

institutions, and constituting the nonmaterial structures of international society. These paths are derived from different perspectives on norms, and the analysis of them signals Kacowicz's commitment to taking all perspectives on norms seriously. Because delimiting paths of influence only outlines possible ways that international norms could influence states, he takes the next step and derives hypotheses on when international norms are likely to have influence. His hypotheses rely on independent variables that are both domestic (salience of mobilizing actors, nature of the regime) and international (distribution of power, regional conflict, hegemonic presence, institutionalization of international society, fitness between normative framework and specifics of a case) in order to explain norm impact.

Kacowicz then justifies his assertion that Latin America is a distinct international society. This third chapter provides needed background for those unfamiliar with the region, as well as an opportunity to discuss the emergence and evolution of the particular "norms of peace" and "norms of security" that he sees as components of the Latin American international society. Specifically, the salient components of the normative framework for Latin American states are sovereignty, *uti possidetis*, territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes, arms control, collective security, political legalism, democracy, and human rights. The two empirical chapters analyze the 11 historical incidents for norm impact. For each case, Kacowicz provides historical background, evidence for the impact of norms on international society, a discussion of the hypotheses on the conditions of impact, and potential alternative explanations for the behavior of states.

His analysis finds that the specific normative framework in Latin American international society has been relevant in keeping the peace and shaping state behaviors/relations—not surprising given that this was his stated working assumption. Exactly when the normative framework matters is a more complicated discussion, however. The author claims that norm impact has flowed through all six paths of influence to varying degrees in the cases. Further, the hypotheses on norm impact had varying levels of support—stable patterns across the cases are somewhat elusive. Nonetheless, he sees enough in the evidence to compare the Latin American case to other regions.

This is a careful, well-researched, and reasoned, serious study. However, at the risk of enacting epistemologism or perhaps perspectival chauvinism, I raise two theoretical concerns from a constructivist perspective. It is perhaps unfair to critique a synthetic enterprise from a single viewpoint, but if the essence of the perspectives being synthesized are lost, then the synthesis is problematic. The first issue is how Kacowicz ultimately provides a viewpoint on norms that makes them essentially equivalent to international legal instruments. This analytic move facilitates a clear assessment of compliance with the instruments as a (pseudopositivist) test for the impact of international

norms. Yet in so doing, he freezes norms. International law contains within it many (if not most) of the characteristics of norms common to multiple perspectives, but the static conception developed here disconnects norms from actors in significant ways that constructivists would reject. While he is careful to note that it is problematic to treat norms and the paths through which they influence behavior as independent variables (p. 168), the hypothesis testing does this nonetheless. The norms being tested for impact are preconstituted, preexisting, and available for states to use, rather than being embedded in mutually constitutive social processes—a violation of the essence of the constructivist perspective.

Further and related, his understanding of norms as both inherent in international society *and* as independent variables that may or may not influence states in international society is problematic from a constructivist viewpoint. To claim that an international society with embedded norms exists is to presuppose the influence of those norms. If the norms did not have influence (i.e., were not expressed in the behavior that constitutes and reifies those norms), then they would not exist, and ergo neither would the international society. Constructivists will find it problematic that the "the degree of fitness between the *preexisting* international normative environment and the relative normative case" (p. 39, my emphasis) could possibly be an *independent* variable. Thus, while I applaud the attempt at synthesis, the enterprise cannot be considered a full success when it downplays a central aspect of the constructivist perspective on norms—their social quality (that they only exist when actors continually reproduce them through their thoughts, words, and actions).

These issues notwithstanding, I highly recommend *The Impact of Norms in International Society*. It appeals to those interested in both Latin America and the more general norms debates, and it combines theoretical innovation, methodological rigor, and empirical importance—a rare combination. The attempt at synthesis is likely to generate perspective-specific critiques like the one discussed here, yet the work is useful and significant in advancing the debate and our understanding of norms.

**Trust and Mistrust in International Relations.** By Andrew H. Kydd. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. 284p. \$39.50.

— Branislav L. Slantchev, *University of California-San Diego*

That cooperation is at best difficult and at worst impossible in the anarchic international system is an established idea. Analyses usually assume that state preferences put them in a prisoner's dilemma where defection is the strictly dominant strategy. Explaining cooperation means showing why actors forgo the short-term benefits of exploiting others. Mechanisms involve conditional play, institutional arrangements, and hegemonic leadership, which help

overcome coordination, monitoring, enforcement, and free-rider problems.

