "must soon expire." 23 To be replaced by what? Mill attempted to base policy prescriptions on a distinction between two kinds of acts, those that affect only the actor and those that affect others. 24 But what act of an individual does not affect others? The criterion proposed is scarcely sufficient for judging the legitimacy of governmental activities. This is well illustrated by the fact that under it Mill could entertain the notion that proof of ability to support a family should be required before marriage, an invasion of the private sphere that causes many less liberal than he to shudder. 25 The difficulty is that Mill has proposed to test policy by a standard that derives from a concern for individual freedom, and this is only one of the twin pillars of a liberal society. Actually Mill's concern has shifted to the second. What concerns him more each year is the lack of justice with which the free-market regulator allocates rewards among those who participate in the processes of production. Laissez faire may increase production. Does

it fairly distribute the fruits? Mill thinks not. James Mill had thought that the protection of law over property would ensure to each the greatest possible quantity of the produce of his own labor. His son emphasizes that the reward of the individual is more often "almost in an inverse ratio" to his labor and abstinence.²⁶

Liberals and utilitarians described conditions necessary for the fair and efficient functioning of a laissez-faire society. There was then latent in the very logic of liberalism the possibility that governmental action would be required to realize and to maintain those conditions. If liberals and utilitarians have correctly described the necessary conditions, they may have to do more than spread the laissez-faire gospel in order to create and maintain them. The state may have to intervene in ways not originally contemplated; for example, in order to prevent extreme economic inequalities from arising. The laws passed by governments are not the only restrictions on individual freedom. Property, become power, may require regulation in the interest of free and effective competition! The thought was at least dimly perceived by Adam Smith when he wrote that "in the race for wealth and honours and preferments, [each] may run as hard as he can, and strain every nerve and every muscle, in order to outstrip all his competitors. But if he should jostle, or throw down any of them, the indulgence of the spectators is entirely at an end. It is a violation of fair play, which they cannot admit of."²⁷ It was suggested in the self-proclaimed socialism of John Stuart Mill's later years, a socialism that was fundamentally a search for the conditions, which he thought were not realized in the England of his time, un-

der which a fruitful and fair competition could take place. It was explicitly recognized at the time of the First World War by Thomas Nixon Carver when he urged that "if the state would do a few right things it would then be unnecessary to do the thousand and one wrong or ineffective things now being advocated." It finds its most recent and one of its most direct expressions in the work of two American economists reflecting upon their frustrating periods of government service. Competition, they write, "is a social institution established and maintained by the community for the common good." The tenor of their book makes it clear that for is one should read ought to be. Limited government remains the ideal of what Wilhelm Röpke terms "liberal revisionism," but, as he points out, government though limited must be strong in its sphere. While remaining outside the market it must be able to prevent the inequalities of wealth that may distort or dominate it.

The liberals' insistence on economy, decentralization, and freedom from governmental regulation makes sense only if their assumption that society is self-regulating is valid. Because a self-regulating society is a necessary means, in effect it becomes part of the liberals' ideal end. If a laissez-faire policy is possible only on the basis of conditions described as necessary, the laissez-faire ideal may itself require state action.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: LIBERAL VIEW

Treitschke defined the primary duty of the state as "the double one of maintaining power without, and law with-

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28 Thus he was attracted by Owen, Fourier, and Blanc but not by Marx.
30 Adams and Gray, Monopoly in America, p. 117.
31 Röpke, The Social Crisis of Our Time, tr. A. and P. Jacobsohn, pp. 192–93. For one of the best summaries of his proposed positive policies, see his Civitas Humana, tr. Fox, pp. 27–32.
in.” The state’s first obligation, he thought, “must be the care of its Army and its Jurisprudence, in order to protect and to restrain the community of its citizens.” Adam Smith had said the same thing. The state is concerned externally with defense and internally with justice. But while the liberal Smith and the unliberal Treitschke agree on a definition of the state’s duties, they differ widely on what actions are necessary to discharge them. In contrast to Hobbes, the problem of internal order was made easy for the liberals by optimistic assumptions about man and society. In contrast to Treitschke, the problem of external security was made easy for them by optimistic assumptions about the characteristics of states and of the international community. In domestic matters the state need perform only a minimum of functions. In international matters, the absence of an ultimate political authority need pose only a minimum of problems. The problems posed are nevertheless important. Just as, with Hobbes, the liberals accept the state as performing necessary functions, so, with Treitschke, they accept war as the ultimate means of settling disputes among states. War in international relations is the analogue of the state in domestic politics. Smith, for example, with one insignificant exception, recognizes “that everything that is the subject of a law suit may be a cause of war.” Bentham recognizes the necessity of states on occasion resorting to war in order to right a wrong, for the same reasons that individuals must sometimes have recourse to courts of

32 Treitschke, Politics, tr. Dugdale and de Bille, I, 63.
33 Smith, Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue, and Arms, p. 330 (Part V, sec. 1). It should be mentioned that Smith’s various comments on international relations are uniformly more perspicacious than those of most liberals of the period. See selections from his works in Wolters and Martin, eds., The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs, which is an excellently chosen collection of readings comprising many of the writers dealt with in this chapter.
law. Spencer puts the analogy simply: "Policemen are soldiers who act alone; soldiers are policemen who act in concert." And Sir Edward Grey, reflecting the experience of a Liberal foreign minister in wartime, writes in his memoirs that among states as within states force must be available to uphold law.

Liberals accept the necessity of the state, and then circumscribe it. They accept the role of war, and then minimize it—and on the basis of a similar analysis. To understand the liberals' view of the state, it was necessary to analyze their conceptions of man and society; to understand the liberals' view of international relations, it is necessary to analyze their conceptions of the state and of the community of states.

Early liberals and utilitarians assumed an objective harmony of interests in society. The same assumption is applied to international relations. "I believe," wrote John Stuart Mill, "that the good of no country can be obtained by any means but such as tend to that of all countries, nor ought to be sought otherwise, even if obtainable." This is so much the burden of liberal arguments, and the arguments have been so often made and so often summarized, that here only two things are necessary, to indicate the recurrence of ideas now identified with liberalism and to emphasize those aspects that will become important later in the analysis.

In the seventeenth century, La Bruyère asked: "How does it serve the people and add to their happiness if their

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35 Spencer, Social Statics, p. 118.
36 Grey, Twenty-five Years, II, 286.
37 J. S. Mill, Letters, ed. Elliot, II, 47; cf. "A Few Words on Non-Intervention," in Dissertations and Discussions, III, 249: "Is a nation at liberty to adopt as a practical maxim, that what is good for the human race is bad for itself, and to withstand it accordingly? What is this but to declare that its interest and that of mankind are incompatible?"
ruler extend his empire by annexing the provinces of his enemies; . . . how does it help me or my countrymen that my sovereign be successful and covered with glory, that my country be powerful and dreaded, if, sad and worried, I live in oppression and poverty?” The transitory interests of royal houses may be advanced in war; the real interests of all peoples are furthered by peace. Most men suffer because some men are in positions that permit them to indulge their kingly ambitions. Three centuries later, James Shotwell wrote: “The political doctrine of international peace is a parallel to the economic doctrine of Adam Smith, for it rests similarly upon a recognition of common and reciprocal material interests, which extend beyond national frontiers.” If real interests were given full play, national boundaries would cease to be barriers. Cooperation, or constructive competition, is the way to advance simultaneously the interests of all people. In a shop or a town, the division of labor increases everyone’s material well-being. The same must be true on a national and on a global scale. There are no qualitative changes to damage the validity of the principle as the scale increases. The liberals’ free-trade argument, put in terms currently and locally relevant, was as simple as this: Do Michigan and Florida gain by trading freely the automobiles of the one for the oranges of the other? Or would Michigan be richer growing its own oranges under glass, instead of importing the produce of “foreign” labor? The answer is obvious. And since the principle is clear, it must be true that where natural conditions of produc-


39 Cf. Cobden, Speeches, ed. Bright and Rogers, II, 161: “The intercourse between communities is nothing more than the intercourse of individuals in the aggregate.”
tion are less spectacularly different, the gain from trade, though smaller, will nevertheless be real. Each side gains from trade, whether between individuals, corporations, localities, or nations. Otherwise no trade would take place.

There was a time when even relatively untutored publicists understood not only this simplified version of the classical free-trade argument but a good many of its more subtle ramifications as well. From the argument it follows not only that free trade is the correct policy but also that attempts to enlarge the territory of the state, whether by annexing neighbors or acquiring colonies, are foolish. The expenses of conquering and holding cannot be balanced by advantages in trade, for the same advantages can be had, without expense, under a policy of free trade. In its most general form, the liberals’ argument becomes a simple bit of common sense. Ultimately, they are saying, the well-being of the world's people can increase only to the extent that production increases. Production flourishes in peace, and distribution will be equitable if all nationals are free to seek their interests anywhere in the world. War is destruction and enrichment from war must therefore be an illusion. The victor does not gain by war; he may pride himself only on losing less than the vanquished. This reasoning is the root of the traditional war-does-not-pay argument, an argument dating back at least to Emeric Crucé early in the seventeenth century,


41 See, e.g., Bright, Speeches, ed. Rogers, p. 469: "Do not all statesmen know, as you [my constituents] know, that upon peace, and peace alone, can be based the successful industry of a nation, and that by successful industry alone can be created that wealth which . . . tends so powerfully to promote the comfort, happiness, and contentment of a nation?"
developed in detail by Bentham and both Mills, used by William Graham Sumner to condemn the American war against Spain, and brought to its apogee by Norman Angell who summed up the work of the liberal economists, largely English and French, who came before him.

