The successful de-nuclearization of former Soviet republics, the implementation of the START I and II treaties with the attendant massive reduction in nuclear arsenals in the U.S. and Russia, and the effective assistance in the Russian efforts to secure the warheads and fissile material were among the most important achievements of Clinton’s foreign policy, and marked milestones in the security relations among the countries involved. Clinton would oversee another important triumph in the Balkans (to which we shall dedicate a separate lecture). His other security-related policies, however, exposed some of the problems in the doctrine of enlargement, especially when it came to places where the humanitarian impetus collided with the absence of genuine American interests.

## 1 Withdrawal from Somalia

Somalia is a country in East Africa that both the U.S. and the USSR had competed over because of its strategic location. With that rivalry ending, the Somalian President Barre was overthrown in January 1991, and the country sank into a civil war between various warlords, all amply armed with the weapons the two superpowers had left behind. The war ravaged the country that was quite poor anyway. The fighting caused over 20,000 casualties by the end of the year. It also ravaged Somalia’s agriculture causing famine that killed over 300,000 people within a year and threatened another 2 million with imminent starvation. The U.N. took the lead in organizing humanitarian aid and securing the food supply and in August 1992, President Bush authorized Operation Provide Relief that deployed about 400 people to Kenya to assist with that. These efforts were unsuccessful because the warlords confiscated much of the food, and obstructed its distribution. By now the death toll had climbed to 500,000 and 1.5 million Somalis had become refugees. In America, CNN broadcast shocking images of starvation producing a groundswell of public pressure on the administration to do something about it.

In December 1992, Bush initiated Operation Restore Hope, which deployed American troops as part of a multinational force under U.N. authorization. The 25,000-strong force quickly managed to stabilize the country and wrest control of
the distribution of food and medicine from the warlords. The number of deaths from starvation and disease had dropped dramatically. On March 15, 1993, the fifteen warring factions agreed to terms to restore peace, enter a process of national reconciliation, and establish a democratic state. The U.N. took over the mission, which now included the disarmament of the Somalis and expanded enforcement capabilities that were to assist in nation building. By the end of the month, 28 countries sent peacekeepers to Somalia, and the U.S. formally handed command to the U.N. on May 4. By June, only 1,200 U.S. combat troops remained the country to support about 3,000 American peacekeepers. The rapid scaling down of American forces, however, encouraged a revival of the conflict. It soon became clear that one of the most important warlords, General Mohammed Farrah Aidid, would not cooperate with the implementation of the March agreement and would do everything possible to thwart it.

On June 5, Aidid ordered an attack on U.N. peacekeepers, which caused the deaths of 24 Pakistanis, and the wounding of 60 men (3 of them American). After the UNSC passed Resolution 837 authorizing the arrest of the people responsible for this attack, U.S. troops began hunting for Aidid. Since the General controlled the capital Mogadishu, it was highly unlikely that the nation-building project could get underway in Somalia while he was still around and opposing it. During the summer, the fighting between Aidid and the Americans escalated with repeated attacks on Mogadishu that killed scores of Aidid supporters but failed to get either him or any of his trusted lieutenants. When Aidid’s militia blew up several U.S. soldiers, Clinton ordered the U.S. Army Rangers to Somalia. The new task force registered some success by capturing Aidid’s main financier but then the militia shot down an American helicopter. While the U.S. military was hunting the elusive General, the Clinton administration secretly dispatched Jimmy Carter to open negotiations with Aidid. It did not inform the U.S. commander in Somalia about this initiative, but when he requested armored reinforcements in September, the Secretary of Defense Les Aspin denied it. This decision would come back to haunt Aspin in just a few days.