Andrew Kydd argues that trust can play no role in such a world because cooperation is based on fear of being punished, rather than on a belief that it would not be exploited. Kydd defines trust as one's subjective belief that the other actor prefers to reciprocate cooperation rather than exploit it. While mistrust figures prominently in realist theories (e.g., causing escalatory spirals under the security dilemma), they have been vague about its origins, impact, and the ways actors can overcome it. To analyze these issues, the author uses a series of game-theoretic models in which actors are uncertain whether the other player is security seeking or expansionist. Trust is the minimum belief that the other is security seeking to the extent necessary for a security seeker to cooperate. Cooperation is possible when the two actors sufficiently trust each other.

The bulk of the book comprises three parts, each consisting of a theory chapter, which develops the formal argument, and an empirical chapter, which examines the historical record in light of theoretical implications. The empirical chapters are not meant as tests of the theory. Because any pattern of behavior can occur in some equilibrium, any observable event can be rationalized with a set of beliefs and preferences. Since many equilibria are not mutually exclusive, the fact that an equilibrium pattern fits the historical record provides only tenuous support for the theory. Instead, Kydd uses the theory as a guide to the type of evidence one would be most likely to find if the model correctly captured a significant part of real world interaction.

Part II shows that in a model where actors are uncertain about each other's beliefs, rational play can result in both tragic and nontragic spirals, but the latter are far more likely. The implication helps explain the origins of the Cold War. Whereas revisionists insist that the Cold War was essentially a tragic spiral between two security-seeking rivals, Kydd argues that the nontragic traditionalist account, which pits a security-minded and initially trusting United States against a potentially expansionist and suspicious Soviet Union, was fundamentally correct.

Part III extends the trust argument to multilateral settings. The model shows that hegemony can lead to cooperation, but only if the leading state is sufficiently trustworthy. Kydd then examines the interaction between Western European states and the United States in the first decade of the Cold War on key questions of defense, and German partitioning and rearmament. He argues that to understand the period, one must account for the steps the Americans took to reassure their European allies. Although a bit vague at times about what precisely the Western Europeans were fearful of (American abandonment? German revanchism? Soviet expansionism? all of the above?), Kydd effectively counters both alternatives

of benign hegemony (the United States provided public goods unilaterally) and coercive hegemony (the United States forced contributions).

Part IV explains how players can overcome mistrust by making costly gestures to signal their preferences and shows how the Soviets were able to reassure the Americans that the USSR was no longer expansionist in the late 1980s. The Reassurance Game shows that a security seeker can take risks by cooperating while being unsure about the other actor. Since this behavior separates him or her from an expansionist, it builds trust that leads to more cooperation, provided the other side is similarly motivated. Mikhail Gorbachev's strategy was to act in a way that an expansionist leader would not have. This is why the series of dramatic, often unilateral, steps he took to disengage from Europe eventually persuaded even the most suspicious observers not to fear the Soviet Union. As in any game-theoretic account, the book is agnostic on the sources of preference formation and hence cannot speak to why this change occurred.

Three modeling choices suggest avenues for future work. First, all models restrict players to two actions: cooperation or defection. If an action can reveal something about preferences, information transmission can happen only when actors want it to and are able to play separating strategies that other types would be unwilling or unable to mimic. Within the limited action space, players cannot tailor behavior to signal preferences or elicit from others actions that would reveal theirs. Second, since trust is about beliefs, revising these beliefs is crucially important. Except for the Reassurance Game, learning is strategically irrelevant because (a) the games end before actors can act on their updated beliefs, or (b) new information comes from nonstrategic reports rather than the opponent's behavior. We cannot use such models to study bluffing, probing, and other forms of strategic misrepresentation that seem relevant. Third, even though most of the analysis is couched in dynamic terms, only the Reassurance Game embeds a meaningful time dimension in that players can update their beliefs and then act on the new information. (It is not even clear how one can think of spirals in a static setting.) One is left wondering why this game was not used as the basis for the entire book.

*Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* is an important book that does what a good theory book should do: offer a novel way of looking at a phenomenon and provide a solid basis for future research. It is an admirable piece of work because it develops the main ideas with logical rigor without sacrificing readability, a rare thing indeed in the often highly technical world of formal modeling. But perhaps most impressively, Kydd utilizes the models to illuminate crucial periods of recent history in a way that allows one to weigh, and dismiss, well-known alternatives.