The liberals had demonstrated, at least to their own satisfaction, the objective harmony of interests among states. Their rational propositions—that war does not pay, that peace is in everyone's real interest—confront the irrational practices of states. The problem is: How can the rational come to prevail over the irrational? But first one must explain why war, the irrational course for all states, characterizes relations among them. Why do governments make war? Because war gives them an excuse for raising taxes, for expanding the bureaucracy, for increasing their control over their citizens. These are the constantly iterated accusations of liberals. The ostensible causes of war are mostly trivial. But the ostensible causes are mere pretexts, ways of committing the nations to the wars their governors want for selfish reasons of their own. Bright, in addressing his constituents at Birmingham in 1858, employed this thesis. It was once England's policy, he told them, "to keep ourselves free from European complications." But with the Glorious Revolution, a revolution that enthroned the great territorial families at the same time that it bridled the king, a new policy was adopted: "We now began to act upon a system of constant entanglement in the affairs of foreign countries." There were wars "to maintain the liberties of Europe." There were wars 'to support the Protestant interest,' and there were many wars to preserve our old friend 'the balance of power.'" Since that time, England had been at war "with, for, and against every considerable nation in Europe." And to what avail? Would anyone, Bright asks, say that
Europe is better off today for all this fighting? The implication is clear. The English nation lost by these wars; Europe lost; only the "great territorial families" may have gained.\textsuperscript{42}

Though the interest of the people is in peace, their governors make war. This they are able to do partly because people have not clearly perceived their true interests, but more importantly because true interests, where perceived, have not found expression in governmental policy. In 1791 Thomas Paine, one of the world's great publicists, described the accomplishments of the French Revolution as follows: "Monarchical sovereignty, the enemy of mankind, and the source of misery, is abolished; and sovereignty itself is restored to its natural and original place, the nation." The consequence of this in international relations Paine indicates in the succeeding sentence. "Were this the case throughout Europe," he asserts, "the cause of war would be taken away." Democracy is preeminently the peaceful form of the state. Control of policy by the people would mean peace.\textsuperscript{43}

The faith in democracies as inherently peaceful has two principal bases. The first was developed by Kant who, like Congressman Louis L. Ludlow in the 1930s, would have the future foot soldier decide whether or not to commit the country to war. The premise of both Ludlow and Kant is that giving a direct voice to those who suffer most in war would drastically reduce its incidence. The second was developed by Bentham who, like Woodrow Wilson and Lord Cecil, was convinced that world public opinion is the most effective sanction, and in itself per-

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., pp. 468–69.

\textsuperscript{43} Paine, \textit{The Rights of Man}, in \textit{Complete Writings}, ed. Foner, I, 342. In \textit{The Age of Reason}, having found that not all the fruits of the American and French revolutions were sweet, Paine shifts his emphasis from changing governments to changing minds.
haps a sufficient sanction, for peace. Thus he proposed a 'common court of judicature, for the decision of differences between the several nations, although such court were not to be armed with any coercive powers.' What would give meaning to the court's decisions? Public opinion! The court's proceedings would be open, and the court would be charged with publishing its opinions and circulating them to all states. Refractory states would be put under "the ban of Europe," which would be a sanction sufficient to dissuade a state from ignoring the court's directive. Interest and opinion combine to ensure a policy of peace, for if governors are made responsive to the people's wishes, public opinion can be expected to operate effectively as a sanction.

Faith in public opinion or, more generally, faith in the uniformly peaceful proclivities of democracies has proved utopian. But the utopianism of the liberals was of a fairly complex order. Their proposition is not that at any moment in time war could have been abolished by acts of informed will, but rather that progress has brought the world close to the point where war can be eliminated in the relations of states. History approaches the stage where reason, internationally as well as domestically, can be expected to prevail in human affairs. Utility is the object of state, as of individual, action. For peace, despotism

44 "'The great weapon we rely upon,' declared Lord Robert Cecil in the House of Commons on July 21, 1919, 'is public opinion ... and if we are wrong about it, then the whole thing is wrong.'" Quoted in Morgen- thau, Politics among Nations, p. 235.

45 Bentham, "Principles of International Law," in Works, ed. Bowring, II, 552-54. Cf. Cobden, Speeches, ed. Bright and Rogers, II, 174: If you make a treaty binding a country to arbitrate and it refuses to do so when the occasion arises, then "you will place it in so infamous a position, that I doubt if any country would enter into war on such bad grounds as that country must occupy."

46 As James Mill says, "If any man possesses absolute power over the rest of the community, he is set free from all dependence upon their sentiments." "Law of Nations," in Essays, No. VI, pp. 8-9.
must give way to democracy—so that the utility of the people, and not the utility of minority groups, will be the object sought. Fortunately, despotism is on the rocks. The faith that remained strong well into the twentieth century, and is not yet dead, was summed up in the early 1790s by Thomas Paine:

It is not difficult to perceive, from the enlightened state of mankind, that hereditary governments are verging to their decline, and that revolutions on the broad basis of national sovereignty, and government by representation, are making their way in Europe. . . .

I do not believe that monarchy and aristocracy will continue seven years longer in any of the enlightened countries in Europe. 47

DIFFICULTIES IN PRACTICE

The nineteenth-century liberals’ view of the state was based on an assumption of harmony, often coupled with an assumption of the infinite perfectibility of men, leading to a situation where the functions of government would shrivel and most of them blow away. Their view of international relations was based on an assumption of harmony and of the infinite perfectibility of states, leading to a situation where war would become increasingly unlikely. To make the liberal ideal of international relations real, states must change. What are to be the mechanisms of change? On this question, liberals oscillate between two poles: the optimistic noninterventionism of Kant, Cobden, and Bright on the one hand; the messianic interventionism of Paine, Mazzini, and Woodrow Wilson on the other. Those clustered at each pole display at once elements of realism and of idealism.

Cobden, as did Kant before him, displayed a deep suspicion of revolution and, conversely, a firm faith in evolution. Internal reforms should come gradually by education, not suddenly by violence, for only in the former

case may one expect improvement to last. And as he rejected revolution domestically, so he renounced intervention internationally. "I am against any interference by the government of one country in the affairs of another nation," he wrote in 1858, "even if it be confined to moral suasion." Intervention in the affairs of others Cobden considered futile, for England could not bring liberty to the rest of the world; illogical, for England could not know what was good for the rest of the world; presumptuous, for England had many defects to correct at home without seeking good works to do abroad; unnecessary, for "the honest and just interests of this country . . . are the just and honest interests of the whole world"; and dangerous, for the war to right wrongs in one corner of the world could so easily outrun its original purpose and the conflagration, once ignited, could so quickly spread.

Despite the role of abnegation he prescribed for the greatest and most liberal state of nineteenth-century Europe, Cobden looked with some confidence to the day when peace would prevail among states. In a letter written in 1846 he set forth both the difficulties and the means of overcoming them.

I don't think the nations of the earth will have a chance of advancing morally in their domestic concerns to the degree of excellence which we sigh for, until the international relations of the world are put upon a different footing. The present system corrupts society, exhausts its wealth, raises up false gods for hero-worship, and fixes before the eyes of the rising generation a spurious if glittering standard of glory. It is because I do believe that the principle of Free Trade is calculated to alter the relations of the world for the better, in a moral point of view, that I bless God I have been allowed to take a prominent part in its advocacy. Still, do not let us be too gloomy. If we can keep the world from actual war, and I trust Trade will do that, a great impulse will from this time be given to

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49 Cobden, Speeches, ed. Bright and Rogers, II, 27.
social reforms. The public mind is in a practical mood, and it will now precipitate itself upon Education, Temperance, reform of Criminals, care of Physical Health, etcetera, with greater zeal than ever.\textsuperscript{50}

Kant had been, in a sense, still more optimistic. Even wars, he thought, by exhausting a nation that engages in them, and threats of war, by forcing a state to grant its subjects the liberty necessary to make it more powerful, would hasten the advent of republicanism and peace.\textsuperscript{51}

The war system has proved more powerful than the instrumentalities of peace described by Cobden, and the waging of wars has often had effects the opposite of those predicted by Kant. Gladstone, who agreed with Cobden on the contribution that free trade would make to the peace of the world, also thought it necessary to keep an eye on the balance of power in Europe. In October of 1853, during the prelude to the Crimean War, he observed that an increase in Russia’s power through a defeat of Turkey would endanger the peace of Europe. It was England’s duty, at whatever cost, to oppose this.\textsuperscript{52} Cobden and Bright, much in contrast to Gladstone, saw a danger to England as the only legitimate cause of her undertaking war and an attempt to invade as constituting the only real danger. Thus Bright, in arguing against war with Russia, took the opportunity to censure Englishmen of another generation for the war waged to determine “that France should not choose its own Government.”

\textsuperscript{50} Quoted in Morley, \textit{The Life of Richard Cobden}, p. 276.

\textsuperscript{51} Kant, “The Principle of Progress Considered in Connection with the Relation of Theory to Practice in International Law,” in \textit{Eternal Peace and Other International Essays}, tr. Hastie, p. 68; and “The Natural Principle of the Political Order Considered in Connection with the Idea of a Universal Cosmopolitical History,” Eighth Proposition, in \textit{ibid}. For an example of how this might work, see J. S. Mill’s comments on the Franco-Prussian War. The loss of Alsace-Lorraine he saw as a relatively painless way of teaching the French people that in the future they must not blindly follow their leaders into wars of aggression but must take an active interest in politics. \textit{Letters}, ed. Elliot, II, 277–78.

\textsuperscript{52} Morley, \textit{Gladstone}, I, 476, 483–84.
One need only read the speeches Pitt made at the time of the French Revolutionary Wars to realize that, for the head of the government at least, the object of the war was the safety of England, not restoration of the ancient constitution of the French state. A narrow definition of state safety, however, typifies those who cluster at the noninterventionist pole of liberalism. Bryan, for example, took the same position on American participation in the First World War that Bright had taken earlier. On February 2, 1917, he told a gathering of five thousand at Madison Square Garden that "this country should fight till the last man was killed, if it were invaded, but that we should settle all other matters by arbitration."

The position of the noninterventionist liberals is understandable if various assumptions of theirs are borne in mind. The good example of the advanced countries, in freeing trade, reducing arms, and emancipating colonies, would have a salutary effect on all countries; and public opinion would force emulation. The threat of armed force would then never be posed. Further, the strength of a country cannot be equated with its size. Conquest in war often leads to weakness. The argument that considerations of state safety require one country to oppose the conquests of another is then false. Finally, a country's strength is related more to the spirit of the people, which is higher in free countries, and to the excellence of the economy than it is to the size of the peacetime military

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53 See Morgenthau and Thompson, *Principles and Problems of International Politics*, where key speeches on the issue of war with France are conveniently reproduced.
55 For the survival among socialists of the idea of disarmament by example, see below, ch. v, pp. 153–54.
establishment.⁵⁷ These assumptions in turn are understandable if one remembers that geography combined with technology to make them plausible for the United States, and to a lesser extent for England, in the nineteenth century. Logically, if Bryan admits that defense is a legitimate concern of the state, he must also admit, and even urge, that his state should watch lest others maneuver into position and build up for an attack. Practically, such worries were remote for the United States until the twentieth century. As for England, the very power she enjoyed obscured for many the extent to which her safety depended upon it.