On October 3, 1993, the Rangers attempted to capture two of Aidid’s top lieutenants in Mogadishu, but the operation ran into difficulties leading to the downing of two Black Hawk helicopters and an urban firefight between Somali militiamen and the Americans. The Somalis repeatedly attempted to overrun the American positions, sometimes using civilians to shield the militiamen. In the ensuing melee, 18 US soldiers were killed, and the same TV sets now showed grisly images of one of their naked bodies dragged through the streets to the jeers of onlookers. It is unclear how many Somalis died in the battle, but estimates range from about 300 to over 1,000. Many of these deaths were of civilian shields that the American soldiers had to fire upon in order to get through to the militiamen. The U.S. forces, however, succeeded in their mission and captured three of Aidid’s top lieutenants among over 20 other supporters.
The responsibility for the tactical disaster lay squarely with the Department of Defense, which had inadequate intelligence, had sent unprotected helicopters into a war zone, had no ground troops nearby that could intervene if the operation went south, and had denied the request for reinforcements. Clinton immediately ordered a stop to all military action against Aidid and even though he beefed up the military presence in Somalia, it was only a short-term measure designed to enhance their defensive capabilities. On October 7, the President announced that American troops would be fully withdrawn from Somalia by the end of March 1994. The administration sent representatives to open negotiations with Aidid, and in December Les Aspin took all the blame for refusing to authorize armored vehicles and gunships in support of the original mission, and resigned.

Aidid’s defiance of both the U.N. and the U.S., whose repeated failures to capture him had only resulted in hostility to their presence, was amply rewarded. The General’s prestige soared when Clinton assented to his demand for a “Somali-based political settlement,” meaning the complete withdrawal of foreign forces. The U.S. completed its pullout before the self-imposed deadline in 1994, and within a year all remaining 20,000 U.N. troops left Somalia as well. The General did not live long enough to enjoy the fruits of his victory: on August 1 1995, he died from wounds sustained in a fight in Mogadishu.

The termination of the mission in Somalia, however, had wider and long-lasting repercussions for the U.S. because Clinton’s behavior was interpreted as a headlong retreat in the face of essentially negligible losses. The Somali fiasco would be used as an example of how easy it was to push the U.S. around despite its apparent military might. The public pressure—which had initially prompted the humanitarian intervention—had too readily swung to the other extreme after the Battle of Mogadishu, clamoring for immediate withdrawal.¹ Clinton himself soured on nation-building, at least in places as remote as Somalia. Both the public and the administration became aware of how easy it was in these strife-torn places for factions to bite the hand that fed them without much concern about the humanitarian consequences of doing so.

The political fallout from this failure also haunted the administration’s foreign policy, which now became excessively concerned with avoiding U.S. casualties. All of this could not but reward extremist opponents, especially the members of rising terrorist organizations. From their position of distinct military inferiority it would have been exceptionally difficult to attract followers for a hopeless fight against America. But what if America had no stomach for a fight? What if killing a handful of American soldiers panicked the nation and compelled its administration to abandon the policies that caused them? The future looked much brighter then.

Moreover, in the wake of the chaotic U.S. (and U.N.) withdrawal, the lawless

¹Some of this was no doubt resentment at the sight of women and children dancing on top of the burned out hulk of an American helicopter. After all, it was these innocent civilians that the U.S. troops had been trying to help.
region fell easy prey to Islamic extremists who proved to be the only ones capable of suppressing some of the violence and providing some services. The example of Somalia would wind up in the mythology constructed by the likes of Osama bin Laden, where it joined the other fairy tale, in which a handful of intrepid Arab fighters helped the Afghan guerrillas defeat the Soviet superpower in Afghanistan. Now, a handful of militiamen armed with AK-47s had defeated the American superpower in Somalia. Bin Laden, in fact, claimed some credit for Mogadishu although the evidence clearly shows he had nothing to do with it. (More on that later.)

2 Inaction in Rwanda

Given the complete turn-about of American policy in Africa after Somalia, it is not difficult to see a connection between that and the tragic events that now unfolded in Rwanda. The genocide there began on April 7, 1994, less than two weeks after the last U.S. troops left Somalia. In Rwanda, members of the extremist informal Hutu organization, the akazu, held many of the important positions of authority in the government, and did not wish to share political power with the minority Tutsi, who had collaborated with the Belgian colonial administration. In the wake of decolonization, the Hutu and the Tutsi fought for dominance in Rwanda and Burundi, with over 200,000 Hutus perishing under extremist Tutsi rulers in Burundi. After Tutsi officers assassinated the democratically elected president of Burundi in 1993, violence broke out against, causing an estimated 25,000 deaths on each side. In Rwanda, the Hutu had taken power in 1962 but they had repressed the Tutsi, causing some to flee to neighboring countries, where they plotted to bring down the government. The Tutsi rebels launched an attack on Rwanda in 1990, and the fighting that followed led directly to the 1994 genocide.

