

WEEK 5: CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Required Readings:

- Fearon, James D. 1997. "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41(1): 68-90.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2007. *Military Coercion*. Book manuscript, Department of Political Science, University of California-San Diego. [Read chapters 3-5.]
- Nalebuff, Barry. 1986. "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World." *World Politics*, 43(3): 313-335.
- Powell, Robert. 1990. *Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Read chapters 2-4.]
- Huth, Paul, and Bruce M. Russett. 1984. "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980." *World Politics*, 36(4): 496-526.
- Lebow, Richard Ned, and Janice Gross Stein. 1989. "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter." *World Politics*, 41(2): 208-24.
- Lebow, Richard Ned, and Janice Gross Stein. 1990. "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable." *World Politics*, 42(3): 336-369.
- Huth, Paul, and Bruce M. Russett. 1990. "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference." *World Politics*, 42(4): 466-501.
- Wagner, R. Harrison. 1992. "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence Theory." *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 4(2): 115-141.
- Fearon, James D. 1994. "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 38(2): 236-269.

Suggested Readings:

- Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2005. "Military Coercion in Interstate Crises." *American Political Science Review*, 99(4): 533-547.
- Zagare, Frank C., and D. Marc Kilgour. 2000. *Perfect Deterrence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Danilovic, Vesna. 2002. *When the Stakes Are High: Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Huth, Paul. 1988. *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- O'Neill, Barry. 1989. "Game Theory and the Study of the Deterrence of War." In P. Stern, et al. (eds.) *Perspectives on Deterrence*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wagner, R. Harrison. 1982. "Deterrence and Bargaining." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 26(2): 329-358.
- Wu, Samuel S. G. 1990. "To Attack or Not to Attack: A Theory and Empirical Assessment of Extended Immediate Deterrence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 34(3): 531-552.