To build a theory of international relations on accidents of geography and history is dangerous. The non-interventionist liberals were never able to cope with the difficulty Cobden himself posed in the letter previously quoted—how can the nations improve internally while the international relations of the world remain on the old footing? Mazzini saw the problem. As an Italian patriot in the middle of the nineteenth century he could not escape it. The despotic powers, he stated in an address to the Council of the People's International League (1847), "hurl their defiance at us:—'We shall rule, for we have the daring of Evil; we act, you have not the courage to stand up for good.'" "Is it enough," he asks, "to preach peace and nonintervention, and leave Force unchallenged ruler over three-fourths of Europe, to intervene, for its own unhallowed ends, when, where, and how, it thinks

⁵⁷ Cf. Godwin, Political Justice, II, 170–71, 193. Arguments associated with the second image are often used to support preferred domestic arrangements. We find the Commercial and Financial Chronicle, for example, editorially calling attention to the threatening world situation, asserting the dependence of military upon economic strength, and concluding that we must "begin forthwith (1) to get our fiscal situation in order, and (2) simultaneously to abolish the New Deal and all its works." "How to Be Strong," Commercial and Financial Chronicle, June 5, 1946, sec. ii, p. 1.
fit?"  

In sum, what sense does it make to preach laissez faire in international relations when not all states will practice it? Those who do find themselves at the mercy of those who do not.

This is one problem posed for the noninterventionist liberals. It raises the more general question: Can one wait with calm confidence for the day when the despotic states that have made wars in the past have been turned, by the social and economic forces of history, into peace-loving democracies? Are the forces of evolution moving fast enough? Are they even moving in the right direction? May not the "good," by doing nothing, make the triumph of "Evil" possible? There may be the necessity of action. And even if the means-end relation is correctly described by Kant and Cobden, may men not hasten the processes of evolution by their own efforts? There may be, if not the necessity, at least the desirability of action.

In internal affairs, liberals begin with the doctrine of the sterile state. All the good things of life are created by the efforts of individuals; the state exists simply to hold the ring as impartial arbiter among the individual competitors. They end by urging that the state must not only maintain but in certain instances must create the conditions necessary for the functioning of a liberal society and economy. Is there a comparable necessity of action in international affairs? Some liberals proposed nonintervention as a means of allowing the natural harmony of interests among states to take over. But will the harmony of interests prevail if, to use Carver's phrase, there are "a

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few right things” prerequisite to the functioning of the system and if there exists no agency to accomplish them? The means are of an importance comparable to the importance of the end. If the end is peace and if the basis for peace is found in the existence of free states, then some active agency must be substituted for the spontaneously functioning evolutionary forces whenever those forces seem to bog down. With this as their logic, many liberals, in international as in domestic matters, move from proscribing state action to prescribing the kind of action necessary. In international matters, the only agents to which liberals can look are the democratic states that may already exist.

While Cobden and Bright would use force in international relations only where necessary to make their own democracy safe, Paine, Mazzini, and Wilson set out to make the world democratic. Paine, in dedicating the second part of The Rights of Man to the Marquis de Lafayette, promises to join him should the unlikely necessity of a spring campaign materialize in order that France may exterminate “German despotism,” surround herself with revolutions, and thus be able to live in peace and safety. In 1853 Mazzini, for similar reasons, sought to convince England that her “present duty is war.” The war he calls for would not be of the type waged by absolutist states, but—

War, with the scope of solving once for all the ancient problem whether Man is to remain a passive slave trodden underfoot by organized brute-force, or to become a free agent, responsible for his actions before God and his fellow-men. . . . War, in the noble intention of restoring Truth and Justice, and of arresting Tyranny in her inhuman career, of rendering the Nations free and happy, and

59 Paine, The Rights of Man, in Complete Writings, ed. Foner, I, 348. He adds, in the manner of many liberals, that France’s “taxes, as well as those of Germany, will consequently become less.”
causing God to smile upon them benignantly, of crowning political and religious liberty, and making England proud and powerful, having gained the sympathy and gratitude of the nations that she has benefited.60

Woodrow Wilson, the third of the interventionists we consider, was quite capable of speaking as though motivated primarily by concern for the safety of the state he led.61 This is not unrepresentative of the interventionist liberals. What is interesting about them is not that they reject balance-of-power politics but that they think it can be superseded.62 They would make a leap into the future and take all of us with them. "Is the present war," Wilson once asked, "a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power?" 63 More frequently as the First World War progressed he sounded the call to a war of "the Present against the Past," of "right against wrong," a war to bring an end to the baleful power of autocracies and to establish freedom and justice for the people of the world. "Nobody has the right," he explained to the foreign correspondents who met with him at the White House in April of 1918, "to get anything out of this war, because we are fighting for peace . . . , for permanent peace. No injustice furnishes a basis for perma-

60 Mazzini, Selected Writings, ed. Gangulee, p. 91.
61 Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him, p. 248; and the speech Wilson wrote for Four Minute Speakers, July 4, 1918, in Woodrow Wilson, Selections for Today, ed. Tourtellot, pp. 107–8.
62 Cf. J. S. Mill's urging that Gladstone should have used the threat of British intervention to dissuade either France or Germany from attacking the other in 1870. Letters, ed. Elliot, II, 274.
63 Wilson's address to the United States Senate, January 22, 1917, in Woodrow Wilson, Selections for Today, ed. Tourtellot, p. 131. The same either-or approach is reflected in Wilson's postwar policy. Cf. Secretary Daniel's argument, designed to gather senatorial support for the League: "We have only two courses." Either we must have "a league of nations by which every nation will help preserve the peace of the world without competitive navy building, or we must have incomparably the biggest navy in the world. There is no middle ground." H. and M. Sprout, Toward a New Order of Sea Power, p. 71.
nent peace. If you leave a rankling sense of injustice anywhere, it will not only produce a running sore presently which will result in trouble and probably war, but it ought to produce war somewhere.”

As a modern English philosopher-historian urged in the face of Hitler's threat to Western civilization, peace is a good cause of war. The existence of a Yahoo-state is itself a danger to the peace-state. It may then be incumbent upon the peace-states to clean up the world, to turn wars from the object of the narrowly defined safety of the state into crusades to establish the conditions under which all states can coexist in perpetual peace. Liberalism, which is preeminently the philosophy of tolerance, of humility, and of doubt, develops a hubris of its own. Thus Michael Straight, a present-day liberal publicist, quotes with approval R. H. Tawney's statement: "Either war is a crusade, or it is a crime. There is no half-way house.”

Thus Wilson found himself saying, in a variety of ways, “I speak for humanity.”

But as there is more than one messiah, so there is more than one mission. In 1880 Dostoevsky proclaimed the Russian's love of his brothers to the West. “Oh, the peoples of Europe have no idea how dear they are to us!” So dear are they that war to redeem them from crass materialism and a selfish ethic becomes the sacred duty of Russia. Dostoevsky had faith in the wisdom and courage of his compatriots: “The future Russians, to the last man,” he wrote, “will comprehend that to become a genuine Russian means to seek finally to reconcile all European controversies, to show the solution of European anguish in our all-humanitarian and all-unifying Russian soul, to

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64 Reprinted in Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him, p. 274. Cf. the address by Wilson cited in the preceding note.
65 Collingwood, The New Leviathan, ch. xxx.
66 Straight, Make This the Last War, p. 1.
embrace in it with brotherly love all our brethren, and finally, perhaps, to utter the ultimate word of great, universal harmony, of the brotherly accord of all nations abiding by the law of Christ’s Gospel!” Not conquest, but liberation would be the object of Russian war in the West, and liberation would provide the basis for peace. The aspiration is the same as Mazzini’s, but the very symmetry of aspiration increases the probability of conflict. The same is true today. “War, that monster of human fratricide, will inevitably be wiped out by man’s social progress and this will come about in the near future. But there is only one way to do it—war against war.” These could easily be the words of a Western liberal; instead they are the words of an Eastern communist, Mao Tse-tung. The thesis was later elaborated by Liu Shao-chi, who is often said to rank second in the hierarchy of the Chinese Communist Party. The people of the world, Liu argues, have no alternative but to unite in a struggle to liberate themselves from capitalist oppression. Liberation is an irresistible law of history. Bad states must be demolished so that the good can live in peace. This is precisely the policy of American liberationists. Our mission, to take an academic expression of the doctrine, “is to persuade those still free that they can with its [America’s] help profitably and successfully follow its way, and to rescue those who are the victims of tyranny and set them, too, on the right path. . . . it will be our ardent mission not simply to spare the humble but to deliver the oppressed. To that end we shall indeed make war à outrance, with no compromise, on the

68 Mao Tse-tung, *Strategic Problems of China’s Revolutionary War*, p. 4. This was written in the fall of 1935.
proud dictators who pervert all principle and debase men whom they have first oppressed." 70

That two sides should entertain contradictory goals does not in itself prove that either is unworthy. It may indicate that both are impractical. The projected crusades of the liberals, as of Dostoeivsky and the Communists, must, if implemented, lead to unlimited war for unlimited ends. They may lead to perpetual war for perpetual peace. This has been pointed out not only by statesmen like George Kennan and scholars like Hans Morgenthau but also by liberals like Cobden and Bright.

The noninterventionist liberals call for no special activities to bring about the widely desired goal of perpetual peace; instead we are to derive all of our hope from their assertion that history is on the side of the angels. This is at once the position of a Dr. Pangloss, as is evident, and the position of a realist, as is perhaps not so evident. What is realistic about the position is this: Reliance on the forces of history to bring about the desired goal may be an admission that man can do little to hasten its coming. Interventionist liberals are, however, not content with a realism that may prolong the era of war forever. Their realism lies in rejecting the assumption of automatic progress in history and in the consequent assertion that men must eliminate the causes of war if they are to enjoy peace. This realism involves them in utopian assumptions that are frightening in their implications. The state that would act on the interventionist theory must set itself up as both judge and executor in the affairs of nations. A good cause may justify any war, but who can say in a dispute between states whose cause is just? If one state throws around itself the mantle of justice, the opposing state will too. In the words of Emmerich de Vat-

70 Cook and Moos, Power through Purpose, pp. 1, 210.
tel, diplomat and writer of the mid-eighteenth century, each will then "arrogate to itself all the rights of war and claim that its enemy has none. . . . The decision of the rights at issue will not be advanced thereby, and the contest will become more cruel, more disastrous in its effects, and more difficult of termination." 71 Wars undertaken on a narrow calculation of state interest are almost certain to be less damaging than wars inspired by a supposedly selfless idealism. Often in history the validity of this logic has been evident. Never has the evidence been more succinctly summarized than by A. J. P. Taylor. "Bismarck," he wrote, "fought 'necessary' wars and killed thousands; the idealists of the twentieth century fight 'just' wars and kill millions." 72

FAILURES IN THEORY

Peace and war are the products, respectively, of good and bad states. Should this be true, what can be done to change states from their present condition to the condition prescribed? This question led to the first criticism of liberal theories of international relations. A second criticism, equally fundamental, is suggested by questioning the original proposition. Bad states may make war. The truth of the statement can be established simply by labeling as "bad" any state that does. But would the existence of numerous states of the type defined as good mean peace? While the first criticism hinged on the practicability of the prescription, the second is concerned with the sufficiency of the analysis that led to it.