In early 1993, the Hutu extremists compiled lists of moderate Hutus, whom they considered traitors, they planned to kill. They imported large numbers of machetes, saws, scissors, and razor blades, which they distributed around the countryside. When the Tutsi assassinated the Burundian president, a wave of anger and fear swept the Hutu population: it was all too easy now to paint all Tutsis as enemies of the Hutus. The akazu realized that they could use this temporary situation to their advantage and armed militia groups with automatic weapons. The commander of the U.N. mission in Rwanda got wind of akazu plans to kill Belgian members of the mission and register all Tutsi in the capital. Since the mission had been established in October 1993 with the consent of both warring parties, Kofi Annan decided that there was no authority to do anything that could be interpreted as playing favorites with one of them.

On April 6, 1994 the presidents of both Rwanda and Burundi were killed when their plane was shot down near the Rwandan capital. Although blamed on the Tutsi at the time, subsequent investigation suggests that it was the extremists Hutu
who were responsible for the murder. This set the *akazu* plans into motion. The Rwandan Prime Minister was killed along with his escort of 10 Belgian soldiers, and everyone on the list of “traitors” was assassinated over night. The *akazu* then implemented the rest of their “final solution,” which was to exterminate the entire Tutsi population of Rwanda. Using the rallying cry that blamed the Tutsi for the death of the president, military officers of the *akazu* ordered Hutu communities to kill every Tutsi they could lay their hands on, including babies.

Aside from the Tutsi rebels, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), there was no organized opposition to the slaughter, and in the first six weeks alone about 800,000 Rwandans, the vast majority Tutsi but also Hutu who “looked” like Tutsi or who were suspected of sympathizing with them, were exterminated. The killings spared no one, but Tutsi women had even more suffering in store for them as the Hutu turned to rape as a weapon. Rape was exceptionally brutal and extraordinarily widespread, and the perpetrators were both military and civilians, sometimes assisted by Hutu women. The Hutu extremists released hundreds of AIDS patients from hospitals and turned them into rape squads. Sexual mutilation after the rape also became common. By the end of April, the killings in the *akazu* heartlands stopped because all Tutsi there had been eliminated. The RPF, however, steadily advanced in the north and in the east, ending the genocide in the areas it captured. Half a million Hutu fled from the occupied areas in fear of retribution.

Although the RPF did conduct some reprisals, its main goal was to overthrow the genocidal regime and assume control of government. By late June, the RPF was close to total victory, having cornered the extremist Hutu in the south-west corner of the country. At this point (June 19), the French government announced its intention to intervene and organize a “safe zone” to protect...the extremist Hutu.

France had been providing military and diplomatic support to the Hutu government for a decade, and this included an intervention in 1990 that had saved it from the RPF. Although ostensibly meant to “maintain a presence pending the arrival of the expanded UNAMIR [U.N. mission in Rwanda]” for the security of refugees, the French-led U.N. force was quickly compromised when the perpetrators of the genocide welcomed it but then continued to kill all Tutsi who dared come out of hiding. The RPF had not forgotten the French role in 1990 and did not halt its advance until the safe-zone had shrunk enough. It took the capital on July 4, and completed its conquest of the country by the end of the month.

Confirmed news of the genocide came out as early as April 9, when Polish U.N. observers witnessed the slaughter of over 100 Tutsi in a church in the capital. They contacted the commander of the UNAMIR forces with a request to send some nearby troops but the request was denied with the explanation that such incidents were occurring all over the city and it was not possible to react to all of them. It was, however, quite possible for over 1,000 heavily armed European troops to show up on the same day and escort all European civilians out of the country. They did not stay to help UNAMIR, not that the U.N. forces were going to do anything.
In fact, on April 11, the Belgian soldiers abandoned thousands of civilians at the Official Technical School where the Belgian UNAMIR had been stationed. Following their withdrawal, the Hutu militia stormed the school and killed everyone. The only actions UNAMIR took involved numerous attempts to establish a cease-fire, all of which were rejected by the RPF, which refused to end the fighting while the killings continued. It was this persistence by the RPF that enabled at least some Tutsi to survive.