Liberals did not look forward to a state of nirvana in which all clashes cease because all conflicts have been eliminated. There would still be disputes among states but not the propensity to settle them by war. With states im-

72 Taylor, _Rumours of War_, p. 44.
proving, granting for the moment the assumption that they are, the occasions for war decrease at the same time that the ability of states to compose their differences amicably and rationally increases. Thus T. H. Green, liberal-idealistic of the mid-nineteenth century, sees no reason why states, as they become more representative of their people, "should not arrive at a passionless impartiality in dealing with each other." 78 But just what would replace the war system—a system of arbitration, a system of conciliation, a loose system of law in which states voluntarily submit disputes to an international tribunal and voluntarily abide by its decision? On such matters liberals, from Bentham to the present, have disagreed. Until recently, however, most of them have come together on a few fundamentals. There should be a minimum of organization and no use of military force except directly to repulse an invading army. Public opinion would be the great sanction, an equilibrium of interests the underlying guarantee. 74 They would have disputes settled rationally, peacefully, without political manipulation.

This is again the anarchist ideal applied to international relations, but liberals, for the most part, did not see it as such—some because they misconstrued the meaning of politics, others because they applied a logic to international relations different from the logic they had applied within the state. Cobden, for example, seems at times to have misconceived politics. On June 12, 1849, he made

73 Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, par. 175.
74 On the idea of equilibrium see, e.g., Bentham, "Principles of International Law," in Works, ed. Bowring, I, 538: "From reiterated experience, states ought either to have set themselves to seek out—or at least would have found, their line of least resistance, as individuals of that same society have already found theirs; and this will be the line which represents the greatest and common utility of all nations taken together. "The point of repose will be that in which all the forces find their equilibrium, from which the greatest difficulty would be found in making them to depart."
an eloquent plea in the House of Commons for a resolution that called upon the British Foreign Office to negotiate treaties of arbitration with other countries. In the course of the speech he described his plan as "simply and solely, that we should resort to that mode of settling disputes in communities, which individuals resort to in private life." William Howard Taft, in the fourth chapter of his book The United States and Peace, Senator William Borah in his resolution calling for the outlawing of war, Salmon Levinson and Charles Clayton Morrison in their writings supporting that idea, all reflect the same misunderstanding. Believing that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court are given effect not by the organized power of government but by the spontaneous force of public opinion, they argue that the same methods can achieve comparable results in international relations. Not only does this ignore the difficulties the Supreme Court has at times had—with President Andrew Jackson, for example, or currently with the desegregation decision—but it commits as well the fundamental error of interpreting instances where force is not visible as proof that power is not present. Those who uphold this view would have us settle disputes internationally as they are domestically without first understanding how disputes are settled domestically. In international affairs they would have reason prevail over force, whereas domestically disputes are settled by institutions that combine reason with

75 Cobden, Speeches, ed. Bright and Rogers, II, 161.
76 In the Borah resolution, introduced in the Senate in February, 1923, the argument is summed up as follows: The "judgments [of an international court] shall not be enforced by war under any name or in any form whatever, but shall have the same power for this enforcement as our federal supreme court, namely, the respect of all enlightened nations for judgments resting upon open and fair investigations and impartial decisions, the agreement of the nations to abide and be bound by such judgments, and the compelling power of enlightened public opinion." Reprinted in Madariaga, Disarmament, pp. 365–67.
Disputes between individuals are settled not because an elaborate court system has been established but because people can, when necessary, be forced to use it. How many times would the adverse decisions of courts be ignored if it rested upon the defendants to carry them out voluntarily, to march themselves to jail and place their heads meekly in the noose, or to pay voluntarily the very damages they had gone to court in order to avoid? An international court, without an organized force to back its decisions, is a radically different institution from the courts that exist within every country. The liberals want the benefits of an effective system of law; they are often unwilling to pay the price for it.

In a limited sense, Wilson marks a turning point. The majority of earlier liberals had regarded international organization as both unnecessary and dangerous. Though differences among them remain, the balance has clearly swung the other way. As many liberals move on questions of domestic policy from a negative to a positive formulation of the policy requirements of a laissez-faire system, so many liberals in international relations have moved from a reliance on education and rational solution of disputes to the advocacy of international organization to perform the inescapable functions of government. If war is the analogue of government, then to eradicate war provision must be made for performing its functions. Yet the old reasoning persists and, based upon it, the old errors as well. Wilson foresees a new era in which there will prevail the same moral standards for states as for men. The essential condition, of course, is that states become democratic, a thought that is nowhere more clearly ex-

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77 Levinson's view, for example, is diametrically opposed. To wit: "There are but two ways of compelling settlement of disputes whether intranational or international in character; one is by force and the other is by law." *Outlawry of War*, p. 14.
pressed than in his message to Congress asking for a declaration of war against Germany. "A steadfast concert for peace," he said on that occasion, "can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. . . . Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own." 78

The peace of the world would still rest on force—in Wilson's phrase, "the organized major force of mankind"—but this would be unlike the force displayed in the balance-of-power politics of the past. Not a balance of power but "a community of power" is Wilson's ideal.79 And with the democratic international community realized, the new force of public opinion would replace the old force of national armies and navies. "What we seek," Wilson once said, "is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind." 80 National self-determination is to produce democracy, and democracies are by definition peaceful. Wilson's stipulation that units, if they are to form a community, must share similar values is not irrelevant. We have already referred to the difficulty of achieving similarity, a difficulty that Wilson himself soon experienced. In addition, one must face the question: How much community is necessary before force, conventionally defined, is dispensable in the relations among its units? If states dis-

78 Wilson's address to Congress, April 2, 1917, in Woodrow Wilson, Selections for Today, ed. Tourtellot, pp. 143-44. For the gradual development of Wilson's position and the influence of Secretary Lansing on this development, see Buehrig, Woodrow Wilson and the Balance of Power, especially pp. 138-44.


80 Wilson's address at Mount Vernon, July 4, 1918, in ibid., p. 54.
played the morality of Englishmen or Americans in their dealings with one another, would that be sufficient? When Wilson called upon states to enter into covenants so that the rights of the small nations might be preserved, he was in effect returning to the optimism of the early laissez-faire liberals who thought that the relations among producers could be satisfactorily governed by contracts among them.\footnote{Wilson's address to Congress, February 11, 1918, in \textit{ibid.}, p. 166.}

Solutions for the problem of war based upon the pattern of either the first or the second image must assume the possibility of perfection in the conflicting units. Perfection being impossible for states as for men, the liberal system can at most produce an approximation to world peace. With such an approximation can we logically expect one state to rely upon the willingness of others to cooperate? Would a necessarily imperfect equilibrium of interests combined with the force of public opinion end the necessity of each state standing ready to marshal its strength in order to defend its interests? And if the answer is no, then what is to prevent the sorry spectacle of balance-of-power politics from repeating itself once more? The liberal aspiration is hopeless precisely for the reasons that anarchism is an impossible ideal. To maintain order and justice with almost no provision made for reaching and enforcing decisions requires a high order of excellence among the units of the system—be they men or states. To secure the improvements necessary may require more force than would be needed to maintain a modicum of order and justice among subjects much less perfect. And if conflict arises not only from defects in the subjects but also from the quality of the relations among them, it may be that no amount of improvement in the individual subjects would be sufficient to produce harmony in anarchy.
That is, the liberal prescription is impracticable, and the impracticability is directly related to the inadequacy of the liberal analysis. Peace with justice requires an organization with more and more of the qualities of government, just as internal justice was found to require an ever stronger and more active government.

CONCLUSION

The present chapter has presented a patterning of liberal thought, moving internally from laissez-faire liberalism to liberal revisionism, externally from reliance upon improvement within the separate states to acceptance of the need for organization among them. But the type of organization envisioned was insufficiently equipped to accomplish its objectives. At this point, there is painfully in evidence, in international as there often is in domestic affairs, the old inclination of liberals to substitute reason for force. Rigorous application of their own logic would lead them to ask more insistently to what extent organized force must be applied in order to secure the peaceful world they desire. It may be that many who consider themselves liberals will not accept this as the pattern of their thoughts. Indeed the more perspicacious liberal, noticing what we have described as difficulties in practice and failures in theory, may find himself arguing for a genuine world government, or for the unhappy alternative of accepting the necessity of balance-of-power politics, or simply lapsing into despair. In short, he may discover the inadequacy of an analysis of international relations according to the second image.

A world full of democracies would be a world forever at peace, but autocratic governments are warlike. . . . Monarchies are peaceful; democracies are irresponsible and impulsive, and consequently foment war. . . . Not political
but economic organization is the key: capitalist democracies actively promote war, socialist democracies are peaceful. Each of these formulations has claimed numerous adherents, and each adherent has in turn been called to task by critics and by history. Walter Hines Page, ambassador to England during the First World War, commented: “There is no security in any part of the world where people cannot think of a government without a king, and never will be. You cannot conceive of a democracy that will unprovoked set out on a career of conquest.” To this the late Dean Inge replied very simply: Ask a Mexican, a Spaniard, a Filipino, or a Japanese! 82 Engels wrote in 1891: “Between a Socialist France and a ditto Germany an Alsace-Lorraine problem has no existence at all.” 83 The interests of the two bourgeois governments might clash; the interests of the workers could not. But Tito split with Stalin. One might have predicted, writes Roy Macridis, “that two national Communist countries were bound to show the same incompatibilities that bourgeois nationalist countries have showed in the past.” 84 And this is almost exactly what Max Weber, writing some thirty years before the event, did predict.85

The optimism of eighteenth-century French rationalists was confounded by the French Revolutionary Wars. The optimism of nineteenth-century liberals was confounded by the First and Second World Wars. For many Frenchmen of the earlier period, enlightened despotism was to provide the guarantee of permanent peace; for most lib-

82 Inge, Lay Thoughts of a Dean, pp. 116–17.
83 Engels to Bebel, October 24, 1891, in Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence, tr. Torr, p. 491.
erals of the later period, republican government was to perform the same function. Were the optimists confounded because their particular prescriptions were faulty? Is it that democracies spell peace, but we have had wars because there have never been enough democracies of the right kind? Or that the socialist form of government contains within it the guarantee of peace, but so far there have never been any true socialist governments? 86 If either question were answered in the affirmative, then one would have to assess the merits of different prescriptions and try to decide just which one, or which combination, contains the elusive secret formula for peace. The import of our criticism of liberal theories, however, is that no prescription for international relations written entirely in terms of the second image can be valid, that the approach itself is faulty. Our criticisms of the liberals apply to all theories that would rely on the generalization of one pattern of state and society to bring peace to the world.