Fresh from its debacle in Somalia, the U.S. stood by and supported the UNSC Resolution that authorized the French-led intervention in the summer. Even though he vigorously defended his decision to withdraw from Somalia at the time, Clinton would later say that the failure to intervene in Rwanda was the greatest policy blunder of his presidency.²

The final toll is horrifying. On the eve of the genocide, Rwanda had 7.3 million people, of whom about 1.1 million were Tutsi. The slaughter took the lives of nearly 1.2 million people, of whom over 800,000 were Tutsi, in just 100 days.

It is important to realize that even though the genocide that is often portrayed as if it was perpetrated along ethnic lines with neighbor suddenly turning on neighbor in an orgy of violence, the reality was quite different. The genocide was not spontaneous — it had been organized by the akazu over more than a year — and was planned (as the kill lists of prominent Tutsi and moderate Hutu showed). The violence was not perpetrated by Hutus in general but by the police, the Presidential Guard, the Hutu army, and the Interahamwe militias that had been created, armed, and trained by the akazu. The militias, which fielded about 50,000 men, had criminals, football hooligans, and assorted thugs at their core, and once the killings began they were joined by large numbers of the extremely poor seeking loot and revenge on the more prosperous. Loot, in fact, was a great motivator for many to join. While it is not easy to establish just how many people took part in the massacres, the victorious Tutsi immediately imprisoned about 33,000 on related charges, and that number was later expanded to 125,000. The upper bound on the total has been estimated at about 200,000.³

This is an extraordinarily high number but one must bear in mind two things. The army, the Presidential Guard, the police, and the extremist militia gangs would account for about 120,000 (under the leadership of about 700 elite Hutu). These were the hardcore killers who perpetrated most of the violence. (If each of them murdered 1 person every 10 days, then they could account for 1.2 million victims

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over the 100 days period.) Perhaps more relevant is the fact that even at the upper bound, the genocidal group would constitute about 8% of the adult Hutu population. In other words, 92% of Hutus did not take part in the killings, which implies that the ethnic-based explanation for the genocide is just a myth. Unfortunately, it was a myth that was at the root of the failure to intervene here, and it would be a myth that would keep Europe and the U.S. on the sidelines when violence escalated in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3 Intervention in Haiti

American coercive involvement in Haiti can be traced back to September 1991, when a military coup ousted the democratically elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Following U.N. sanctions on oil sales to Haiti and mounting diplomatic pressure from the Organization of American States (OAS), the leader of the military junta, General Raoul Cedras, struck a deal with Aristide in July. The former president would be allowed to return by the end of October 1993, the junta would be pardoned, the Haitian army modernized, and a new police force formed. Violence in Haiti continued unabated and soon the U.S. began to suspect that the junta was not going to uphold its end of the bargain. Clinton, however, decided to go ahead as if Aristide was going to return as per agreement. In October, he dispatched a military ship with 200 U.S. and Canadian army engineers and military police on a joint peace-keeping mission whose purpose was to ensure the safe arrival of Aristide. On the 11th, barely a week following the well-publicized Mogadishu debacle, the ship arrived in Port-au-Prince, where it was met by an angry mob that yelled how it was going to make this another Somalia. Unwilling to take any risks, the ship turned back the following day, cementing the perception of Clinton’s foreign policy as falling in tatters.

In part because of this public image disaster and in part because impotence in the Caribbean would be intolerable, Clinton’s administration increased pressure on Cedras but the general would not budge. UNSC imposed a naval blockade on Haiti while the U.S. threatened intervention in an attempt to coerce the junta to give up power. After trying economic sanctions with no effect, Clinton finally resolved to remove Cedras by force. On July 31, 1994, the UNSC passed Resolution 940, the first ever authorizing the use of force to restore democracy in a member state. It provided for a 6-months U.N. mandate to maintain order, followed by the reinstatement of the Aristide government. The 25,000-strong invasion force, backed by two aircraft carriers and extensive air support, assembled in early September for Operation Uphold Democracy. On the 17th, Jimmy Carter and Colin Powell launched a last-ditch diplomatic effort to keep the peace. As the negotiations dragged on, the operation was launched on schedule on September 19, fully prepared to execute a frontal assault on Haiti. With military invasion imminent, Cedras capitulated.
to avoid the bloodshed. When he agreed to relinquish power, the invasion force was converted en route into a peacekeeping mission, and the commanding general became a diplomat. Aristide returned to Haiti on October 15.