Bad states lead to war. As previously said, there is a large and important sense in which this is true. The obverse of this statement, that good states mean peace in the world, is an extremely doubtful proposition. The difficulty, endemic with the second image of international relations, is the same in kind as the difficulty encountered in the first image. There the statement that men make the societies, including the international society, in which they live was criticized not simply as being wrong but as being incomplete. One must add that the societies they live in make men. And it is the same in international relations. The actions of states, or, more accurately, of men acting for states, make up the substance of international relations. But the international political environ-

ment has much to do with the ways in which states behave. The influence to be assigned to the internal structure of states in attempting to solve the war-peace equation cannot be determined until the significance of the international environment has been reconsidered. This will be done in Chapters VI and VII. Meanwhile we shall take a look at a serious attempt to work out in practice a program for peace based on the second image.
CHAPTER VI. THE THIRD IMAGE

International Conflict and
International Anarchy

For what can be done against force without force?

CICERO, The Letters to His Friends

with many sovereign states, with no system of law enforceable among them, with each state judging its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates of its own reason or desire—conflict, sometimes leading to war, is bound to occur. To achieve a favorable outcome from such conflict a state has to rely on its own devices, the relative efficiency of which must be its constant concern. This, the idea of the third image, is to be examined in the present chapter. It is not an esoteric idea; it is not a new idea. Thucydides implied it when he wrote that it was "the growth of the Athenian power, which terrified the Lacedaemonians and forced them into war." ¹ John Adams implied it when he wrote to the citizens of Petersburg, Virginia, that "a war with France, if just and necessary, might wean us from fond and blind affections, which no Nation ought ever to feel towards another, as our experience in more than one instance abundantly testifies." ² There is an obvious relation between the concern over

¹ Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, tr. Jowett, Book I, par. 23.
² Letter of John Adams to the citizens of the town of Petersburg, dated June 6, 1798, and reprinted in the program for the visit of William Howard Taft, Petersburg, Va., May 19, 1909.
relative power position expressed by Thucydides and the admonition of John Adams that love affairs between states are inappropriate and dangerous. This relation is made explicit in Frederick Dunn’s statement that “so long as the notion of self-help persists, the aim of maintaining the power position of the nation is paramount to all other considerations.”

In anarchy there is no automatic harmony. The three preceding statements reflect this fact. A state will use force to attain its goals if, after assessing the prospects for success, it values those goals more than it values the pleasures of peace. Because each state is the final judge of its own cause, any state may at any time use force to implement its policies. Because any state may at any time use force, all states must constantly be ready either to counterforce with force or to pay the cost of weakness. The requirements of state action are, in this view, imposed by the circumstances in which all states exist.

In a manner of speaking, all three images are a part of nature. So fundamental are man, the state, and the state system in any attempt to understand international relations that seldom does an analyst, however wedded to one image, entirely overlook the other two. Still, emphasis on one image may distort one’s interpretation of the others. It is, for example, not uncommon to find those inclined to see the world in terms of either the first or the second image countering the oft-made argument that arms breed not war but security, and possibly even peace, by pointing out that the argument is a compound of dishonest myth, to cover the interests of politicians, armament makers, and others, and honest illusion entertained by patriots sincerely interested in the safety of their states. To dispel the illusion, Cobden, to recall one of the many who have

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*Dunn, Peaceful Change, p. 13.*
argued this way, once pointed out that doubling armaments, if everyone does it, makes no state more secure and, similarly, that none would be endangered if all military establishments were simultaneously reduced by, say, 50 percent. Putting aside the thought that the arithmetic is not necessarily an accurate reflection of what the situation would be, this argument illustrates a supposedly practical application of the first and second images. Whether by educating citizens and leaders of the separate states or by improving the organization of each of them, a condition is sought in which the lesson here adumbrated becomes the basis for the policies of states. The result?—disarmament, and thus economy, together with peace, and thus security, for all states. If some states display a willingness to pare down their military establishments, other states will be able to pursue similar policies. In emphasizing the interdependence of the policies of all states, the argument pays heed to the third image. The optimism is, however, the result of ignoring some inherent difficulties. In this and the following chapter, by developing and examining the third image in detail, we attempt to make clear what these difficulties are.

In preceding chapters we examined the reasoning of a number of men whose thoughts on international relations conform to either the first or second image. In the present chapter, for the sake of varying the treatment and because political philosophy provides insufficiently exploited clues to the understanding of international politics, we shall focus primarily upon the political thought of one man, Jean Jacques Rousseau. For the same pair of reasons, in making comparisons with the first and second images, we shall refer most often to two philosophers who closely followed those patterns—Spinoza for the first image,

4 Cobden, especially his Speeches on Peace, Financial Reform, Colonial Reform, and Other Subjects Delivered during 1849, p. 135.
Kant for the second. Though both have been mentioned before, a summary of the reasoning on which they based their views of international relations will make the comparisons more useful.

Spinoza explained violence by reference to human imperfections. Passion displaces reason, and consequently men, who out of self-interest ought to cooperate with one another in perfect harmony, engage endlessly in quarrels and physical violence. The defectiveness of man is the cause of conflict. Logically, if this is the sole cause, the end of conflict must depend on the reform of men. Spinoza nevertheless solved the problem, on the national level only, not by manipulating the supposedly causal factor but by altering the environment in which it operates. This was at once the great inconsistency and the saving grace of his system. Spinoza moved from the individual and the nation to the state among states by adding one to the number of his original assumptions. States, he assumes, are like men; they display both an urge to live and an inability consistently to order their affairs according to the dictates of reason. States, however, can provide against their own oppression, whereas individuals, "overcome daily by sleep, often by disease or mental infirmity, and in the end by old age," cannot. Individuals, to survive, must combine; states, by their very constitution, are not subject to a similar necessity. Wars among states are then as inevitable as are defects in the nature of man.

Kant’s analysis, while on some points similar to Spinoza’s, is both more complex and more suggestive. Men he de-

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5 Though for Spinoza the unity of the state rests ultimately on the ability of the supreme authority to enforce his will, in explaining the behavior of states he uses both an organismic and a corporate-trust analogy. For the former, see Political Treatise, ch. ii, sec. 3; ch. iii, sec. 2. For the latter, see ibid., ch. iii, sec. 14, and Theologico-Political Treatise, ch. xvi (I, 208).

6 Spinoza, Political Treatise, ch. iii, sec. 11.
finishes as being members of both the world of sense and the world of understanding. If they were wholly of the latter, they would always act according to universally valid, self-imposed maxims. They would follow the categorical imperative. But since they are members of the former as well, impulse and inclination overcome reason, and the categorical imperative is so seldom followed that in the state of nature conflict and violence reign. The civil state appears as a necessary constraint. A number of men acting upon empirical "and therefore merely contingent" knowledge must have a judge among them, and a judge who can enforce his decisions, if violence is to be avoided. After the state is established, men have some chance of behaving morally. Before the state is established, uncertainty and violence make this impossible. Men need the security of law before improvement in their moral lives is possible. The civil state makes possible the ethical life of the individual by protecting the rights that were logically his in the state of nature, though actually he could not enjoy them. The civil state, however, is not enough. Peace among as well as within states is essential to the development of uniquely human capacities. States in the world are like individuals in the state of nature. They are neither perfectly good nor are they controlled by law. Consequently conflict and violence among them are inevitable. But this bit of analysis does not lead Kant to the conclusion that a world state is the answer. Fearing that a world state would become a terrible despotism, stifle liberty, kill initiative, and in the end lapse into anarchy, he must cast about for another solution. The other possibility open to him is that all states so improve that they will act on maxims that can be universalized without conflict. While Kant fears the former solution, he is too cautious and too intelligently critical to hope for the latter. Instead he attempts to combine the two.
is the aim of his political philosophy to establish the hope that states may improve enough and learn enough from the suffering and devastation of war to make possible a rule of law among them that is not backed by power but is voluntarily observed.\textsuperscript{7} The first factor is the internal improvement of states; the second, the external rule of law. But the second, being voluntary, is completely dependent on the perfection with which the first is realized. The "power" to enforce the law is derived not from external sanction but from internal perfection.\textsuperscript{8} This is a solution according to the second image, that is by the improvement of the separate states, though Kant's own analysis leads one to question his conclusion. At the level of the state, an adequate political system permits individuals to behave ethically; a comparably adequate system is not attainable internationally. Still we are to hope for peace among states. The inconsistency is apparent, though its glare is somewhat dimmed by Kant's confession that he has established not the "inevitability" of perpetual peace but

\textsuperscript{7} For the above comments on man and morality, see "Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals," secs. 2 and 3, in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, tr. Abbott. On the natural and civil states, see The Philosophy of Law, tr. Hastie, secs. 8, 9, 41, 42, 44. On the dependence of morality on a condition of peace among states, see "The Natural Principle of the Political Order Considered in Connection with the Idea of a Universal Cosmopolitical History," Eighth Proposition, in Eternal Peace and Other International Essays, tr. Hastie. On the characteristics of the international federation, see "The Principle of Progress Considered in Connection with the Relation of Theory to Practice in International Law," in ibid., pp. 62-65; "Eternal Peace," First and Second Definitive Articles, in ibid.; and The Philosophy of Law, tr. Hastie, sec. 61.

\textsuperscript{8} Each republic, the form of the state that Kant labels good, "unable to injure any other by violence, must maintain itself by right alone; and it may hope on real grounds that the others being constituted like itself will then come, on occasions of need, to its aid." ("The Principle of Progress Considered in Connection with the Relation of Theory to Practice in International Law," in Eternal Peace and Other International Essays, tr. Hastie, p. 64.) Republics, Kant must assume, will act in accordance with the categorical imperative.
only that the existence of such a condition is not unthinkable.9

In Rousseau’s philosophy, considered in this chapter as a theory of international relations, emphasis on the framework of state action makes some of the assumptions of Spinoza and Kant unnecessary; it makes other of their assumptions impossible.

JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU

Montesquieu and, like him, Rousseau, upon looking at attempts of other philosophers to understand a real or hypothetical state of nature, were both moved to make the same critical comment. Montesquieu says of Hobbes that he “attributes to mankind before the establishment of society what can happen but in consequence of this establishment.”10 Both Montesquieu and Rousseau maintain that the state of nature of Hobbes—and the same applies to Spinoza—is a fiction constructed by assuming that men in nature possess all of the characteristics and habits they acquire in society but without the constraints imposed by society. Men before the establishment of society have not developed the vices of pride and envy. Indeed they could not, for they see very little of one another. Whenever chance brings them together, consciousness of weakness and impotency dissuades them from attacking one another. Since none knows either pride or envy, thrift or greed, he will attack another only if driven by hunger to do so.11

9 This interpretation, supported by considering Kant’s political thought in the context of his moral philosophy, contrasts with that found in Friedrich’s book on Kant, Inevitable Peace.


From one point of view this criticism of Hobbes is mere quibbling. Montesquieu and Rousseau arrive at a different conclusion simply by starting one step further back in their imaginary prehistory than did either Spinoza or Hobbes. In doing so, however, they emphasize an important point. Because of the difficulty of knowing such a thing as a pure human nature, because the human nature we do know reflects both man's nature and the influence of his environment, definitions of human nature such as those of Spinoza and Hobbes are arbitrary and can lead to no valid social or political conclusions. Theoretically at least one can strip away environmentally acquired characteristics and arrive at a view of human nature itself. Rousseau himself has advanced "certain arguments, and risked some conjectures," to this end. The very difficulty of the undertaking and the uncertainty of the result emphasize the error involved in taking the social man as the natural man, as Hobbes and Spinoza have done. And instead of deriving social conclusions directly from assumed human traits, Montesquieu argues that conflict arises from the social situation: "As soon as man enters into a state of society he loses the sense of his weakness; equality ceases, and then commences the state of war."  

This estimate of the causes of conflict Rousseau takes up and develops. It raises three questions: (1) Why, if the original state of nature was one of relative peace and quiet, did man ever leave it? (2) Why does conflict arise in social situations? (3) How is the control of conflict related to its cause?

13 *Les Confessions*, Book IX, in *Oeuvres complètes de J. J. Rousseau*, VIII, 289: "Aucun peuple ne seroit jamais que ce que la nature de son gouvernement le ferait être."
14 *Inequality*, p. 190.
16 See especially *Inequality*, pp. 234 ff.
For Spinoza and Hobbes, the formation of state and society was an act of will that served as a means of escape from an intolerable situation. Similarly Rousseau at times, in his explanation of the establishment of the state, seems to assume the purely willful employment of art and contrivance. At other times, Rousseau describes the establishment of the state as the culmination of a long historical evolution containing elements of experience, perceived interest, habit, tradition, and necessity. The first line of thought leads to the Social Contract; the second to the explanation found in *A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*. The seeming contradiction is eliminated by the fact that Rousseau considers the first a philosophical explanation of what happened by historical processes; the second, a hypothetical reconstruction of those processes.

In the early state of nature, men were sufficiently dispersed to make any pattern of cooperation unnecessary. But finally the combination of increased numbers and the usual natural hazards posed, in a variety of situations, the proposition: cooperate or die. Rousseau illustrates the line of reasoning with the simplest example. The example is worth reproducing, for it is the point of departure for the establishment of government and contains the basis for his explanation of conflict in international relations as well. Assume that five men who have acquired a rudimentary ability to speak and to understand each other happen to come together at a time when all of them suffer from hunger. The hunger of each will be satisfied by the fifth part of a stag, so they “agree” to cooperate in a project to trap one. But also the hunger of any one of them will be satisfied by a hare, so, as a hare comes within reach,

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17 See, e.g., *Social Contract*, pp. 4, 7 (Book I, chs. i, iv).

18 In *Inequality*, pp. 190–91, he refers to the state of nature as “a state which no longer exists, perhaps never did exist, and probably never will exist; and of which it is, nevertheless, necessary to have true ideas.” Cf. *ibid.*, p. 198.
one of them grabs it. The defector obtains the means of satisfying his hunger but in doing so permits the stag to escape. His immediate interest prevails over considera-
tion for his fellows.\textsuperscript{19}

The story is simple; the implications are tremendous. In cooperative action, even where all agree on the goal and have an equal interest in the project, one cannot rely on others. Spinoza linked conflict causally to man’s imper-
flect reason. Montesquieu and Rousseau counter Spinoza’s analysis with the proposition that the sources of conflict are not so much in the minds of men as they are in the nature of social activity. The difficulty is to some extent verbal. Rousseau grants that if we knew how to receive the true justice that comes from God, “we should need neither government nor laws.”\textsuperscript{20} This corresponds to Spinoza’s proposition that “men in so far as they live in obedience to reason, necessarily live always in harmony one with another.”\textsuperscript{21} The idea is a truism. If men were perfect, their perfection would be reflected in all of their calculations and actions. Each could rely on the behavior of others and all decisions would be made on principles that would preserve a true harmony of interests. Spinoza emphasizes not the difficulties inherent in mediating conflicting interests but the defectiveness of man’s reason that prevents their consistently making decisions that would be in the interest of each and for the good of all. Rousseau faces the same problem. He imagines how men must have behaved as they began to depend on one another to meet their daily needs. As long as each provided for his own wants, there could be no conflict; whenever the combination of natural obstacles and growth in population made cooperation necessary, conflict arose. Thus in the

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 238.

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Social Contract}, p. 34 (Book II, ch. vi); cf. \textit{Political Economy}, p. 296.

\textsuperscript{21} Spinoza, \textit{Ethics}, Part IV, prop. xxxv, proof.
stag-hunt example the tension between one man's immediate interest and the general interest of the group is resolved by the unilateral action of the one man. To the extent that he was motivated by a feeling of hunger, his act is one of passion. Reason would have told him that his long-run interest depends on establishing, through experience, the conviction that cooperative action will benefit all of the participants. But reason also tells him that if he foregoes the hare, the man next to him might leave his post to chase it, leaving the first man with nothing but food for thought on the folly of being loyal.

The problem is now posed in more significant terms. If harmony is to exist in anarchy, not only must I be perfectly rational but I must be able to assume that everyone else is too. Otherwise there is no basis for rational calculation. To allow in my calculation for the irrational acts of others can lead to no determinate solutions, but to attempt to act on a rational calculation without making such an allowance may lead to my own undoing. The latter argument is reflected in Rousseau's comments on the proposition that "a people of true Christians would form the most perfect society imaginable." In the first place he points out that such a society "would not be a society of men." Moreover, he says, "For the state to be peaceable and for harmony to be maintained, all the citizens without exception would have to be [equally] good Christians; if by ill hap there should be a single self-seeker or hypocrite . . . he would certainly get the better of his pious compatriots." 22

If we define cooperative action as rational and any deviation from it irrational, we must agree with Spinoza that conflict results from the irrationality of men. But if we

22 Social Contract, pp. 135-36 (Book IV, ch. viii). Italic added. The word "equally" is necessary for an accurate rendering of the French text but does not appear in the translation cited.
examine the requirements of rational action, we find that even in an example as simple as the stag hunt we have to assume that the reason of each leads to an identical definition of interest, that each will draw the same conclusion as to the methods appropriate to meet the original situation, that all will agree instantly on the action required by any chance incidents that raise the question of altering the original plan, and that each can rely completely on the steadfastness of purpose of all the others. Perfectly rational action requires not only the perception that our welfare is tied up with the welfare of others but also a perfect appraisal of details so that we can answer the question: Just how in each situation is it tied up with everyone else’s? Rousseau agrees with Spinoza in refusing to label the act of the rabbit-snatcher either good or bad; unlike Spinoza, he also refuses to label it either rational or irrational. He has noticed that the difficulty is not only in the actors but also in the situations they face. While by no means ignoring the part that avarice and ambition play in the birth and growth of conflict, Rousseau’s analysis makes clear the extent to which conflict appears inevitably in the social affairs of men.

In short, the proposition that irrationality is the cause of all the world’s troubles, in the sense that a world of perfectly rational men would know no disagreements and no conflicts, is, as Rousseau implies, as true as it is irrelevant. Since the world cannot be defined in terms of perfection, the very real problem of how to achieve an approximation to harmony in cooperative and competitive activity is always with us and, lacking the possibility of perfection, it is a problem that cannot be solved simply by changing men. Already Rousseau has made it possible to

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23 A Lasting Peace, tr. Vaughan, p. 72. On p. 91 Rousseau refers to men as “unjust, grasping and setting their own interest above all things.” This raises the question of the relation of the third image to the first, which will be discussed in ch. viii, below.
dispense with two of the assumptions of Spinoza and Kant. If conflict is the by-product of competition and attempts at cooperation in society, then it is unnecessary to assume self-preservation as man's sole motivation; for conflict results from the seeking of any goal—even if in the seeking one attempts to act according to Kant's categorical imperative.

FROM NATURE TO STATE

In the state of nature, for Rousseau as for Spinoza and Kant, men are governed by "instinct," "physical impulses," and "right of appetite"; and "liberty . . . is bounded only by the strength of the individual." Agreements cannot bind, for "in default of natural sanctions, the laws of justice are ineffective among men." 24 Without the protection of civil law, even agriculture is impossible, for who, Rousseau asks, "would be so absurd as to take the trouble of cultivating a field, which might be stripped of its crop by the first comer?" To be provident is impossible, for without social regulation there can be no obligation to respect the interests, rights, and property of others. But to be provident is desirable, for it makes life easier; or even necessary, for population begins to press on the amount of food available under a given mode of production. Some men unite, set up rules governing cooperative and competitive situations, and organize the means of enforcing them. Others are forced to follow the new pattern, for those outside the organized society, unable to cooperate effectively, cannot stand up against the efficiency of a group united and enjoying the benefits of a social division of labor. 25

It is clear that in moving from the state of nature to

24 Social Contract, pp. 18–19 (Book I, ch. viii); p. 34 (Book II, ch. vi).
25 Inequality, pp. 212, 249–52. The dialectical development, in which each step toward the social state produces difficulties and near disasters, is especially interesting.
the civil state man gains materially. But there are more than material gains involved. Rousseau makes this clear in a brief chapter of *The Social Contract*, which Kant later followed closely. "The passage from the state of nature to the civil state," Rousseau says, "produces a very remarkable change in man, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving his actions the morality they had formerly lacked." Man prior to the establishment of the civil state possesses natural liberty; he has a right to all he can get. This natural liberty he abandons when he enters the civil state. In return he receives "civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses." Natural liberty becomes civil liberty; possession becomes proprietorship. And in addition "man acquires in the civil state, moral liberty, which alone makes him truly master of himself; for the mere impulse of appetite is slavery, while obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty." 26

THE STATE AMONG STATES

For Rousseau as for Kant the civil state contributes to the possibility of the moral life, though Rousseau conceives of the contribution as a more positive one, somewhat in the manner of Plato and Aristotle. But what of the condition among the civil states themselves? At this point, Spinoza reverted to the analysis he had applied to individuals in the state of nature where, he thought, conflict had resulted from the defective reason of man. Kant too reverted to his analysis of the original conflict among men, but in his case the explanation included both the nature of the conflicting units and their environment. The explanations of Rousseau and Kant are similar, but Rousseau's is the more consistent and complete.

The social contract theorist, be he Spinoza, Hobbes,

26 *Social Contract*, pp. 18–19 (Book I, ch. viii).
Locke, Rousseau, or Kant, compares the behavior of states in the world to that of men in the state of nature. By defining the state of nature as a condition in which acting units, whether men or states, coexist without an authority above them, the phrase can be applied to states in the modern world just as to men living outside a civil state. Clearly states recognize no common superior, but can they be described as acting units? This question we must examine before considering Rousseau’s schematic description of the behavior of the state among states.

Rousseau, like Spinoza, occasionally uses corporate-trust and organismic analogies. The first is implied in his statement that the sovereign cannot do anything derogatory to the continued existence of the state. The end of the state is “the preservation and prosperity of its members.” The organismic analogy is reflected in his statement that “the body politic, taken individually, may be considered as an organized, living body, resembling that of man.” As a living being, “the most important of its cares is the care of its own preservation.” Rousseau, however, cautions that the analogy is loosely used. The identity of individual and state motivation is a possible coincidence, not, as in Spinoza, a necessary assumption. And he defines with considerable care what he means when he describes the state as a unit complete with will and purpose.

In this respect, Rousseau can be considered as distinguishing two cases: states as we find them and states that are constituted as they ought to be. Of the first, he makes clear, there can be no presumption that the interest of the state and the action of the sovereign coincide. Indeed in

27 Ibid., pp. 16–17 (Book I, ch. vii); p. 83 (Book III, ch. ix).
Cf. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, tr. Nugent, Book X, ch. ii: “The life of governments is like that of man. The latter has a right to kill in case of natural defense: the former have a right to wage war for their own preservation.”
most states it would be strange if they did, for the sovereign, far from caring for the interests of his state, is seldom moved but by personal vanity and greed. Even to such states organismic and corporate analogies have a limited application, for in one way the state is still a unit. The sovereign, so long as he retains sufficient power, carries out his will as though it were the will of the state. This parallels Spinoza, who simply assumes that in international affairs the state must be considered as acting on behalf of all its members. Rousseau adds to this an analysis, which, supplemented and borne out by the subsequent history of nationalism, reveals that the state may become a unit in a deeper sense than the philosophy of Spinoza can comprehend. Rousseau argues that under certain conditions a state will actualize the general will in its decisions, the general will being defined as the decision of the state to do what is “best” for its members considered collectively. The unity of the state is achieved when there exist the conditions necessary for the actualization of the general will.

From this abstract formulation one can scarcely derive an answer to the question that interests Rousseau: Under what conditions will the state achieve the unity that he desires for it? Fortunately it is quite easy to make Rousseau’s formulation concrete. Public spirit or patriotism, he says, is the necessary basis of the good state. In the primitive tribe, economic interdependence and pressure from outside produced group solidarity. Amid the greater complexities of the eighteenth century, Rousseau fears that the spirit of solidarity found in the social or political groups of a simpler era has been lost. “There are today,” he writes, “no longer Frenchmen, Germans, Spaniards, Englishmen . . . ; there are only Europeans.” All have the same tastes, passions, and morals because none receives a distinctive shaping of his character from his national in-
Patriotism is, he thinks, in danger of being lost in a welter of counterpassions arising from sub- or transnational interests. How, among so many other interests, can patriotism grow? This is the question Rousseau asks. He answers:

If children are brought up in common in the bosom of equality; if they are imbued with the laws of the State and the precepts of the general will; if they are taught to respect these above all things; if they are surrounded by examples and objects which constantly remind them of the tender mother who nourishes them, of the love she bears them, of the inestimable benefits they receive from her, and of the return they owe her, we cannot doubt that they will learn to cherish one another mutually as brothers, to will nothing contrary to the will of society, to substitute the actions of men and citizens for the futile and vain babbling of sophists, and to become in time defenders and fathers of the country of which they will have been so long the children.  

In such a state, conflict is eliminated and unity is achieved because, from a negative point of view, equality prevents the development of those partial interests so fatal to the unity of the state; from a positive point of view, the inculcation of public feeling imparts to the citizen a spirit of devotion to the welfare of the whole. The will of the state is the general will; there is no problem of disunity and conflict.

In studying international politics it is convenient to think of states as the acting units. At the same time, it does violence to one's common sense to speak of the state, which is after all an abstraction and consequently inani-

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29 Considerations sur le Gouvernement de Pologne, in Vaughan, ed., The Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau, II, 432. The following, used below, are also cited from this work: Projet de Constitution pour la Corse and extracts from Émile.

30 Political Economy, p. 309.

31 On the importance of equality see Considerations sur le Gouvernement de Pologne, especially II, 436, 456; Projet de Constitution pour la Corse, II, 337-38; and Political Economy, p. 306. On the importance of building patriotism see Considerations sur le Gouvernement de Pologne, especially II, 437.
mate, as acting. This is an important point for any theory of international relations, and especially for the third image. How generally applicable are the thoughts of Rousseau to this problem?

The philologist Eric Partridge has commented on the widespread tendency of primitive peoples to refer to themselves as "the men" or "the people," appellations implying that they are better than, as well as distinct from, other similar groups. Herodotus found that the Persians regarded themselves as a greatly superior people who rated the merit of other peoples according to their geographic nearness to the Persians. That the Greeks applied the same idea to themselves is a commonplace of Hellenic literature, and the Jews were certain that they were the chosen people of God. The feeling here expressed is the sentiment of group or local patriotism. Prior to the eighteenth century the sentiment was either confined to a small part of a population spread over a relatively large area or it was confined to a larger percentage of those living in a relatively small area. An example of the first condition is found in the resistance in France to the interference of Pope Boniface VIII in questions that king, nobility, and clergy united in regarding as domestic. An example of the second is found in the civic feeling in the Greek city-states and in some of the medieval towns.

The existence of group patriotism has no special meaning for our analysis until, as C. J. H. Hayes says, it becomes fused with the idea of nationality. Then we have the immensely important fact of modern nationalism.

32 Partridge, "We Are The People," in Here, There, and Everywhere, pp. 16–20. Cf. "War," in Sumner, War and Other Essays, ed. Keller, p. 12: "Perhaps nine-tenths of all the names given by savage tribes to themselves mean 'Men,' 'The Only Men,' or 'Men of Men'; that is, We are men, the rest are something else."

33 The History of Herodotus, tr. Rawlinson, I, 71.
Hans Kohn points out that nationalism is impossible without the idea of popular sovereignty; that the growth of nationalism is synonymous with the integration of the masses into a common political form. Such an integration is the ideal of Rousseau's political writings, but he, like Plato, thought it possible only within a narrowly circumscribed area—the city-state. With the development of modern technology, especially as applied to the means of transportation and communication, it has become possible for the interests of individuals to be thought of as tightly complementary, even without the use of devices Rousseau thought necessary, over areas larger than Rousseau ever visualized. The scale of activity has changed; the idea has not.

The idea of nationalism does not imply that allegiance to the nation is the sole allegiance. It has been increasingly true in recent centuries, however, that most people feel a loyalty to the state that overrides their loyalty to almost any other group. Men once felt a loyalty to church that made them willing to sacrifice their lives in war for it. The mass of men have, in modern times, felt a similar loyalty to the national state. Modern nationalism admits of exception, but the exceptions have seldom resulted in numerous denials of the primary claim of the nation on the loyalties of its citizens.

The centripetal force of nationalism may itself explain why states can be thought of as units. To base one's whole analysis on this point is, however, unnecessary. Rousseau has made it clear that his analysis will apply in

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35 Cf. the advice he gives in *Considérations sur le Gouvernement de Pologne*, II, 442: “Commencez par resserrer vos limites, si vous voulez réformer votre Gouvernement.”
either of two cases: (1) If the state is a unit that can with some appropriateness take the adjective "organismic." This, although Rousseau did not foresee it, has become the case in many states that in most other respects fall far short of his ideal. (2) If the state is a unit only in the sense that some power in the state has so established itself that its decisions are accepted as the decisions of the state.

In any actual state the situation can be described as follows. In the name of the state a policy is formulated and presented to other countries as though it were, to use Rousseau's terminology, the general will of the state. Dissenters within the state are carried along by two considerations: their inability to bring force to bear to change the decision; their conviction, based on perceived interest and customary loyalty, that in the long run it is to their advantage to go along with the national decision and work in the prescribed and accepted ways for its change. The less good the state, by Rousseau's standards, the more important the first consideration, and in the ultimate case the unity of the state is simply the naked power of the de facto sovereign. On the other hand, the better the state, or, we can now add, the more nationalistic, the more the second consideration is sufficient; and in the ultimate case the agreement of the citizens with the government's formulation of foreign policy is complete. In either case, the state appears to other states as a unit. Any "state" falling outside the terms of the preceding descriptions could no longer be considered a unit for purposes of international political analysis, but, since it would also cease to be a state, this does not complicate our problem. Some questions become questions of foreign policy; some questions of foreign policy call for single choices; some of these choices must be supported by the state as a whole or the state disappears—and with it the problem of state
unity. If we have a state, we have a foreign policy, and in foreign policy the state must on occasion speak with a single voice.

There is a further consideration, which causes the nation to act more consistently as a unit than the preceding analysis suggests. In moments of crisis and especially in the crisis of war, attempts to achieve a nearly unanimous backing for foreign policy are most likely to be successful. The united front is enforced by the feelings of individuals, by their conviction that their own security depends on the security of their state. It is enforced by actions of the state that punish the traitors and reward those who are most effectively or most spectacularly patriotic. It is enforced by pressures from within society: the outrage of the chorus in Aristophanes' *The Acharnians* in reaction to Dicaeopolis' defense of the enemies of Athens is reflected in the wartime experience of every society.