The invasion-cum-peacekeeping force restored Aristide to power, disarmed the army that had supported the coup and the paramilitary groups that had terrorized Haiti, stabilized the country, and trained the new police force to maintain security. The operation was transferred to UNMIH (United Nations Mission in Haiti) command on March 31, 1995, which deployed 6,000 peacekeepers. In December of the same year a new president, René Préval, was elected in free and fair elections, and a peaceful transfer of power occurred on February 7, 1996. Democracy had been returned to Haiti, and Clinton referred to this mission as “remarkable success.”

Unfortunately, this proved to be only a passing optimistic interlude as the country descended into poverty and chaos. With unemployment reaching the unbelievable 60%, most foreign investment collapsed, and the barely functioning government could not even pass legislation to absorb the aid that was trying to make it into the country. The U.S. soon lost its appetite for nation-building, and by 2000 the island was abandoned to its fate and at the mercy of the warring factions.

In November of that year, Aristide won the presidential elections, in which the opposition had refused to participate. He failed to stabilize the country and violence escalated as his supporters attempted to suppress the opposition. This triggered a rebellion in 2004, Aristide was forced into exile, and the U.N. again stationed peacekeepers in Haiti. The 2006 elections brought Préval back to power, and the U.S. engaged in a sustained effort to prevent Aristide from going back to Haiti.

The country has been buffeted by several tropical storms resulting in loss of life and burgeoning humanitarian problem. In 2010, the problem turned into disaster when Haiti was struck by a magnitude-7.0 earthquake — which killed an estimated 85,000 and displaced over 1.5 million — and the government’s inept relief policies.

4 Terrorism and al Qaeda

We shall explore this topic in quite a bit of detail when we study the emergence of the Islamic jihadist movement. For now, a brief summary will suffice. Clinton’s tenure saw an escalation of Islamic attacks, most somehow connected to al Qaeda, on U.S. interests both here and abroad. There were bombings of the World Trade Center in New York (February 26, 1993, Islamic terrorists, possibly linked to al Qaeda), the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia (June 25, 1996, Hezbollah, possibly assisted by Iran and al Qaeda), the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya (August 7, 1998, al Qaeda), and the USS Cole in Yemen (October 12, 2000, al Qaeda). On August 20, 1998, the administration responded to the embassy bombings by launching missile strikes against al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and a suspected chemical plant in Sudan (which turned out to have no links to terrorists). This, the
freeze on bin Laden’s assets in the U.S., and a $5 million bounty on his head, was as far as this administration would go. The President, mired in domestic scandals about his sexual escapades and possibly illegal deals with Chinese interests that had contributed to his election campaign, was too distracted to do anything.