The unity of a nation, in short, is fed not only by indigenous factors but also by the antagonisms that frequently occur in international relations. Such antagonisms become important not when they result in feelings of hatred between individuals in different countries but when the state mobilizes resources, interests, and sentiments behind a war policy. Previously inculcated feelings of enmity may make a war policy more likely and may increase its chances of success. But the war is prosecuted even though the infantryman on the line might rather be anywhere else doing anything other than shooting at the enemy. Individuals participate in war because they are members of states. This is the position of Rousseau who argues that "if war is possible only between such 'moral beings' [states], it follows that the belligerents have no quarrel with individual enemies." One state makes war on another state. The object of the war is to destroy
or alter the opposing state. And if the opposing state "could be dissolved at a single stroke, that instant the war would end."  

One need not look far for confirmation of the hypothesis. We fought against Germany in the Second World War because as a whole it followed the lead of Hitler and not because so many people in the United States felt a personal enmity for the people of Germany. The fact that we opposed not individuals but states made possible a rapid realignment of states following the war, which is now spectacularly demonstrated by the cooperation of the United States with the leaders and people of states that were a short time ago our mortal enemies.

We can now return to Rousseau's theory of international relations paying special attention to the points that primarily concern him, namely the political environment and qualities of states. Of the role of the international environment, Rousseau says this:

'It is quite true that it would be much better for all men to remain always at peace. But so long as there is no security for this, everyone, having no guarantee that he can avoid war, is anxious to begin it at the moment which suits his own interest and so forestall a neighbour, who would not fail to forestall the attack in his turn at any moment favourable to himself, so that many wars, even offensive wars, are rather in the nature of unjust precautions for the protection of the assailant's own possessions than a device for seizing those of others. However salutary it may be in theory to obey the dictates of public spirit, it is certain that, politically and even morally, those dictates are liable to prove fatal to the man who persists in observing them with all the world when no one thinks of observing them towards him.'  

The framework within which nations act makes prudence futile, for to be prudent is useless "when everything is

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left to chance." 38 The character of those who act makes the situation more hopeless still. "The whole life of kings," Rousseau says, "is devoted solely to two objects: to extend their rule beyond their frontiers and to make it more absolute within them. Any other purpose they may have is either subservient to one of these aims, or merely a pretext for attaining them." 39 As for their ministers "on whom they shuffle off their duty" whenever possible, they "are in perpetual need of war, as a means of making themselves indispensable to their master, of throwing him into difficulties from which he cannot escape without their aid, of ruining the State, if things come to the worst, as the price of keeping their own office." 40 If in such a world prudence is futile, then sanity is downright dangerous, for "to be sane in a world of madmen is in itself a kind of madness." 41

Of the relations among states as we find them, Rousseau has said nothing that is not also found in Spinoza and Kant, though in most cases he says it better. But would the existence of a number of good states, whether defined according to the juridical standard of Kant or the more inclusive criteria of Rousseau, add up to a world at peace? To this question Kant answered, yes; Rousseau says, no. The will of the state, which in its perfection is general for each of the citizens, is only a particular will when considered in relation to the rest of the world. Just as the will of an association within the state, while general for itself, may be wrong when considered from the standpoint of the welfare of the state; so the will of a state, though equitable for itself, may be wrong in relation to the world. "Thus it is not impossible," Rousseau says, "that a Republic, though in itself well governed, should

38 A Lasting Peace, tr. Vaughan, p. 88.
39 Ibid., p. 95.
40 Ibid., p. 100.
41 Ibid., p. 91.
enter upon an unjust war." 42 To achieve a will general for the world, the particularity of the separate states would have to be sublimated, just as Rousseau insists the particularity of private associations must be lost in the state. The nation may proclaim, and mean, that its aspirations are legitimate from the point of view of all states; but, despite the intent, each country's formulation of its goals will be of particular rather than of general validity. 43 Since this is the case, the absence of an authority above states to prevent and adjust the conflicts inevitably arising from particular wills means that war is inevitable. Rousseau's conclusion, which is also the heart of his theory of international relations, is accurately though somewhat abstractly summarized in the following statement: That among particularities accidents will occur is not accidental but necessary. 44 And this, in turn, is simply another way of saying that in anarchy there is no automatic harmony.

If anarchy is the problem, then there are only two possible solutions: (1) to impose an effective control on the separate and imperfect states; (2) to remove states from the sphere of the accidental, that is, to define the good state as so perfect that it will no longer be particular. Kant tried to compromise by making states good enough to obey a set of laws to which they have volunteered their assent. Rousseau, whom on this point Kant failed to follow, emphasizes the particular nature of even the good

42 Political Economy, pp. 290–91.
43 On the subject of local variations in standards of conduct, of which the above thoughts are an extension, consider La Nouvelle Héloïse, Part II, Letter xiv, in Oeuvres complètes de J. J. Rousseau, IV, 160: "Chaque coterie a ses règles, ses jugemens, ses principes, qui ne sont point admis ailleurs. L'honnête homme d'une maison est un fripon dans la maison voisine. Le bon, le mauvais, le beau, le laid, la vérité, la vertu, n'ont qu'une existence locale et circonscrite."
44 This parallels Hegel's formulation: "It is to what is by nature accidental that accidents happen, and the fate whereby they happen is thus a necessity." Philosophy of Right, tr. Knox, sec. 324.
state and, in so doing, makes apparent the futility of the solution Kant suggests. He also makes possible a theory of international relations that in general terms explains the behavior of all states, whether good or bad.

In the stag-hunt example, the will of the rabbit-snatcher was rational and predictable from his own point of view. From the point of view of the rest of the group, it was arbitrary and capricious. So of any individual state, a will perfectly good for itself may provoke the violent resistance of other states. The application of Rousseau’s theory to international politics is stated with eloquence and clarity in his commentaries on Saint-Pierre and in a short work entitled *The State of War*. His application bears out the preceding analysis. The states of Europe he writes, “touch each other at so many points that no one of them can move without giving a jar to all the rest; their variances are all the more deadly, as their ties are more closely woven.” They “must inevitably fall into quarrels and dissensions at the first changes that come about.” And if we ask why they must “inevitably” clash, Rousseau answers: because their union is “formed and maintained by nothing better than chance.” The nations of Europe are willful units in close juxtaposition with rules neither clear nor enforceable to guide them. The public law of Europe is but “a mass of contradictory rules which nothing but the right of the stronger can reduce to order: so that in the absence of any sure clue to guide her, reason is bound, in every case of doubt, to obey the promptings of self-interest—which in itself would make war inevitable.

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45 Kant is more willing to admit the force of this criticism than is generally realized. On this point, see above, pp. 164–65.

46 This is not, of course, to say that no differences in state behavior follow from the different constitutions and situations of states. This point raises the question of the relation of the third image to the second, which will be discussed in ch. viii, below.

even if all parties desired to be just.” In this condition, it is foolhardy to expect automatic harmony of interest and automatic agreement and acquiescence in rights and duties. In a real sense there is a “union of the nations of Europe,” but “the imperfections of this association make the state of those who belong to it worse than it would be if they formed no community at all.”

The argument is clear. For individuals the bloodiest stage of history was the period just prior to the establishment of society. At that point they had lost the virtues of the savage without having acquired those of the citizen. The late stage of the state of nature is necessarily a state of war. The nations of Europe are precisely in that stage.

What then is cause: the capricious acts of the separate states or the system within which they exist? Rousseau emphasizes the latter:

Every one can see that what unites any form of society is community of interests, and what disintegrates [it] is their conflict; that either tendency may be changed or modified by a thousand accidents; and therefore that, as soon as a society is founded, some coercive power must be provided to co-ordinate the actions of its members and give to their common interests and mutual obligations that firmness and consistency which they could never acquire of themselves.

But to emphasize the importance of political structure is not to say that the acts that bring about conflict and lead to the use of force are of no importance. It is the specific acts that are the immediate causes of war, the general

49 A Lasting Peace, tr. Vaughan, pp. 38, 46–47. On p. 121, Rousseau distinguishes between the “state of war,” which always exists among states, and war proper, which manifests itself in the settled intention to destroy the enemy state.
50 Ibid., p. 49.
51 In ibid., p. 69, Rousseau presents his exhaustive list of such causes. Cf. Social Contract, p. 46 (Book II, ch. ix): “There have been known States so constituted that the necessity of making conquests entered into
structure that permits them to exist and wreak their disasters. To eliminate every vestige of selfishness, perversity, and stupidity in nations would serve to establish perpetual peace, but to try directly to eliminate all the immediate causes of war without altering the structure of the "union of Europe" is utopian.

What alteration of structure is required? The idea that a voluntary federation, such as Kant later proposed, could keep peace among states, Rousseau rejects emphatically. Instead, he says, the remedy for war among states "is to be found only in such a form of federal Government as shall unite nations by bonds similar to those which already unite their individual members, and place the one no less than the other under the authority of the Law." 62 Kant made similar statements only to amend them out of existence once he came to consider the reality of such a federation. Rousseau does not modify his principle, as is made clear in the following quotation, every point of which is a contradiction of Kant's program for the pacific federation:

The Federation [that is to replace the "free and voluntary association which now unites the States of Europe"] must embrace all the important Powers in its membership; it must have a Legislative Body, with powers to pass laws and ordinances binding upon all its members; it must have a coercive force capable of compelling every State to obey its common resolves whether in the way of command or of prohibition; finally, it must be strong and firm enough to make it impossible for any member to withdraw at his own pleasure the moment he conceives his private interest to clash with that of the whole body.53

It is easy to poke holes in the solution offered by Rousseau. The most vulnerable point is revealed by the ques-

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53 Ibid., pp. 59–60.
tions: How could the federation enforce its law on the states that comprise it without waging war against them, and how likely is it that the effective force will always be on the side of the federation? To answer these questions Rousseau argues that the states of Europe are in a condition of balance sufficiently fine to prevent any one state or combination of states from prevailing over the others. For this reason, the necessary margin of force will always rest with the federation itself. The best critical consideration of the inherent weakness of a federation of states in which the law of the federation has to be enforced on the states who are its members is contained in the Federalist Papers. The arguments are convincing, but they need not be reviewed here. The practical weakness of Rousseau's recommended solution does not obscure the merit of his theoretical analysis of war as a consequence of international anarchy.

CONCLUSION

The present chapter provides a basic explanation of the third image of international relations. That there is still important ground to cover is made clear by two points. First, there is no obvious logical relation between the proposition that "in anarchy there is no automatic harmony" and the proposition that "among autonomous states war is inevitable," both of which were put forth in this chapter. The next chapter will attempt to make clear their relation to each other and to the third image. Second, although it has by now become apparent that there is a considerable interdependence among the three images, we have not systematically considered the problem of interrelating them. This problem will be considered in Chapter VIII.