5 The Problem of Iraq

We shall explore this topic in detail when we study the 2001 invasion of Iraq. For now, a brief summary will suffice. The hopes of the Bush administration that Hussein will be toppled internally were dashed despite risings of the Shi’ites, the Kurds, the normally loyal Sunni, and numerous assassination attempts on his life. Without a compelling reason to remove the regime by direct action, the U.S. government settled on containing him while maintaining a comprehensive sanctions regime to put pressure on Iraq. When it came to hurting Iraq’s economy, the sanctions had the desired effect. When it came to undermining Hussein’s rule, however, they proved far less consequential. Hussein even attempted to assassinate former president Bush in 1993. Clinton responded with “aggressive containment” (which involved retaliatory strikes on intelligence and military targets in Iraq), and eventually evolved a policy of “dual containment” of Iraq and Iran (instead of relying on Iraq to contain Iran). The U.S. government also discovered that Hussein had continued the secret development of WMDs, and there ensued a game of cat and mouse with the U.S. pressing for inspections, and Hussein frustrating all attempts at making a complete inventory of its military programs. It was not until high-ranking defectors revealed details of these programs that Iraq could be declared in material breach of the ceasefire resolutions. Hussein continued to stall, and the UNSC consensus began to wobble because of tempting commercial interests in Iraq, and the humanitarian toll of the sanctions. Only Britain remained a staunch ally to the U.S., and the other three members even condemned the military buildup the U.S. initiated to compel Hussein to allow unrestricted access to inspectors. For his part, the dictator feared that the inspectors were American spies and would undermine his regime from within. Congress eventually passed the “Iraq Liberation Act”, and in December of 1998 Clinton announced that it would be U.S. policy to topple Hussein’s regime. Containment had become regime change, but for the remainder of the Clinton presidency, the U.S. government simply held the line on Iraq. The outgoing administration bequeathed a festering problem to incoming President Bush. Containment had failed: the regional allies would not support military action, the UNSC had split and would not authorize the use of force, the sanctions regime was in ruins, smuggling had given Saddam a new lease on life, the inspectors had not returned, the internal opposition had collapsed, the Kurds were in disarray, the covert activities programs had been aborted, and the dictator was ensconced in Baghdad, seemingly able to survive any challenge. The new administration would somehow
have to magically rebuild the consensus to contain Saddam — a tall order given a
decade of failures in that regard — or face the unpleasant choice between leaving
him to his own devices or undertaking the aggressive option of regime change.

6 NATO and Russia

Although NATO never fired a shot in anger during the Cold War, it had been a
great boon to Western Europe. Ostensibly created merely to enhance American
commitment to the defense of Europe against the Soviet Union, the alliance had
served two very useful purposes beyond deterrence: it had allowed the Europeans
to free-ride on American military power, and it had spared them potentially divisive
decisions about foreign policy. Thus, for decades European governments were able
to redirect much of their spending to social programs instead of defense, which in
turn had prevented either Germany or France to become too threatening militarily
to its neighbor.

Under the American security umbrella and with American encouragement, Eu-
ropean integration had proceeded apace, resulting in the formation of the European
Union in 1993, and in the introduction of a common currency in 2002. As of 2014,
the EU comprises 28 states, encompassing almost all of Europe. Its population of
about 505 million exceeds that of the United States by nearly 60% (only China
and India have larger populations). Its GDP of $16.26 trillion is very close to U.S.’s
$16.80 trillion (although its larger population means that per capita the EU is far be-
hind the US: $32,198 to $52,829). The EU’s military spending in 2013 was €192.5
billion (about $258 billion), which is exceeded only by the American defense bud-
get of about $640 billion. Coordination among the members, however, has been
especially troublesome in security matters. This is partly by design and has to do
with the role NATO plays in Europe.

When the collapse of the Soviet Union deprived NATO of its principal opponent,
some analysts wondered whether the alliance had to disband now that it had lost its
purpose. While Russia did not present a threat on the Soviet order and was in such
depth economic distress that it looked (at least for a while) that had it not been for its
possession of nuclear weapons, it might have slipped from the ranks of great powers
altogether, NATO’s cohesive role in Europe was untouched by the end of the Cold
War. Unified Germany soon emerged as the dominant economy in Europe and the
economic engine of the EU. If Germany had to provide for its defense on its own,
this potential could be converted into military power that would come to threaten
its neighbors and perhaps even Russia. As Russia recovered, it could similarly be-
come threatening to its neighbors, especially the former republics, particularly if
democratic institutions failed to take hold and Moscow reverted to its authoritar-
ian traditions. With Germany and Russia resurgent, the Central European states —
especially Poland and Hungary — would have to build up their own independent
militaries. With tensions simmering in various parts of Europe and violence having established a precarious balance in the Balkans, the continent could see arms races, instability, and a slide to yet another catastrophe. NATO could fill the power vacuum left by the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact and keep Europe far less militarized than it could be. Doing so, however, required extending its security guarantees to states formerly part of the Soviet Union or members of the Soviet bloc. Any penetration of NATO east of the Iron Curtain, however, was bound to elicit the vehement opposition of the Russians.

As of 2014, NATO has 28 members, of which 21 are also members of the European Union. Twelve of these were added after the 1990 German unification, all of them in Eastern Europe.